The charge of collusion with the Austrians which we have examined and discussed in connection with the siege of Vienna we here dismiss as being supported by very insufficient data. What had Ibrahim to gain by accepting money or position from Charles? Could the latter give him the half of what Suleiman lavished on him? The similar charge made by Iskender Chelebi when at the gallows, that Ibrahim had been induced by Persian gold to plan the assassination of the sultan falls to the ground for the following reasons; lack of any other witness than Iskender[202] and the discredit that attaches to a witness who was the vizir’s fiercest and most desperate enemy, together with the fact that the Persians could offer Ibrahim nothing commensurate with his wealth and power as grand vizir.
I think then we may definitely put aside the charges of his being bought with either Persian or Austrian gold. But the most serious charge remains. Did he aspire to overthrow his master, and himself become sultan? Again our sources are silent or ambiguous. Let us inquire of the Turkish historians. “He fell into the net of the imagination of kingship and power,”[203] says Osmanzadeh, which might mean no more than the megalomania of which he gave so many signs. Sadullah Saïd Effendi expresses himself with an equal vagueness: “Perhaps Ibrahim was caught in the net of the thought of partnership of the empire.”[204] Petchevi makes no charge. Solakzadeh and Abdurrahman Sheref consider Ibrahim’s death a just punishment for his treatment of Iskender, but prefer no severe charge.[205] The Venetians make no accusation beyond the very vague one that “he loved himself better than he did his lord, and wished to be alone in the dominion of the world in which he was much respected.”[206]
Guillaume Postel takes up some of the accusations against Ibrahim and treats them as follows: The accusations were: 1st. Complicity with the defterdar in looting. This Postel accepts, telling how Ibrahim had looted wherever he had marched. 2nd. His being a Christian, which we need not consider further here. 3rd. An understanding with the Emperor. 4th. An understanding with the Shah of Persia. 5th. A desire to be sultan. 6th. A desire to raise Mustafa, Suleiman’s son, to the throne. Postel says that Ibrahim certainly had no understanding with the emperor, as is proved by the fact that the latter did not use the unexampled opportunity of the Persian war to invade Turkey, an argument which seems to us strong. To this he adds the weak argument that Ibrahim could not bear to hear the emperor spoken of. The charge of an understanding with the shah was based on the early losses in the Persian campaign which Postel disposes of as not being the fault of Ibrahim. The charge of wishing Mustafa on the throne is baseless and unreasonable, as the grand vizir could certainly not gain by a change of masters. As to the charge of wishing to be sultan, Postel dismisses that with the single argument that it was a much too dangerous to attempt.
In the absence of any data inculpating Ibrahim of desiring the throne, we are confined to probabilities. That he loved power and became very ambitious must be recognized. Whether he were mad enough to think he could replace Suleiman on the throne which until this day has never been held by any other than a member of the family of Othman, and that he could hold such a position in the face of an enraged public, Mohammedan to the core as to its army and priesthood; whether he could have so far lost his judgment as to conceive that, Christian slave as he was, he could possibly be in a more advantageous position than the one he already held by the grace of Suleiman, we cannot answer except by the fact that in public affairs his brain was still cool and clear. How far, if at all, he was unfaithful to his master and friend is buried with him in the convent at Galata.
Ibrahim Pasha’s brilliant career was closed. What were the achievements of his thirteen years of power? He had carried the Turkish arms to the gates of Vienna in the west and to Bagdad and Tebriz in the east, and his almost uniformly successful generalship had added to the great renown in which the Ottoman army was held. Sometimes alone, and sometimes under the sultan, he had shown himself an able strategist, and fearless soldier. He had established diplomatic relations with Europe, one of his last acts being the first treaty with the French, and in diplomacy he had shown himself intelligent, true to Suleiman’s interests, and strong if not subtle. As an administrator, his brief power in Egypt was used wisely, and his governorship of Roumelie was able and strong, if not rising in a marked degree above the standards of his day. He was possessed of dignity, impressiveness of manner, and a magnificence in which he vied with his imperial master. He certainly had cared for his own interests, obtaining enormous wealth and power, but that he had ever neglected his master’s interests is unproved, and many times he showed himself loyal rather than venal.
Ibrahim’s importance in Turkish history lies partly in the great diplomatic changes and the conquests which he achieved together with Suleiman, and partly in the fact that he was the first grand vizir taken from the people who exercised much power, and that with him began the rule of vizirs and favorites which became a very important fact in later Turkish history. While we recognize the danger of such rule, yet we also feel that Turkey had a better chance under such men of ability as Mehmet Sokolli Pasha and the Kiuprelli vizirs than under the chance sultans of the Ottoman family, which has produced few great rulers since Suleiman the Magnificent.
To western students the interest in Ibrahim’s history lies not only in his bringing Turkey into friendly contact with Europe, but perhaps more in the very perfect and highly developed illustration he affords of the curious anomalies, the romantic possibilities, the strangeness of Turkish rule, as well as in the light that his career throws on European rulers and armies of the same century.