To one person at least, this literary performance was a serious matter. In the promotion of it, John Brown was deeply, deadly in earnest. The statement that "Forbes and not Brown, was the author of the tract"[276] is not correct, and to characterize the paper as Forbes's attempt to seduce the soldiery of the Union,[277] is equally misleading. The scheme originated with Brown; he furnished the subject. To Forbes he assigned the duty of preparing the text for publication. Writing to Rev. Theodore Parker, from Boston, March 7, 1858, he said:
... I want you to undertake to provide a substitute for an address you saw last season, directed to the officers and soldiers of the United States Army. The ideas contained in that address I, of course, like for I furnished the skeleton. I never had the ability to clothe those ideas in language at all, to satisfy myself.... In the first place it must be short or it will not be generally read. It must be in the simplest or plainest language, without the least affectation of the scholar about it, and yet be worded with great clearness and power.... The address should be appropriate, and particularly adapted to the peculiar circumstances we anticipate, and should look to the actual change of service from that of Satan to the service of God. It should be in short, a most earnest and powerful appeal to men's sense of right and to their feelings of humanity. Soldiers are men, and no man can certainly calculate the value and importance of getting a single "nail into old Captain Kidd's chest." It should be provided beforehand, and be ready in advance to distribute by all persons, male and female, who may be disposed to favor the right.... Now, my dear sir, I have told you about as well as I know how, what I am anxious at once to secure. Will you write the tracts, or get them written, so that I may commence colporteur?[278]
There can be no doubt that Brown placed a high estimate upon the value of this tract, but we know from the postscript thereto, that, although the tract was dedicated to the "Officers and Soldiers" of the army, it was the "common soldier" that he hoped to arouse and incite. His effort to convert the army to his service, by means of a tract, may be called madness, but it may also be said there was "method" in the madness. If he had been criticised in relation to this matter, he would probably have said in reply what he said to Mr. Sanborn, defending his action in ordering the thousand spears: "Wise men may ridicule the idea; but I take the whole responsibility of that job;" which was equivalent to saying: "You do not comprehend the scope of my scheme, or the use which I intend to make of these spears. When they have accomplished their silent but deadly work, the wisdom of my conduct concerning them will appear." The trouble in this case was how to obtain an opportunity to inject the virus of revolt into the ranks of the army—how to start the contagion—how to get his proposition before the troops, and to explain what he intended to do; and what he would have at his disposal to offer in the way of rewards for services in his army, without putting himself and his plans in peril. How he intended to use the tract can only be surmised. But the fact remains that he had to begin this all important move somehow or somewhere, and the tract was, probably, evolved from his inner consciousness to meet that necessity. It may therefore be assumed that, under cover of discussing the generalities contained in the tract, Brown hoped to make acquaintances among the enlisted men of the army in whom he could confide, and who would serve his purpose by fomenting the revolt.
In projecting his campaign, Brown was a law unto himself, untrammelled by the accepted usages of war. The excess of his ardor and enthusiasm led him to believe that he could corrupt the rank and file of the army. In his philosophy, the daring, dangerous, adventurous men who largely composed the enlisted men of the army at that time, having no hope of promotion in the service, would become eager listeners to his proposal. Before them, he would throw open the storehouses of his prospective empire, that they might behold the volume of his treasures, and select that which they desired. His army was to be created; he had the men in view—the slaves whom he would set free—but not the officers to command them. If the enlisted men would desert from their service singly or en masse, and thus temporarily paralyze the United States forces, and join him, they could immediately become commissioned officers in his army and share with him the honors, the booty, and the beauty of the rich country he intended to ravage. By means of these "mighty and soul satisfying rewards" he hoped to "seduce the soldiery of the Union." The campaign of education was a stratagem.
It is not apparent that Forbes, at any time, showed a desire to quit Brown's service, or any disinclination to follow him westward. It is true that he was in arrears at one time with his literary work, but that was due to an incidental diversion of his activities in other directions—soliciting contributions and collecting money from various benevolent persons, including Mr. Greeley and Mr. Gerrit Smith. Forbes also had been making necessary arrangements for the comfort of his family—a wife and a daughter. The former being in Paris, and the latter in New York, he wisely decided, in view of the character of the pending military operations, to have the latter return to the care of her mother. Brown, who was paying the price, required results rather than explanations. It appears that Forbes had not prepared the "Manual" within the time in which he had led his impetuous chief to believe it would be forthcoming; and this had aroused an unwarranted suspicion in his mind that his subordinate was lagging. It is also true that Forbes had been indiscreet from a "military" point of view. He had talked, as one having authority, or knowingly, about the situation in Kansas, and had committed the very serious mistake of expressing a doubt that their services would be needed there before winter, which would have a tendency to discourage contributions to the "cause of freedom." In addition to all this, Brown became suspicious that the "Colonel" was ambitious, and aspired to supersede him in command; or, it may be that he became jealous because of his subordinate's brilliant accomplishments—his "military bearing" and qualifications. Mr. Sanborn confirmed Brown's distrust of him. He says that "Forbes was ambitious and apparently desirous of taking Brown's place in command." It may, however, be nearer the truth to assume that the depleted condition of the exchequer had much to do with Brown's "dissatisfaction" with Forbes.
There is no apparent reason why Forbes should have preceded Brown into Kansas, and the fact that he arrived at Tabor August 9th, two days after the arrival of his chief, is proof of commendable alacrity on his part to take up and continue his duties. Besides, Forbes brought with him copies of the "Manual," and copies of Brown's specialty: "The Duty of the Soldier." With these evidences of his ability, fidelity, and loyalty, the shadows of distrust were all dispelled, and Forbes's restoration to Brown's confidence and favor resulted immediately. The next day Brown was in a hopeful mood, and wrote very encouragingly to Mr. Stearns, sending him copies of the tracts and, incidentally, impressing upon his attention the important fact that he was "in immediate want of Five Hundred to One Thousand Dollars for secret service and no questions asked."
There can be no doubt that in their poverty, but dreaming of the splendors of war, of marching armies, and the possibilities of empire, these two bankrupt but hopeful speculators in destiny gazed wistfully upon the order for the seven thousand dollars that Stearns had given to Brown after his "Farewell to the Plymouth Rocks" effort. The question was, how to get some of it. Unfortunately for their purpose, Mars was not doing a thing for them; they were unable to detect even so much as a trace of a war-cloud upon the Kansas sky; and the $7,000 could only be used for the subsistence of the make-believe troopers when in "active service." Under these circumstances they did the best they could; they made as much as possible out of nothing. They wrote Mr. Stearns what he already knew; that there was no fighting in Kansas "just then"; and, that while "Rather interesting times were expected, no great excitement is reported." But "Our next advices may entirely change the aspect of things." From this, Mr. Stearns was to be led to infer that imminent danger to the Free-State cause was lurking somewhere, and that the sagacious leader was already upon the trail of it. Also, the hope that Brown earnestly expressed that the "Friends of Freedom" would respond to his call and "prove me now herewith," was intended to move Mr. Stearns to authorize Brown to draw upon him for a part of the seven thousand dollars for their immediate necessities. But, although the request was wisely framed and neatly but urgently pressed, it failed to raise any money. To Theodore Parker Brown wrote September 11th:[279]
My dear Sir: Please find on other side, first number of a series of tracts lately gotten up here. I need not say I did not prepare it; but I would be glad to know what you think of it, and much obliged for any suggestions you see proper to make. My particular object in writing is to say, that I am in immediate want of some five hundred or one thousand dollars for secret service, and no questions asked. I want the friends of freedom to "prove me now herewith."... Have no news to send by letter.
Stranded at Tabor, without means to go anywhere, or with which to do anything, the two leaders of the revolution had abundant leisure to compare their respective plans of operation, and their views upon methods of procedure, as well as to formulate and agree upon final plans for the invasion and conquest. Forbes, later, disclaimed any intention to participate in "Brown's" purpose to overthrow the State Governments, and establish a provisional government; but that disclaimer came as an incident in his effort to supersede Brown, after his name had been dropped from the muster and pay-roll. November 1st, the financial embargo was raised by the receipt of two hundred and fifty dollars: one hundred and fifty from Lane, and one hundred from Mr. Adair. It was not a large sum of money, when compared with the expenses usually incurred in "mobilizing" even a small army, or, as compared with the magnitude of the operations they intended to inaugurate; but it was large enough to enable the filibusters to start doing something.