SIGNS OF WEAKENING.
By this time the Indians began to realize the magnitude of the power they were contending with, and to show signs of weakening. No extensive campaign was found necessary along the river for a number of years, although many of the Indians continued hostile and committed numerous depredations. The termination of the Civil War, with complete victory for the government, and the release of so many soldiers from Southern fields who could now be sent to the frontier, all tended to make the Indians proceed in their schemes of war with greater caution and hesitation. Could the evils of our Indian system have been corrected the tribes might readily have been brought to terms of “lasting peace,” which was so confidently predicted at the time by Indian agents and even by some military officers.
In this matter of the military conquest of the Missouri Valley, as in that treated in the last chapter, it is not possible, with our present space, to follow in detail the course of events during the next twelve years. The army made some new advances every year, not only in the Missouri Valley, but throughout the entire West. Campaigns, battles, and some appalling massacres occurred, and the soldiers became as familiar with the country and as expert in savage methods of warfare as the Indian himself. Finally, in 1875–77, came the last act in the great tragedy, by which the power of the Sioux nation was broken and their career as an independent people brought to an end.
NON-TREATY SIOUX.
Great efforts had been made for several years to reduce the Sioux tribes, by peaceable methods, to life on the reservations. Several government commissions were sent to them, and one in particular, of which General Sherman was a member, went into the whole matter with the greatest possible care. Most of the Sioux were finally located on the reservations and appeared to be peaceably disposed. But there were some exceptions, estimated to number not more than six or eight hundred warriors, who had persistently refused from the first to recognize in any way the treaties or other arrangements with the government. The agents had failed to get them to quiet down on the reservations, and they continued to roam over the country as of old, subsisting upon the fruits of the chase. They were uncompromisingly hostile to the whites and their Indian allies, and committed outrages without number upon both. Finally the Indian Department served notice upon them that unless they settled down on the reservations before January 31, 1876, they would be turned over to the military authorities and be dealt with by force. The Indians paid no attention to this ultimatum, and their case was accordingly placed in the hands of the army.
CAMPAIGN OF 1876.
An effort was made to reach these Indians by a winter campaign, but after one attempt, which ended in a battle of no decisive results, the scheme was abandoned, because the excessive cold made it impossible to conduct operations in that shelterless country. General Sheridan, who was charged with the conduct of this important business, thereupon planned a campaign which was to be carried out as soon as the season would permit. He determined upon a concentric movement by which bodies of troops from widely separated localities should move upon a given section where it was believed that the hostile band would be found. General Crook was to start from Fort Fetterman, on the Platte, and move north; General Terry from Fort Abraham Lincoln, on the Missouri, and move west; and General Gibbon from Fort Ellis, in western Montana, and move east. The point of rendezvous was to be in the Yellowstone Valley near the mouth of the Powder River, or wherever in that vicinity further development might indicate. General Crook left Fort Fetterman May 29 with about 1000 men; General Terry left Fort Lincoln May 17 with about 1000 men, sending his supplies around into the Yellowstone by steamboat. General Gibbon, with 450 men, left Fort Ellis on the 1st of April, crossed over to the Yellowstone, and marched down the left bank of that stream.
ERRONEOUS ESTIMATES.
Up to this time all obtainable evidence indicated that the hostile Indians did not number more than 800 warriors. As a matter of fact, discontented Indians from nearly all the surrounding Sioux and Cheyenne agencies had for some time past been leaving the reservations and going to the hostiles, until the latter had gathered a force of not less than 2500 men. It was against this force, more than three times as large as was supposed, that the joint movement of Generals Terry, Crook, and Gibbon was directed.
General Crook was the first to encounter the Indians. He met and fought them on the head of the Rosebud River June 17, and although the Indians withdrew, the battle was indecisive, and the great number of the Indians, as disclosed by the fight, induced General Crook not to take the risk of going further. He withdrew to the valley of Goose Creek and sent for re-enforcements.