The trace of the walls of Toulouse in 1217-1218 is known throughout most of their length. On the south they left the river at the corner of the present Rue des Renforts, and extended in a fairly regular curve until they struck the line of the present inner boulevards just east of St. Etienne. They then followed, roughly, the Boulevard Lazare Carnot and the Rue Dutemps, divided the capitol and its grounds, and met the river in the neighbourhood of the Place St. Pierre—a circumference of about a mile and three-quarters.
The bits of their foundation which still exist are built in small square stones, with occasional binding courses of brick, in the manner of the later Empire and the Dark Ages. Throughout most of its length the wall is flanked by round towers at the regulation Roman intervals of about seventy yards.
The fortress known as the Château Narbonaise stood near the intersection of the present “Allée St. Michel” with the Rue des Renforts. It was rectangular in plan, of no great extent, with a tower at each corner. Instead of forming a part of the city walls, it stood outside them, commanding them the more easily through being considerably higher. The Porte St. Michel, through which ran the road to Narbonne, pierced the city wall just opposite the castle’s north-western corner, so that the castle dominated it completely.
Within the place the intense local patriotism of the mediæval commune was again blazing high. Everyone worked fiercely, digging ditches and setting up palisades and wooden towers to fill the gaps made in the walls by the recent “demolitions.” Even at night the work was continued by torchlight.
The first party of Crusaders to arrive was commanded by Guy de Montfort, Count Simon’s brother. Dismounting, and cutting off part of the shafts of their lances to make them more manageable in street fighting, the “French” men-at-arms attacked the place. An entrance was forced, but, as in the previous year, the assailants could not maintain themselves in the streets of the town, finding themselves always confronted by new barricades and exposed to a hail of missiles from the houses. Guy and his men ended by taking refuge in the Château.
The Toulousains had fought so savagely that when Count Simon himself appeared and proposed another general assault, Guy and those who had seen the new spirit of the citizens finally persuaded him not to do so. The crusading leader, with all the scorn of a knight of the Middle Ages for townsmen in arms, at first made no preparations for a regular siege, but merely completed his concentration and terraced the walls of the Château Narbonaise with emplacements for catapults to fire upon the works which the Toulousains had thrown up to confront it. But despite this heavy “artillery support,” the attack which he delivered was repulsed with loss, and Guy was wounded. Clearly a regular siege was necessary, and Count Simon called a council of war and resigned himself in sombre anger to listen to the advice of his barons and clergy as to how such an operation might be made good.
Throughout the true Middle Ages it was extremely difficult—in fact, almost impossible—to contain, that is to hold continuous lines all around, one of the first-class cities of the time. The sudden, spontaneous expansion of Christendom, reflected especially in the size of those cities, had been accompanied by no adequate corresponding increase of public powers, and by no system of banking and floating credit. Therefore, it was almost impossible to raise and maintain an army of sufficient size for such an undertaking. Very few mediæval commanders would risk attacking, let alone laying regular siege to, a first-class city. In this case the circumference of the defences to be attacked was over 1,600 yards on the right or east bank alone plus a bridgehead on the left or west bank. In the council of war Bishop Fulk pointed out that it would be useless to blockade the city proper if the bridgehead were not blockaded also. The double task was accordingly undertaken.
Having contained the bridgehead, De Montfort’s main task was to make it as difficult as possible for the city proper, on the right bank, to communicate with the open country. Even if he could not make good his blockade, he might be able to annoy the citizens so much that they would end by surrendering.
Throughout the siege both sides continued to receive reinforcements. The Count of Foix, together with certain Aragonese and Catalans, joined the besieged, so that it was possible to make an active defence with continual sorties. De Montfort’s reinforcements seem to have come in more slowly, and to have consisted mainly of mercenary troops. At first de Montfort himself took station on the left bank opposite the bridgehead, so as to hinder communication between the town and the friendly country to the south-west. Shortly after the arrival of Foix and the Spaniards, he was forced to return to the right bank by a vigorous sortie, against the Chateau Narbonaise, and the entrenched camp of the Crusaders which was growing up around it to the south of the town. Throughout the late autumn continual sharp skirmishing went on south of the town in the space between the walls and the entrenchments of the camp. During the winter the Crusaders attempted a surprise attack at dawn, and broke into the city, but were repulsed with nothing gained. With the spring both sides were reinforced. De Montfort was forced to withdraw the lines of his entrenched camp some distance further from the town, abandoning many of the shelters he had constructed. The besieged thereupon began attacking the Château Narbonaise, when a high flood of the Garonne not only cramped their operation but hindered their communications with their bridgehead so that Count Simon was able, by long and obstinate fighting, to win the bridgehead altogether. Further, with the reinforcements which kept coming in, he was able to extend his entrenched lines from the Château Narbonaise (which stood on the river bank above the town) to a point opposite the great church of St. Sernin. But he could not close the space between St. Sernin and the river bank below the town or prevent the movement of boats on the lower river. Further, while the morale of the besieged was as high as ever, and their defences were always being made stronger, in de Montfort’s camp the strain was beginning to tell. The legate taunted him to madness with his failure to get a decision. Money to pay the numerous mercenaries was running short. In vain Pope Honorius alternately threatened and pleaded with the Kings of France and of Aragon, the Count of Foix, the younger Raymond, the citizens of Toulouse, Avignon, Marseilles, and anyone else who occurred to him. Clearly, either matters must be brought to a head, or the siege raised.
De Montfort was not the man to admit himself beaten. He determined on a decisive assault by means of a large “cat,” a movable wooden gallery with a steep roof covered with raw hides to prevent fire. Under such cover the defences might be approached and sapped. At the first attempt the “cat” was injured by stones from catapults. Strengthened, it was moved forward a second time, “moving with jerky little steps,” as an eye witness reports. Without waiting for it to reach their lines, the besieged began a general sortie. De Montfort himself was at mass when this news was brought to him. “I will not go,” he said, “until I have seen my Saviour.” Not until after the elevation of the Host did he take command. Then he concentrated his men and had driven the Toulousains back to their walls, when a stone from a catapult worked by women struck him on the head. He fell and died in a few minutes, his face all bloody and black where the helm had been driven in upon it. A few days after a final attack was made and repulsed, upon which the siege was raised.