A thousand miles on an elephant in the Shan States

by Holt S. Hallett

“It is further to be noted that the import duties are only 3 per cent ad valorem. If Siam proper were to pass into the hands of any European Power with protectionist tendencies, it cannot be doubted that the tariff would be greatly increased; and it is by no means improbable, if we are to judge by what has been proposed with regard to the trade of Tonquin, that differential duties would be imposed to the disadvantage of British trade.”

After reading this report, it is not surprising to find the late Sir Arthur Phayre, who had been for many years chief commissioner of Burmah, writing to the ‘Times,’ in his letter dated October 12, 1885, that “I beg to add that British interests appear also to require that the King of Siam, so long the friend and ally of the United Kingdom, should be assured of support in the conservation of his independence and of the integrity of his dominions.” No better assurance of support could have been given by us to the King of Siam than the promise of co-operation in the junction of the two countries, Burmah and Siam, by railway. Our trade with Siam would in that case vastly and rapidly expand, our fixed capital in the country would increase, and our railway route to China, which would pass through Northern Siam and its Shan States, would never be allowed to pass into French hands, and the French, knowing this, would cease all thought of further encroaching on the king’s territories.

The strengthening of the French hands in Indo-China by the absorption of Siam would render France a more formidable antagonist, for it would keep a larger army in Indo-China and have a larger recruiting-field for its native auxiliaries. The absorption of Siam by France would place the French frontier within sixty miles of Maulmain; would render the country to the south of Burmah, between it and our Straits Settlements, French territory; would destroy our trade in Siam and its Shan States; stop the recruitment of cattle[^[26]] and elephants from those countries, which are the breeding-grounds for Burmah; would ruin our pedlars, foresters, timber-traders, and other fellow-subjects in Siam; and would block for ever our connection with China by railway.

There seemed to be every reason for making arrangements with Siam for connecting it with Burmah, and continuing the proposed railway to China; and if Sir Arthur Phayre had been still chief commissioner of Burmah, doubtless the advisability of pushing on the railway would have been strongly urged upon the Government. Unfortunately for the extension of our trade in the East, the reins of the province were in the grasp of an official of a different school. In a letter which I have leave to quote, Sir Charles Bernard gave me his reasons, in a very straightforward manner, for opposing the connection of Burmah with Siam by railway. He said: “I demur to the correctness of any statement that I ‘had set my face against our being linked on to Siam.’ I have distinctly and repeatedly said that I would gladly see a railway from Maulmain viâ Raheng to Bangkok and the Yunnan border. And I have repeatedly said that such a railway would do great good to that part of British Burmah, and especially to the port of Maulmain. But I have at the same time said that in my judgment that railway would be too dearly purchased if it involved a guarantee from India to Siam against French aggression. And I have also said that in my belief the railway from Maulmain to Raheng would not pay for many years; also, that there are other railways in Burmah and in India on which money from the Indian Treasury would be more usefully spent than on the Maulmain-Raheng line. If you or any one else can get British Burmah linked by railway to Siam, I shall regard you as benefactors to British Burmah. But, as you are aware, benefits can be bought at too high a price.”

We have seen in Mr Satow’s letter to Earl Granville that the interests of Great Britain in Siam are greater than those of any other nation—and, indeed, than those of the rest of the world combined. We have been warned by him that if Siam is allowed to pass into the hands of any European Power with protectionist tendencies, it would be the death-blow to our commerce in the country. We have seen that the late Sir Arthur Phayre considered British interests in Siam already sufficient to require us to assure the King of Siam of support in his independence, and of the integrity of his dominions.

The connection of Siam with Burmah by railway would certainly increase our stake in Siam by developing British and Indo-Siamese trade; but I fail to see how it would increase the responsibilities of the Government of India. Our trade is not in such a position as to allow us to hand over markets to the French. The Siamese dominions are at present nearly exclusively British markets, and it cannot be expected that the British nation will calmly stand by and see its goods turned out of those markets by our French rivals.

I was glad to find during the discussion of the paper in which I gave an account of my explorations before the Royal Geographical Society, that the India Council, as represented by Colonel (now Sir Henry) Yule, the most eminent authority on Indo-China, did not consider the French bugbear a sufficient reason for blocking the Burmah-Siam-China Railway, and with it, the extension of our commerce in South-eastern Asia. He said: “As to the projects themselves, described in the paper, I cannot now say much, for what I have to say will probably have to be said elsewhere [in the India Council]. I feel the difficulties that beset them—not engineering difficulties, but of quite another kind. Still, I cannot but hope that events which are even now [November 1885] upon the wing [the annexation of Upper Burmah and its Shan States] may help to clear the way for the execution of the projects which Mr Colquhoun had at heart, and on which he and Mr Hallett have expended an amount of thought and energy which I cannot believe will be in vain.”

As to the statement by Sir Charles Bernard, that in his “belief the railway from Maulmain to Raheng would not pay for many years,” that is merely a matter of opinion, and estimates based upon opinions as to the prospective trade that would accrue to projected railways in Burmah have always proved below the mark. The paying prospect of railways in Burmah was officially allowed by the Government of India, in its despatch to the Secretary of State in January 1881, where it stated that—“The great financial success of the Rangoon-Prome Railway (a success almost unprecedented in railway construction in India) has demonstrated that railways in Burmah will, on account of the enterprising character of the people, and the great undeveloped wealth of the country, not only give large indirect returns in land, customs, and forest revenue, but will pay, within a very short period after being opened to traffic, a fair percentage of net income on their capital cost.”

The line to our frontier, besides opening out and developing the country through which it passed, would have the advantage of conveying the traffic to and from the Siamese lines with which it would be connected; and when the line is extended to China, a vast increase of traffic would be ensured. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that when the Siamese railways are constructed, this branch line to our seaport would be the most profitable line in our Indian dominions. It would not be undertaken until the connection between Raheng and Bangkok is completed; and if opened up at the same time as the Siamese section of the branch, it is certain that it would in the first year far more than recoup the Government for the interest upon the outlay for its construction.

Sir Richard Temple, who has administered some of the largest provinces in India, in writing of our proposed line to China, gave his opinion that—“By all the accounts of exploration, also on a consideration of the commercial and political geography, this is the most promising of all the future railway lines that can be devised.” And in comparing our north-western frontier of India with our north-eastern or Burmese frontier, Sir Richard says: “The ways across the north-western frontier, from the British side, lead to nothing profitable for British interests. On the other hand, the ways across the north-eastern frontier lead to regions full of prospective advantage for British commerce and for British expansion in every way.... On our north-western frontier the railways are mainly for strategic or political objects, and only in part for commercial objects. But on this our north-eastern or Indo-Chinese frontier, the railways will be mainly for commerce, for the opening of new markets, for the spread of cultivation and habitation, for material development in every way.” Our system of railways would act like arteries, developing the resources, mineral and agricultural, of all the regions they traversed, and would enable us to throw British goods right into the interior, and bring back in return the produce of Siam and China for shipment at Maulmain.