On July 20th the Japanese Minister sent an ultimatum to the king complaining of the introduction of Chinese troops whose coming was undeniably to protect a dependent state. He gave the king three days to accept Japanese reforms. If within that time he did not accede to them they would be enforced. On the night of the 22nd the king returned an evasive answer and this decided the immediate policy of the Japanese. On the following morning two battalions of Japanese troops, feigning to start out for Asan, turned suddenly and marched on the palace. They met with a certain weak show of resistance at the gates but easily forced their way in and soon had the king in their care. Every member of the Min faction was forthwith driven out and the Prince Tai-wŭn was called in to assume a leading part in the management of the government.
By this time China and Japan were hurrying troops into the peninsula, the former by way of Asan and[and] the latter by Fusan and Chemulpo. On July 21st eleven steamers left Taku for Asan and the mouth of the Yalu with 8,000 troops. Those that came to Asan were ostensibly for the purpose of aiding the government in the putting down of the Tong-hak. The Japanese government was immediately apprised of the departure of the transports from the Peiho and on July 25th the Akitsushima, Yoshino and Naniwa, among the best of the Japanese navy, were ordered from Sasebo to Asan. Two days later at six-thirty they encountered the Chinese men-of-war Tsi-yuen and Kwang-ki in the vicinity of P’ung Island off Asan.
The Japanese were not aware of the sudden turn which affairs had taken in Seoul but the Chinese were, and they expected the Japanese to take the offensive. The Japanese became aware of the situation only when they found the Chinese did not salute and that they were cleared for action. The Japanese speedily put themselves in fighting trim. As the channel narrowed and the vessels came within range the Chinese opened fire and were answered with terrible effect by the Japanese. The Kwang-ki[Kwang-ki] was speedily disabled and beached. The Tsi-yuen, her bow-gun being disabled, withdrew toward Wei-hai-wei. It is disputed as to which side began firing first but it is quite immaterial. The fact that the Chinese knew what had occurred at Seoul, that they were cleared for action and that they failed to salute would seem to throw the burden of proof upon them.
While the Yoshino was pursuing the Tsi yuen, two more ships appeared on the horizon. They proved to be the Chinese dispatch boat Tsao-kiang and the British steamer Kowshing carrying about 1,500 Chinese troops. The Akitsushima took the former in charge and the Naniwa took the latter. The Naniwa signalled the transport to follow her, but the Chinese on board of her would not let the English Captain obey. Two parleys were held but the Chinese officers were obdurate and would not listen to reason. When it became apparent that the Chinese were bent upon self-destruction the Naniwa turned her battery upon her and blew her up. More than a thousand of the Chinese troops were drowned. A large number were picked up and held as prisoners of war. The sinking of the Kowshing has been judged as hasty but the situation was a peculiar one. The Chinese would neither surrender nor follow. They were plentifully supplied with small arms and could keep a boarding party at bay effectually. The better judgment of second thought proves that the Japanese were fully justified in their action.
The results of the P’ung incident became apparent at once. It made neutrals more careful, it proved that the sea was dangerous ground for the Chinese, it kept over a thousand men from landing at Asan and it proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that Japan was fully in earnest and would fight to the bitter end. Moreover it changed the whole plan of campaign for China. The Tong-hak were forgotten and the co-operation of the force at the Yalu and that at Asan and a joint attack upon the Japanese was the plan determined upon by the Chinese.
The Japanese forces in and about Seoul were now ready for a land campaign. It was wisely determined to eliminate from the problem all the Chinese forces south of Seoul before advancing against those in the north along the Ta-dong River. The army in the north was being watched by mounted spies. For the time being there was no danger to be apprehended from these troops in the north but the two thousand at Asan, if reinforced, might advance on the capital and make trouble unless they were dispersed once and for all. Accordingly on the twenty-fifth of July Gen. Oshima started for Asan with the greater part of the troops in Seoul. The march was rapid. On the way the news of the P’ung incident was received and applauded. The vicinity of Asan was reached in three days. As the Japanese approached, the Chinese retreated a short distance to a point which they could easily fortify. On the twenty-eighth the Japanese army arrived within five miles of this position. A night attack was determined upon by Gen. Oshima. It was not explained to the army until midnight when it was aroused and informed of the intended movement. The advance was made in two divisions. The right wing, four companies of infantry and one of engineers under Lieutenant-colonel Tadeka, sought the enemy’s left. The left wing under Gen. Oshima, and comprising nine companies of infantry, one battalion of artillery and one company of cavalry, swept forward in the dark to attack the flank and rear of the enemy’s right.
It would have been a difficult undertaking even by daylight but in the dark it was fourfold more trying. The Chinese outposts in the neighboring village gave the signal, and, posted among the houses, offered a stubborn resistance. The assaulting column was repulsed and was compelled to lie down to hold the ground already taken. At last however the Chinese had to withdraw. They crowded slowly out into the neighboring, rice fields.
This preliminary struggle was followed by a brief breathing space. It had lasted less than an hour but had proved a stiff encounter. At five the Japanese attached the redoubts. The left wing now came into action and under the smoke of the artillery the troops stormed the forts at either extremity. In half an hour the Chinese were dislodged and the rising sun looked down upon its flaming image on Japanese banners flying victoriously from the Chinese ramparts.
The escape of the Chinese general, Yeh Chi-chao has given ground for the alleged Chinese victory at A-san. It often happened during the Japan China war that, unless the Chinese force was almost utterly annihilated, they claimed a victory. It is[is] still a puzzle to many, however, that in the Asan skirmish as well as in the battle of the Yalu the victorious Japanese permitted even a remnant of the enemy to escape. Although thoroughly defeated Gen. Yeh brought a remnant of his force around the city of Seoul and arrived safety at P’yŭng-yang, undoubtedly a difficult and brilliant movement.
This first battle won by Japan in a foreign land, for a period of three centuries, illustrated two points. Not only had the Japanese soldiers learned their lesson from instructors but the officers proved themselves worthy of the steadfastness of the men under them. One man out of every twelve killed was an officer. Nor, when elated by the victory, did the Japanese forget the ends for which they were working. They did not undertake any further subjugation of the south, not even attempting to exterminate the Tong-haks. It was the Chinese in the peninsula with whom they were measuring swords. The forces at A-san being destroyed or dispersed and danger from that quarter was consequently removed, and the banners of rising sun turned northward.