The forces which worked to the expulsion of Pok Yong-hyo also operated to curtail the term of banishment of Yi Chun-yung who was recalled from Kyo-dong Island on August 6th, but even the ex-Regent could not secure the residence of his grandson in Seoul, so he sent the young man to Japan, since which time he has been numbered with the political refugees and has never been able to think of returning to his native land. After the departure of Count Inouye, who had enjoyed the partial confidence of the queen, the ex-Regent’s prospects improved to such an extent that several of the ministers of state who were well affected toward Her Majesty were removed and others substituted; especially significant was the removal of the king’s brother Yi Chŭ-myŭn from the Ministry of the Household. As he was the son of the ex-Regent, this would seem to be a defeat for that faction but, in fact, his removal from that position was a necessary step to the carrying out of the dangerous plot which was already being formulated in the mind of the queen’s determined enemy.
This summer, which witnessed so many curious contradictions, was further distinguished by a determined effort in the line of education. The Educational Department projected a Normal school and a beginning was made. One hundred and seventeen young men were sent to study in Japan and other measures of lesser importance were carried out.
On the first day of September Viscount Miura arrived from Japan to assume the duties of Minister. Over a month had elapsed since the departure of Count Inouye. The Viscount was an enthusiastic[enthusiastic] Buddhist and evidently belonged to the old rather than the new Japan. He was, withal, a strenuous man and is said to have considered the settlement of the Korean difficulties merely a matter of prompt and vigorous action. At the time of his arrival the ex-Regent was living at his summer-house near the river and from the very first he was in close relations with the new Japanese Minister. It was quite evident that the latter had espoused the cause of the ex-Regent as against the queen and that instead of trying to close the breach which was constantly widening between these two powerful[powerful] personages he was preparing to make use of this estrangement to further what he supposed to be the interests of Japan. Min Yong-whan, the most powerful of the queen’s friends, was sent to America as Minister; and everything was ready for the coup which had undoubtedly been determined upon. From the mass of conflicting evidence, charge and counter charge, it is difficult to escape the following conclusion. There were two different policies held by political parties in Japan as to the best way to handle the Korean question; one was what we may call the radical policy which advocated strong measures and the instant and complete overthrow of all opposition to the will of Japan in the peninsula; the other, or conservative, policy looked to the attainment of the same object by gradual and pacific means. It seems that the failure of Count Inouye to accomplish anything definite in the line of a settlement of internal dissentions at Seoul resulted in the appointment of Viscount Miura as an exponent of the extreme radical policy. He was supposed to do prompt work but what that work would be perhaps neither he nor his constituency saw clearly before his arrival on the scene[scene]. It would be going much too far to say that the assassination of the queen was once thought of, and yet it is more than likely that those most conversant with conditions in Seoul felt that by some means or other her enormous influence must be permanently checked and that affairs must be so managed that she should have nothing more to do in the handling of questions of state. How this was to be accomplished neither Miura nor any of his advisers knew until he came and looked over the field.
For this reason it is easy to see how the ex-Regent would be the first man in Korea with whom the Japanese Minister would wish to consult, and it is certain that the Tă-wŭn-gun would have but one word to say as to the solution of the difficulty. His experience of twenty years had convinced him that there was only one way to accomplish the object which the Minister had in view and while Viscount Miura naturally shrunk from adopting that course it would seem he too was at last convinced that it was the only feasible plan. That he actually advised it in the first instance we do not believe, but that he fell in with the plan which others suggested and which they offered to carry through without his personal intervention there can be no doubt whatever. Nor can there be any question as to where the responsibility for the tragedy rests; not with the Japanese Government, surely, except in-so-far as its appointment of such a man to the difficult post of Minister to Seoul may reflect upon its wisdom.
It has sometimes been hinted that Count Inouye upon his return to Japan advocated some such policy as that which was carried out by Marquis Miura but there is nothing to indicate that this is other than a libel, for the whole career of that able statesman gives the lie to such suspicions and his dispatches to his government show the very opposite spirit from that intimated in these slanderous reports. For instance we have the extract from his reports read in the Japanese Parliament in which he says:
On one occasion the queen observed to me, “It was a matter of extreme regret to me that the overtures made by me toward Japan were rejected. The Tă-wŭn-gun, on the other hand, who showed his unfriendliness toward Japan, was assisted[assisted] by the Japanese Minister to rise in power.” In reply to this I gave as far as I could an explanation of these things to the queen and after allaying her suspicions I further explained that it was the true and sincere desire of the emperor and government of Japan to place the independence of Korea on a firm basis and in the meantime to strengthen the Royal House of Korea. In the event of any member of the Royal family, or indeed any Korean, attempting treason against the Royal House, I gave the assurance that the Japanese Government would not fail to protect the Royal House even by force of arms.
This unequivocal promise of protection was made by Count Inouye just before his departure for Japan and we do not and cannot believe that he expressed anything but his honest sentiments and those of the government that was back of him. It has been urged that the action of the Japanese Government in acquitting Viscount Miura in the face of the evidence given proves the complicity of that government in the outrage and its previous knowledge that it was to be perpetrated, but this does not necessarily follow. That government was doubtless unwilling to stultify itself by acknowledging that its accredited minister to Korea was actually guilty of the crime indicated in the charge. This attempt to evade the responsibility was of course futile. There was no escape from the dilemma in which that government was placed but the deduction that it was particeps criminis in the events of October 8th is unbelievable. It was the work of Viscount Miura and of his staff and of them alone, as is shown by the following extract from the Decision[Decision] of the Japanese Court of Preliminary Inquiry, which court sat in Hiroshima in January 1896.
Chapter XXI.
Decision of Hiroshima Court on queen’s assassination.... Miura’s estimate of situation.... Approached by Tă-wŭn-gun.... pledges required of ex-Regent.... Miura’s instructions.... preparations complete.... The rendezvous at the Tă-wŭn-gun’s summer place.... a final exhortation.... joining the Korean troops outside the West Gate.... The move on the palace.... the entrance.... Royal quarters surrounded.... The search for the queen.... the assassination.... Viscount Miura arrives on the scene.... an audience.... other representatives arrive and see the king.... Miura disclaims any connection with the plot.... degradation of the queen.... foreign representatives refuse to recognize it.... Miura recalled.
We append the decision of the Hiroshima Court in full as it gives the fullest and probably the most nearly correct account of the events which led up to the assassination of the queen. It reads as follows:—