The position of His Majesty during the months succeeding the attack was anything but comfortable. He had no voice in the direction of affairs, and he considered himself practically a prisoner in the hands of the Cabinet. He even feared for his life, and for weeks ate no food except what was brought to him in a locked box from friends outside the palace. He had requested that two or three foreigners should come to the palace each night and be at hand in case of trouble, feeling that their presence would exert a deterrent influence upon any who might plot injury to his person.
The half-way measures adopted on Nov. 26th by no means satisfied those who wished to see His Majesty freed from practical durance at the hands of men thoroughly obnoxious to him, and a scheme was evolved by a number of Koreans to effect his release by forcible means. The purpose of these men was a laudable one but the execution of it was ill-managed. On the night of the 28th upwards of a thousand Koreans demanded entrance into the palace. They had arranged with one of the members of the palace guard, inside, to open the gate to them, but at the last moment he failed them and they found themselves balked. The palace was in some confusion, the King had called in to his presence the three foreigners who, at his request, were on duty that night, but in spite of their assurances that his person would be protected it was only natural that excitement should run high. The crowd without were shouting wildly and attempting to scale the high wall, and the members of the cabinet, before the King, did not know at what moment the guard might betray them to the assailants, and they knew that once betrayed they would be torn to pieces without mercy. They tried therefore to induce the King to remove to a distant part of the palace where he could hide for a long time before he could be found even though the crowd should effect an entrance. The night was bitterly cold and the King was but lightly clad, and as the King’s person was safe in any event, the foreigners who were with him opposed the move strongly and at last were compelled to use physical force to prevent the change, which would certainly have endangered the King’s life. The purpose of the cabinet was thus thwarted but as the hours passed it become evident that the men outside would not be able to effect an entrance. The shouts gradually died away and at last the crowd dispersed leaving in the hands of the palace guard three or four men who had scaled the wall but had not been followed by their confreres.
In view of the attitude of the Tokyo Government the Japanese in Seoul were now entirely quiescent[quiescent] and the government was standing on its own base. The cabinet held its own by virtue of the palace guard which was composed of the soldiers trained by the Japanese. This cabinet and guard held together from necessity, for both knew that should their power fail they would be denounced as traitors and under the circumstances could expect little help from the Japanese. The cabinet had to make a show of investigating the attack of Oct. 5th and someone must be killed for having murdered the queen. At the same time punishment was to be meted out to the principals in the attempt on the palace on November 28th.
Three men were arrested and charged with being directly implicated in the crime of regicide. Of these one was certainly innocent and while the second was probably privy to the crime, being a lieutenant of the Japanese-trained troops, there was no evidence adduced to prove his actual participation in the act of assassination. He had not been reinstated in his position in the new guard and he knew altogether too much about the existing cabinet. Their choice fell upon him as one of the scapegoats. The third was Yi Chu-hoé formerly Vice Minister of War. There was no evidence adduced against him at the trial, though from other considerations he seems to have been implicated in the outrage. He was chosen as the principal one to bear the obloquy of the crime, probably because (1) he was a bitter enemy of the existing cabinet and (2) because it was necessary for the sake of appearances to convict and execute someone of rank and reputation. As a fact the court did not know and never discovered who the actual perpetrators were. The three men were executed before the end of the year.
Though only three men were arrested in connection with the assassination of the queen thirty-three men were arrested in connection with the comparatively trivial affair of November 28th. Their trial proceeded simultaneously with that of the other three. Two of them were condemned to death, four to exile for life and four to three years imprisonment. To show the kind of evidence on which these convictions were based we will cite the case of Prince Yi Chă-sun who was proved to have gotten hold of some compromising documents and to have shown them to the King only, instead of to the proper authorities, namely, of course, the cabinet. On these grounds he was sentenced to three years imprisonment!
December and January saw matters move to an inevitable climax. The cabinet forced upon the people the edict ordering the cutting off of the top-knot, the distinctive mark of Korean citizenship. The whole country was in a ferment and the people, almost to a man, were gnashing their teeth at the cabinet. The finding of the Hiroshima court claimed to have freed Miura and his fellows from blame and it was rumored that several of them were to return to Korea to take office under the government. Chöng Pyung-ha, a proved traitor, had been reinstated in the cabinet as Minister of Agriculture and Cho Heui-yŭn as Minister of War, and it was reported that Kwŭn Yŭng-jin who had fled to Japan would be made again Chief of Police. It was perfectly evident, therefore, that the grip of the Japanese upon the king through the Gaoler[Gaoler] Cabinet was tightening and that there was no escape from it except through heroic measures. These measures the king was prepared to adopt rather than longer endure the humiliating position to which he seemed condemned. At that time the principal men in the cabinet were Kim Hong-jip, Chöng Pyŭng-ha, O Yun-jung, Yu Kil-jun. Of these O Yun-jung seems to have been far less culpable than the rest. The king had great confidence in him and had he not met his fate at the hands of the people he would probably have been called back to office.
But now we come to the important step taken by His Majesty to free himself from his unpleasant position. He determined to find asylum in the Russian Legation. C. Waeber was the Russian Minister, a pronounced friend of the dead Queen, and a man of great ability. Just how he was approached and his consent gained to the king’s scheme is not generally known but in view of subsequent events and the part that Russia intended to play in Korea it is easy to see how the Russian Representative would welcome an opportunity to do the King such a signal service and one which was of such a personal character as to render it certain that it would never be forgotten.
The plan was carried out successfully in every detail. Women’s chairs were caused to be sent in and out the palace gates at frequent intervals by day and night until the guards had become quite accustomed to them. Then on the night of the eleventh of February the King and the Crown Prince without escort slipped by the guards in common women’s chairs and were taken directly to the Russian Legation where they were courteously received and given the best portion of the Legation building. This act was of course a grievous lapse from the dignity that befits a king but under the circumstances there is much to say by way of excuse. On the whole it must be considered a mistake so far as the country at large is concerned, for it set in motion a new set of factors which probably did more harm than the temporary enforced seclusion of the King could have done. It acted as a potent factor in embittering the Japanese against Russia and opened the door for Russian intrigue which finally hastened if it did not actually cause the war at present waging. Had Japan been able to preserve the predominance which she held in Korea just after the China-Japan war she might have looked with more or less complaisancy upon the Russian aggression in Manchuria, but when Korea itself became disputed ground the war was inevitable.
At seven o’clock on the morning of February 11th the King and the Crown Prince entered the Russian Legation. Several hours elapsed before the Cabinet in the palace became aware of the fact. During that interval active operations were going on at the Russian Legation. The organization of a new cabinet was hastened by summoning from various parts of the city such officials as the King could trust. Pak Chöng-yang was made Prime Minister. No time was lost in putting out a Royal Edict deprecating the necessity of taking refuge in a foreign legation, promising to punish the real authors of the Queen’s assassination, rescinding the order for cutting the top-knots. This was posted on the gates of the Legation and at various points throughout the city.