Philip, conquered by the Romans, had lost his hold of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, and Antiochus seems to have thought it was the moment to take advantage of the misfortunes of his ally and seized those cities for his own.
Both the Egyptian enterprise and also this in Asia Minor were a direct offence to the Romans, seeing that both Egyptians and Greeks were their allies and looked to Rome for protection.
They did not look in vain. It is likely that Antiochus did not realise how great Rome had become. She was a long way off. But a few years ago she was scarcely known. We may imagine that he had very little idea of the might of the nation whose allies he had dared to attack. Perhaps the Romans themselves did not realise their own strength or the weakness of the enemy, for they tried their best to come to terms with him.
It was all to no purpose. Antiochus actually ventured into Greece itself with an army; but before he achieved anything of importance the Romans had come to the help of the Greeks, and the Syrian force broke up and melted away after the very first battle.
The Legions in Asia
But the Romans had not finished with them yet. They had seen, perhaps, that the Syrians were less formidable than they had thought. The Syrian navy was beaten heavily by the combined navies of Rome, Rhodes, and Pergamus. The following year, that is, 190 B.C., saw a sight new to our story—Roman legions in Asia Minor. They were under the leadership of one of the Scipios, who was consul for the year and brother of that Scipio who had led the Roman legions in Africa in the last years of the Second Punic War, and for his victories had been given the surname of Scipio "Africanus." Scipio Africanus accompanied his brother, the consul, with the legions in Asia Minor. There West met East, and there was no doubt, after the first clash of arms, with which the victory must be. The Roman legionaries under this Scipio, who assumed the title of "Asiaticus," as his brother took that of "Africanus," had a discipline and a battle formation against which the impetuous attacks of the more lightly armed Syrians broke and wasted themselves. Just so far as the Romans chose to advance must those others recede before them. They had all Asia behind them for their retreat. Rome at her strongest could not utterly destroy the power of the East as she had destroyed the power of Carthage; but she could drive it back and back at her pleasure, so long and so far as she chose to put out her power. The East would come on again after each driving back, like flies at some great creature which has whisked them away for a moment, but they could not really get through the great creature's hide; certainly they could not get to any vital part, to any centre of his body where they could do him real hurt. Rome had perpetual trouble with these buzzing swarms in the East all through her days of world-power; but it was this kind of trouble—vexatious, and costing her much money and many lives of her soldiers, but never threatening her own life or power, as the Gauls from the north had threatened it once, and were to threaten it, and worse than threaten it, again.
After the first punishment had been given to Antiochus, Rome did not annex any of his dominions or form them into a province under a Roman governor. There is this remarkable difference that we may see between the Romans and other conquerors whom we have met in the course of this great story, that the Romans, before they went on farther, always consolidated, made solid and firm and almost a part of themselves, what they won.
They acted on the principle divide et impera, that is, disunite people and then you can rule them. They did not interfere much with the customs and laws of the peoples that they conquered. They let them manage their affairs in their own way. They expected them perhaps to pay tribute and to furnish soldiers for the army. So long as they did this they were not greatly troubled by their Roman governors. But—and this is the point on which the Romans insisted, and to which they owed a very great deal of their success—although these peoples were allowed to manage their own affairs, within their own borders, they were not allowed to make wars or treaties of peace and alliance or anything of that kind with their neighbours. On all such questions they had to refer back to Rome and ask her permission and advice and help.
One sees what the effect of that must have been—to make these always look to Rome as their sovereign. That was one effect. Another was that they were not able to combine together and so become strong enough to be a danger to that sovereign. And Rome was wise in her dealings with them. She punished them heavily if they did not obey her, but rewarded them, by giving them rights and privileges, if they were very faithful in obeying and in helping her.
The prudence of Rome