“1. By an organization of the courts in such a manner as not to secure it to suitors; nor,
“2. By authorizing the courts to exercise, or their assumption of, equity or admiralty jurisdiction over cases at law.”
“This amendment,” says he, “preserves the right of jury trial against any infringement by any department of the government.”—Baldwin’s Rep. 404.
Now, what are the tribunals created by the Fugitive Slave law but a new “organization of the courts”? or rather, the creation of new courts, “in such a manner as not to secure, [the right of trial by jury,] to suitors?” By it, Congress creates tribunals unknown to the common law, and purports to give them power over common law rights.
Having now proved, from the nature of the claim in controversy,—namely, the claim of one man to the personal services and the liberty of another man, and the counter claim of personal liberty and of self-ownership,—that the right in dispute between the claimant of an alleged fugitive, and the person claimed, is a common law right; and that any legal process to determine this right, “whatever form it may assume,” is a “suit at common law,” it only remains, under this head, to establish my third point, namely;
A claim to any person, as one “held to service or labor,” always and necessarily presumes that “the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.”
On this point, direct authority may be found in the case of Lee vs. Lee, 8 Peters’s Rep. 44. This was an appealed case, where by law no appeal could be taken unless “the value in controversy” should be “one thousand dollars or upwards.” It was objected that the appellants,—the petitioners for freedom,—were not worth a thousand dollars. But the court said,—
“The matter in dispute, in this case, is the freedom of the petitioners. The judgment of the court below is against their claim to freedom; the matter in dispute is, therefore, to the plaintiffs in error, the value of their freedom, and this is not susceptible of a pecuniary valuation. Had the judgment been in favor of the petitioners, and the writ of error brought by the party claiming to be the owner, the value of the slaves as property would have been the matter in dispute, and affidavits might be admitted to ascertain such value. But affidavits estimating the value of freedom are entirely inadmissible, and no doubt is entertained of the jurisdiction of the court.”
Suppose there are two claimants for the same alleged fugitive? If his market value exceeds twenty dollars, both of them have a clear right to the trial by jury. And can it be that a man’s right to his own freedom cannot be tried by a jury, when, if two men dispute about his value, each may claim the jury trial, and cannot be denied?
On the three points, then, 1. What constitutes a common law or “legal right;” 2. What constitutes “a suit at common law,” and 3. What constitutes “a value which exceeds twenty dollars,”—namely; the personal liberty of any human being, though he be an infant just born, or a drivelling idiot, or he be stretched upon his death bed with only another hour to breathe,—I trust I have made out a case which entitles a party to trial by jury under the constitution of the United States.