But to avoid the force of this, it has been said, that the proceedings before the commissioner do not constitute a “case,” within the meaning of the second section of the third article, which extends the “judicial power” of the United States to all “cases” in law and equity. Instead of being a “case,” it is said to be only a summary inquiry, designed to operate as a condition for executive action, in order to accomplish a special and limited object; like the inquiry, who are rightful claimants of money held by the government, under a treaty, and how much belongs to each one. It is also said, that if a construction so literal is to be put upon the words “judicial power,” then no master in chancery could act in behalf of the courts in equity cases; no commissioner of bankruptcy could be appointed under a bankrupt law, &c.
In answer to the first position, that the proceedings for the reclamation of fugitive slaves do not constitute “a case,” we have the most explicit declaration of the supreme court in more cases than one. In Prigg’s case, 16 Peters, 616, the court say,—
“It is plain, then, that while a claim is made by the owner, out of possession, for the delivery of a slave, it must be made, if at all, against some other person; and inasmuch as the right is a right of property capable of being recognized, and asserted by proceedings before a court of justice, between parties adverse to each other, it constitutes, in the strictest sense, a controversy between the parties, and a CASE, arising under the constitution of the United States, within the express delegation of JUDICIAL POWER given by that instrument.”
“A CASE in law or equity consists of the right of the one party as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the constitution, or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF EITHER.”—Cohens vs. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 379, (5 Cond. Rep. 101.)
Indeed, almost every page of the opinion of the court, in Cohens vs. Virginia, may be referred to, to show that they used the word “case” in a sense that embraces the proceedings for the reclamation of a fugitive slave. If so, then any tribunal, having jurisdiction over such a “case,” is vested with a part of the “judicial” power of the United States.
In defining the word “case,” as it occurs in this article, Judge Story says,—
“It is clear that the judicial department is authorized to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, whenever any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it. When it has assumed such a form, it then becomes a case”—3 Comm. 507.
“A case, then, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, arises, when some subject touching the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, is submitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.”—Ibid.
And, as if these definitions were not clear enough, the learned judge adds,—
“Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, within the scope of their constitutional authority, whether they constitute the right, or privilege, or claim, or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted.”—3 Comm. 508.