A similar thing must have happened to thousands of our fellow-citizens of the Union. Some of them at first lived under a foreign government; then under one territorial government; then under another; and at last have become citizens of a state, without any change of domicile. Indeed, it would seem that nothing can be clearer than the proposition, whether regarded as a legal or a political one, that the laws and the jurisdiction may be changed over a man who continues to reside in the same place, just as effectually and as completely as a man may change the laws and jurisdiction over himself by removing to a different place. In many cases, the former works a more thorough change than the latter. The laws of Great Britain do not acknowledge the right of self-expatriation; while, at the same time, it is held, that the inhabitants of a foreign province, incorporated into the kingdom, change their allegiance without changing their residence.
3. My third proposition is this: That the jurisdiction under which the inhabitants of what is now the District of Columbia lived, prior to the cession of the District by Maryland to the United States, was utterly and totally changed, at the moment of the cession,—at the moment when, according to the provisions of the constitution, they ceased to be citizens of the state of Maryland, and became citizens of the District of Columbia.
By the 17th paragraph, (Hickey’s Constitution,) of the 8th section of the 1st article, it is provided that Congress shall have power “to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District, (not exceeding ten miles square,) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States.”
Congress, then, has the power of sole and exclusive legislation, “in all cases whatsoever,” in regard to the District of Columbia. What is the meaning of the word “exclusive” in this connection? It cannot mean absolute and uncontrolled; for, if it did, it would make Congress as sovereign as the Russian autocrat. It means that no other government, no other body of men whatever, shall have concurrent power of legislation over the District; nor, indeed, any subordinate power, except what may be derived from Congress. Over every man who is a citizen of one of the United States, there are two jurisdictions,—the jurisdiction of the general government, and the jurisdiction of the state government. There are two governments that have the power to legislate for him; but there is only one power,—the Congress of the United States,—that can legislate for a citizen of the District of Columbia.
In Kendall vs. The United States, 12 Peters, 524, it is said, “There is in the District of Columbia no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control over the District, for every purpose of government.”
So it has been held that a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia is an officer of the government of the United States, and is therefore exempt from militia duty. Wise vs. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331; 1 Cond. Rep. 552.
A citizen of the District of Columbia is not a citizen of any one of the United States. Hepburn et al. vs. Ellery, 2 Cranch, 445; Westcott’s Lessee vs. Inhabitants ——, Peters, C. C. R. 45.
Up to the time of the cession, the inhabitants of this District were under two jurisdictions—that of Maryland and that of Congress; but after the cession, under that of Congress alone. Now, when the inhabitants of this District passed out of the jurisdiction of Maryland, and came under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, let us see what was the effect of such change of jurisdiction upon them.
In the act of Congress of 1790, c. 28, sect. 1, which was an act for establishing the seat of government of the United States, there is the following clause: “Provided, nevertheless, That the operation of the laws of the state [of Maryland] within such District shall not be affected by this acceptance, until the time fixed for the removal of the government thereto, and until Congress shall otherwise by law provide.”
Here, then, Congress expressly provided and contracted with the state of Maryland, that the laws of Maryland in this District should not be interfered with until the removal of the seat of government to this place; and Congress likewise impliedly provided and contracted, that when the seat of government should be removed to this place, it would discharge the duty imposed upon it by the constitution of the United States, and would assume and exercise the “exclusive legislation” provided for in that instrument. This act of Congress was approved on the 16th of July, 1790.