On January 7th, the Parliament met again after the adjournment; and on the 16th, Mr. Pelham laid the Treaty before the House. The Duke of Bedford came to town on the 15th; so far from meditating opposition, that he was resolved to make use of the remains of the King’s favour, to ask a pension for the Duchess’s sister, Lady Elizabeth Waldegrave. The Duchess, who could not bear to be out of favour as well as out of power, and who always kept a reconciliation in view, had planned this suit, with at least as much prospect to tie down the Duke by an obligation to the King, from reverting to Opposition, as from kindness to her sister; and there was no doubt but the Pelhams would have pressed the King to grant so trifling a boon; for what could they wish more, when they had driven the Duke of Bedford to resign the power of serving all his friends, than to silence his murmurs, by serving the first friend of his for whom he should submit to solicit?
The prospect of allies in Opposition was immediately hung out to the Duke of Bedford, by some[207] who wished to fix him against the Court, and who wanted to engage him to speak against the Treaty, which they knew would either prevent him from soliciting the pension, or by touching so tender a point as a German subsidy, would provoke the King to refuse his request. This train caught effectually; and though the Duchess was alarmed, yet not having time to work back her husband, whose warmth was most impetuous, the Duke determined at once to oppose the Saxon Treaty.
22nd, Mr. Pelham opened the Treaty in the Committee. Old Horace Walpole spoke against it in a manner that showed how well he knew where the weakness of such treaties lay; and however astonishing such arguments were when coming from him, they were pressed with such force and weight as stilled their ridicule, had he not himself done justice upon himself, and concluded his oration with professing such duty to the King, that, though so averse to the Treaty, he should yet vote for it. The House burst into laughter at such absurd pretence for zeal, which could conquer its own conscience, but had not prevented him from exposing the measures of a Prince, for whom he expressed such veneration! Murray, Potter, Sir Harry Erskine, Sir Thomas Robinson, Sir William Yonge, Lord Hilsborough, Mr. Fox, Sir Peter Warren, Mr. Legge, and Charles Townshend, spoke for; Sir Walter Blacket, Beckford, Lord Strange, and Lord Cobham against it; but it was agreed to by 236 to 54.
On the 23rd it was reported to the House. Northey and George Haldane opposed it again. Nugent was zealous for it. Sydenham, reflecting on Nugent’s former religion, said, that he seemed not content with a majority of electors, but would have an Emperor chosen, like a Pope, by two-thirds. Vyner reflected on the King for bringing such expenses on the nation, after such obligations to it, and such noble provision made for his children. This Mr. Pelham answered finely, seriously, and pathetically; a manner in which he particularly shone. There was no division.
On the 28th the Treaty was debated in the House of Lords. The Duke of Bedford opened the opposition to it, with professing, that his greatest difficulty lay in its having been the act of the King, so good a King, whom he had served seven years, and to whom he was agitated with the fear of being misrepresented: yet, that he could neither in conscience acquiesce, nor be content with silently opposing subsidiary treaties in time of peace; and the dangerous measures of wasting, when we ought to be saving. That if you treat after a war, you may obtain conditions certain; but what advantages can you make, where there is nothing to be given up or restored? That by paying for votes for the Archduke, we are purchasing advantages for our Allies, instead of for ourselves; and at the same time instruct those Princes who take our money, never to unite with us but for money. That with the people it must be a measure most unpopular, to tax them for money to be sent abroad, when they cannot possibly discern how it touches their own interest. And that in no shape the measure can be right, but when a war is approaching; whereas, we are but just emerged out of one. That the preamble is most injurious to the dignity of our Crown; it speaks us suppliants to that inconsiderable Prince, the King of Poland, who is most incapable to serve us, not only from the situation of his country, but from his bad administration. Besides, he might have been obliged to join us by the two Imperial Courts, as his ruling passion is to make Poland hereditary in his family—how great then is his condescension, if he will not take part against you! If he did, it would be of little consequence: it is only giving so much for levy-money. If England were attacked, of what use would Saxons be? That he did not think this country or Holland should always have such preparatory connexions on the Continent; and yet that this Treaty did not even stipulate that his Polish Majesty shall increase his forces. That the fifth Article was wretchedly drawn! and for that King’s vote—had it been secured, when it might have been—that Cologne had been lost for want of proper words to tie him down: a fit example to have made us more wary! and yet how many evasions open, if this Saxon Prince is disposed to elude his engagements! That we are not likely to bring about this election; and that we even keep off two of the electors, by showing them that they may ask a price for their votes. That Prussia’s protesting against the election is a new doctrine—and as new is this opportunity for Lords who love subsidizing! Notify your intentions, you may have thirty or forty of the College of Princes, who will take your money. Yet, while we are thus bounteous, Russia takes no steps, Austria few. But he supposed he should be told, that Holland is to pay part; he was sorry for it; Holland is still less able than we to be thus extravagant. But if Holland should not pay, who is to make good the deficiencies? If this is done with the consent of France, she only will have the merit: if without her consent, it will bring on a war.
He then turned to home considerations, and (as this was supposed to be a sacrifice offered by the Duke of Newcastle to the King’s German passions, contrary to the inclination of Mr. Pelham), he said it was extravagant imbecility, if this measure was yielded to by the Minister against his will. That the tenour was throughout the same, and parsimony or profusion took their turns, as individuals took prepossessions. That to please individuals,[208] the material service, the Navy, had been reduced to 8000 seamen: that to please individuals,[209] Nova Scotia had been profusely suckled, and its deficiences always supplied. That the land-tax, the malt-tax, the reduction of interest, had been carried on with spirit: yet for what have the public creditors been taxed, if the savings made at their expense are scandalously lavished? If measures are not changed, if men are not changed, we must go on de mal en pire. That when we pretend to economy, how judiciously is it exerted! It is displayed in contracting the rewards for removing the mortality of the cattle, or for discovering highwaymen! That our youngest daughter, Nova Scotia, is favoured, while Jamaica is neglected, by an Administration who neither grant protection to commerce, nor endeavour at any reformation of morals. The Duke concluded with a Motion for an Address, to represent that subsidiary treaties ought never to be concluded in time of peace, especially after a long war, and that they are neither necessary at present, nor likely to procure any real advantage.
The Duke of Newcastle replied in a wild, incoherent, incomprehensible speech of an hour and a quarter, in which he set out with saying, that he would not answer general heads, because the Duke of Bedford had descended to particulars; and yet the greatest deduction of his defence was an account of the three last wars. That for this, it was a measure of peace and economy, and that it is little as it is, because it is so great. That he remembered the argument used to blacken the great war was, that we have no interest on the Continent; and that the Dutch were reproached then, and are now. That he that is not for us, is against us: that there are those who would gladly accept the union of the Dutch. That if he thought this a greater burthen than England could bear, in proportion to the objections, he should be against it; but that if it prevents a war, the sooner England concludes this Treaty the better. That if we do not connect with the Continent, we shall be obliged to enter into the next, as we were into the last war. What was the occasion of the three last wars? Of the first, the succession to the Crown of Spain—but that can never happen again. Everybody knows the zeal of the present King of Spain. In the second, the war occasioned by the vacancy of the Throne of Poland, England took no part: if we had, it would have prevented the last; at least, it would have been better carried on. The last war was occasioned by the ambition of Bavaria. It cost us much, yet glad he was, for we should have been in a worse condition, if we had not entered into it. From the Treaty of Utrecht to that of Aix-la-Chapelle, there have been no four years without greater expenses than these four last. If the last war was occasioned by the vacancy of the Imperial Throne, the treaty in question is calculated to prevent such a vacancy and such consequences. That Holland, he hoped, would emerge out of her difficulties by the prudence of the present conjuncture—that his meaning was sufficiently explained, though it might be more elegantly; that more plainly, would be improper. That we have received the strongest assurances—what they are: if there should be any Motion for laying them before the House, he would be the first to oppose it. Have we never seen Saxony act against its interest? If any means had been omitted for engaging that Power in the common cause, the Ministry would have much to answer for. That the question of the necessity of the unanimity of the electors had been fully considered, though there was a time when no elector would have opposed. That the election had not hitherto proceeded, because Cologne did not understand itself obliged to concur. That we must get six votes, and therefore, whatever is demanded, must be granted, though Cologne did ask more, and it was not granted. All arts were tried to engage that elector without a subsidy. He then proved that the election might have been carried and been valid with a majority, and yet that we waited till we could secure two-thirds. That he was told we meddled everywhere; an accusation he was sometimes surprised to hear from some people. That the Fleet had repaired the miscarriages of the Army—was it not the duty of economic Ministers to supply the Sea Service? That for what had been hinted of the provocation we should give to France, the wisdom of that Power will admire us, not be angry, if we do nothing to hurt her.
This, and some few preceding harangues of this extraordinary person, I give merely as a specimen of the rhetoric of a man, who certainly did not govern his country by his oratoric abilities. The reader must excuse me, if for the future I omit them, unless on very particular occasions; for though I have generally given myself the trouble to minute them down at the delivery, it were too impertinent to commit them to history. And I must beg so much indulgence, as when argument, or connexion, or grammar is observably wanting, that it may be remarked that at least in all other speeches I have taken care to write true English: in those of the Duke of Newcastle, the original has been faithfully copied.