Sir George Lyttelton answered with great modesty, that the Administration had not suffered by Mr. Pelham’s death, except by his advancement. Let it be considered who was at the head of the Treasury, of the Admiralty, of the Chancery, &c. Could it be said that we had done nothing, when we had taken 8000 French seamen? Here he would rest the whole; no one calamity had happened yet.
George Grenville observed, that in December last the Fleet consisted of 150 sail, of which 78 were of the line; of 42,700 seamen, of which 36,000 had been mustered: the marines had been voted since—was this inability to send fourteen ships to the Mediterranean? In January, there were sixty-two ships at home capable of being employed. Fourteen ships had sufficed to keep the Brest and Rochfort squadrons in their harbours. He commended Lord Anson, and said, he had heard of representations being made from the Admiralty for sending force to the Mediterranean. In the last war, he remembered that the Admiralty was restrained from meddling with the Mediterranean service, which was reserved to the Secretary of State (Duke of Newcastle); if that restriction continued, the Admiralty was not to blame. In America, Braddock had been defeated in July; not a man was sent thither till within the last fortnight. Fox replied, that he knew of no representation from the Admiralty. The Fleet could not have been prepared so soon as Mr. Grenville alleged: it is no neglect if things are preparing. Dates, he knew, might save from punishment, but events only would save from blame. Some merit he thought there was in the Prussian treaty, of which the contrary, a breach, had been so much foretold. The question before the House was not so diffuse as that of last year, because the augmentation was made, and consequently not necessary now. He wished the incapacity was in the Administration, not in the country itself.
Pitt took little notice of Fox, only rising again to lash Sir George Lyttelton, who had called it an opposal of epithets; very little proper to come from him, said he, whose character is a composition of epithets. But what! did we meet as an academy of compliments? but Lyttelton had mistaken the day; for himself, he said, had used no epithets that day. If Lyttelton would say, we had no more resources, he would tell him he was incapable; and when he disclaimed having had any hand in drawing the words of the question, he saw Sir George was not at liberty to change them.
Lyttelton, much hurt, but firm, cried, he says I am a thing made up of epithets—was not this the language of Billingsgate? The world complained that the House was converted into a bear-garden—he should not envy Mr. Pitt the glory of being the Figg or Broughton of it—yet if he assumed fewer airs of superiority, it would do him more honour.
Pitt, redoubling contempt, said with a sneer, we once lived in a road of epithets together—hard! that my friend, with whom I have taken sweet council of epithets, should now reproach me with using them! Lyttelton, he said, was a pretty poetical genius: with his pen in his hand, nobody respected him more: but what! were not Billingsgate and Broughton epithets? He at once described Lyttelton as an innocent, and would have fixed the use of invectives on him. Sir George terminated the altercation and debate, by protesting it was not his fault if he did not still live in friendship with Mr. Pitt.
May 14th.—The Prussian treaty was opened to the House by Sir George Lyttelton. It stipulated that the King of Prussia should pay 61,000l. due on the Silesian loan; but admitted that 20,000l. was due to him, which the Parliament was desired to grant. Pitt took the convention to pieces, interpreting it as a design in the King of Prussia of returning indignity for indignity; and as derogatory to the sovereignty of England, which was now giving 20,000l. to a Monarch, represented as intimidated, for unjust claims, examined and pronounced so, and now allowed by a commission of review, as unheard of as that exercised at Berlin; and founded on admission of damages, by what kind of liquidation could not be guessed. Had that King made a demand, or had this compensation been offered to him? But he saw he said, that all the Powers of Europe were setting up a new jurisprudence, and that we were no longer to enjoy the empire of the ocean. For himself, he should affect no superiority but what was common to him with twelve millions, innocence of his country’s ruin, the superiority of the undone over the undoers. If he could but be told that even by a protest we had secured the rights of our Courts of Admiralty, he would acquiesce; and should be glad, as it would bring the long sufferers on the Silesian loan into their money. Yet he had rather vote them the 60,000l.: we did not want such a sum; the necessary thing to us was the acknowledgment of the right. So thought the King of Prussia, and said, I will take nothing, to show I set my foot on your neck, and how I am intimidated.—He hoped the Committee would at least couple with the vote the assertion of our rights.
Murray answered in a long discussion, pleading like a lawyer for the King of Prussia, though formerly, when consulted as a lawyer, he had nobly confuted him like a statesman. He said, free ships make free goods, and that a Prince whose property is taken must judge by his own courts. That we did not allow that decision—if his friendship were bought by allowing it, the purchase would be too dear. That the single question was, whether the convention did or did not give up our rights. That the King of Prussia had not been alienated by our fault, but by his own interest, and that breach had been kept up by his fear. That, under the name of reprisals, he had paid himself, having the Silesian loan in his power. That he had tried to list the powers of the Baltic, by the captivating maxim of free ships make free goods. That he did not demand one sixpence for goods of strangers taken on board Prussian ships, and therefore could not demand satisfaction, as no injury was done to him. He had made no reply to our memorial, nor ever negotiated with us in defence of his principles; but retained the Silesian loan. There had been thoughts of making war on him—but how? if by the Queen of Hungary, then France would have taken part, and a general war had ensued. As we detained his ships, he might demand to appeal—very difficult to grant that, or to refuse it.
He then enlarged on the King of Prussia’s right and power of appeal—urged the long time elapsed, the money dispersed, the danger of a single-handed war with France; the advantage of reconciliation with Prussia, who, by giving up the whole Silesian debt, gave up at once his whole commission of revision. He had only said, “Save my credit, give me something.” Who would have held off for 20,000l.? We did make that sort of amende to him; we did save his credit. Just so, the French seized the smuggler Mandrin in the territory of Savoy, and hanged him—but when we sent a fleet to America, and France wanted allies, she asked pardon of the King of Sardinia. The same was our case with Spain on the convention of 1739: they agreed to pay us for captures they had made, and to liquidate with the South Sea Company. Nobody thought that by that accommodation they gave up their principles of searching. In the whole treaty we had not allowed the King of Prussia’s principles; nor did it appear whether his goods had been condemned as an enemy’s, or as contraband. Very uncertain what is contraband when not expressed in any treaty. Spain calls tobacco so, because they think it makes the English fight better. If we did not allow the Northern Powers to carry some contraband goods, they could have no trade. We had desired from the Prussian Minister a plan of a treaty: he took a Swedish treaty for his model, in which it was expressly stipulated that “free ships do not make free goods.” To have had it expressed now would have weakened it—a subtilty which justifies my saying that he argued as Counsel for Prussia. Pitt taxing him with it, he pretended not to have said, that it was stipulated so in the Swedish treaty, but understood so in it.
The Committee, by a majority of 210 to 55, voted the money; and four days afterwards war was proclaimed with France.