The result was announced; yeas 22, nays 21. If Stockton had not voted, the result would have been a tie, and he would have held his seat. His opponents had exhausted their resources and there was no parliamentary way of trying the case over again. By casting a vote in his own case he gave them a weapon with which to renew the fight.
When the Senate reassembled, Sumner moved that the journal be corrected by striking out Stockton's name from the vote last taken, on the ground that he had no right to vote in his own case. The subject was thus brought up again, and the result was a reconsideration of the vote of the previous day. Trumbull concurred in the view that the question before the Senate was judicial in its nature and that, therefore, Stockton could not vote when his own seat was in question.
On the last day of the debate a telegram was received from Senator Wright requesting a postponement of the vote till the following day, saying that he would then be in his seat or would not ask further delay. His request was supported by Reverdy Johnson in a pathetic appeal to the fraternal feeling and gentlemanly instincts of Senators; but Clark, who led the opposition, objected strenuously to any postponement, although two postponements had been previously granted on account of his own illness.
On the motion to postpone till the following day the vote was, yeas 21, nays 22. Senator Dixon, a Republican supporter of Stockton, had fallen sick and was absent. Senator Stewart, another Republican supporter, was absent when the vote was taken, although he had been in the Senate Chamber earlier in the day; he had dodged. All the members of the Judiciary Committee, who had signed the original report in favor of Stockton, voted for him to the last, except Stewart. If he and Dixon had been present, the final vote would have been postponed, and in all probability Stockton would have retained his seat, although Morgan, of New York, who had voted for postponement, changed on the very last vote, which was against Stockton, 20 to 23.
An impartial reader of the whole debate, in the calm atmosphere of the present day, will be apt to conclude that partisan zeal rather than judicial fairness was the deciding factor in Stockton's case, and that the heat developed in the contest was due to a desire on the part of the majority to gain a two-thirds vote in order to overcome the President's vetoes.
Consideration of the Civil Rights Bill began on the 29th of January, on an amendment proposed by Trumbull which provided that all persons of African descent born in the United States should be citizens thereof, and there should be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any state or territory on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery. The question was not merely whether this provision was just, but whether Congress had power under the Constitution to pass laws for the ordinary administration of justice in the states. On this point Trumbull said:
Under the constitutional amendment which we have now adopted, and which declares that slavery shall no longer exist, and which authorizes Congress by appropriate legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we have a right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom to all people in the United States. The various state laws to which I have referred,—and there are many others,—although they do not make a man an absolute slave, yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman; and it is perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not allow a colored person to go from one county to another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman. A law that does not allow a colored person to hold property, does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is certainly a law in violation of the rights of a freeman, and being so may properly be declared void.
Without going elaborately into this question, as my design was to state rather than to argue the grounds upon which I place this bill, I will only add on this branch of the subject that the clause of the Constitution, under which we are called to act, in my judgment vests Congress with the discretion of selecting that "appropriate legislation" which it is believed will best accomplish the end and prevent slavery.
Then, sir, the only question is, will this bill be effective to accomplish the object, for the first section will amount to nothing more than the declaration in the Constitution itself unless we have the machinery to carry it into effect. A law is good for nothing without a penalty, without a sanction to it, and that is to be found in the other sections of the bill. The second section provides:
"That any person, who under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject or cause to be subjected any inhabitant of any state or territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding $1000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court."
This is the valuable section of the bill so far as protecting the rights of freedmen is concerned. That they are entitled to be free we know. Being entitled to be free under the Constitution, that we have a right to enact such legislation as will make them free, we believe; and that can only be done by punishing those who undertake to deny them their freedom. When it comes to be understood in all parts of the United States that any person who shall deprive another of any right, or subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color or race, will expose himself to fine and imprisonment, I think all such acts will soon cease.[88]
Senator Saulsbury, of Delaware, contended that the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution had given no power to Congress to confer upon free negroes rights and privileges which had not been conceded to them by the states where they resided. He said that in Maryland about one half of the colored population were free before the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, that in Delaware the free negroes largely outnumbered the slaves, and that in Kentucky the free negroes were a large part of the population. All that the Thirteenth Amendment did was to put the slave population on the same footing on which the free negroes already stood. Congress had no power to legislate on the status of free negroes in the several states before the Civil War. But the powers of Congress in this respect had not been enlarged by anything in the Thirteenth Amendment. That amendment had merely said that the condition of slavery—the condition in which one man belongs to another, which gives that other a right to appropriate the profits of his labor to his own use and to control his person—should no longer exist. Those who voted for the amendment might have contemplated a larger exercise of power by Congress than mere emancipation, but they did not avow it on the floor of the Senate when the measure was pending. He continued:
The honorable Senator from Illinois has avowed that he does not propose by this bill to confer any political power. I have no doubt the Senator is perfectly honest in that declaration, and that he personally does not mean to give any political power, for instance, the right of voting, not only to the freedmen, but to the whole race of negroes; but the intention of the Senator in framing this bill will not govern its construction, and I have not the least doubt that, should it be enacted and become a law, it will receive very generally, if not universally, the construction that it does confer a right of voting in the states; and why do I say so? Says the Senator, "It confers no political power; I do not mean that." The question is not what the Senator means, but what is the legitimate meaning and import of the terms employed in the bill. Its words are, "That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities." What are civil rights? What are the rights which you, I, or any citizen of this country enjoy? What is the basis, the foundation of them all? They are divisible into two classes; one, those rights which we derive from nature, and the other those rights which we derive from government. I will admit that you may divide and subdivide the rights which you derive from government into different classifications; you may call some, for the sake of convenience and more definiteness of meaning, political; you may call others civil.
What is property? It has been judicially decided that the elective franchise is property. Leaving out the question of voting, however, as a question of property, is it not true that, under our republican form and system of government, the ballot is one of the means by which property is secured? Your bill gives to these persons every security for the protection of person and property which a white man has. What is one means and a very important means of securing the rights of person and property? It is a voice in the Government which makes the laws regulating and governing the right of property. Under our system of government—mark you, I do not say that it is so under all governments—one of the strongest and most efficient means for the security of person and property is a participation in the selection of those who make the laws. It was therefore that I thought that the honorable Senator when he framed this bill meant to give to these persons the right of voting; and I should still think so but for his personal disclaimer of any such object.