The results of these tests have been, on the whole, very interesting. In almost every case, benzol has given better results than petrol, while the benzol-alcohol mixture has given results in some cases rather better than petrol, and in other cases not quite so good. On the average, the mixture has shown itself approximately equal to petrol, so far as consumption is concerned. By visiting Versailles in the early hours of September mornings when the temperature was fairly low, the writer satisfied himself that the use either of benzol or of the mixture did not constitute any serious difficulty in the way of starting up the engines. Moreover, the general absence of offensive smell or smoke seemed to indicate satisfactory combustion of the fuels.

As to the results of the French subvention scheme, the fact that the regulations have recently been made more severe, and certain restrictions as to horse-power, weight, etc., introduced, seems to indicate that the number of vehicles available at the time of the outbreak of war must have been at least approaching the number estimated as required. The last series of trials were only just over when war broke out. In these trials some sixty vehicles competed, representative of a considerable variety of makes and types, including a small number of Colonial lorries of special design, and one or two tractors. On the whole, the vehicles went through the trials well, and the opinions of experts who were present were all to the effect that great improvement was noticeable in mechanical details as compared with previous years.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the big fleet of the Paris General Omnibus Co. forms a very useful and conveniently concentrated supply of substantial cars available either for the rapid carriage of troops, or—by the substitution or conversion of bodies—for the transport columns. Numerically, however, the Paris omnibus fleet falls very far short of that of London, while from the mechanical point of view the vehicles are of heavier construction, and one would imagine less easily handled on narrow and winding country roads.

In Germany, a motor transport subvention scheme was inaugurated in 1908. At that time a limited number of German manufacturers were producing considerable quantities of heavy motor vehicles, more especially for export, but it was becoming evident that some very substantial encouragement would be needed to make the home market sufficiently active to be of any real utility to the War Office. Consequently, a scheme was got out which was openly stated to be “a scheme for popularising the use of mechanical transport,” or, in other words, a scheme for persuading business houses to adopt a species of transport which, without Government aid, would represent an uneconomical and consequently undesirable feature of an industrial concern. The German Government decided in favour of heavy motor lorries, capable of carrying 4 tons and hauling an additional 2 tons on a trailer. These trailers, contrary to usual commercial practice, are fitted with rubber tyres, since this addition is found to ease the work of hauling by some 25 to 30 per cent. The total subsidy for a subvention train consisting of a power lorry and rubber-tyred trailer amounts to something in the neighbourhood of £450 spread over a period of five years. The choice of a heavy type of vehicle was probably justified by the need for limiting the length of the transport columns destined to accompany enormous armies. At the same time consideration has evidently shown that there are grave disadvantages to the use of such heavy cars, and recent regulations have provided more stringent stipulations as to maximum weight.

When the subvention scheme had been in operation for five years, figures were got out indicative of its results up to the end of March, 1913. During this period 825 army trains were subsidised, namely, 743 in Prussia and the other states whose armies are under Prussian control, and 82 in Bavaria. In addition, some 400 lorries of very similar types were sold in Germany outside the scheme, making about 1,200 trains available for use at that time. Allowing for increase in the interval which has since elapsed, we may perhaps put the total available at the outbreak of war at about 1,600. Captain Davidson estimates that the German Army requires for transport purposes about 2,000 of its trains, but this figure presumably does not take into account the needs of the whole of the Landwehr and Landsturm. It is admitted that the normal British Expeditionary Force requires about 1,000 3-ton vehicles, which would correspond in capacity to about 500 of the German trains. Consequently, 2,000 of the German trains would apparently only be about sufficient for an army four times the size of our Expeditionary Force. Similarly, the estimate that France needs about 5,000 vehicles of the 3-ton type apparently does not take into account the complete mobilisation of reserves.

The manufacturing concerns which have figured most largely in the German scheme are the German Daimler, the Büssing, the N.A.G., and the Gaggenau. These four have all been participating in the scheme from the start, and about ten other manufacturers have more recently fallen into line, while in Bavaria only three manufacturers have been building to official requirements. The states the industries of which have enabled the strongest support to be given to the scheme are Brandenburg, Saxony, the Rhine Province, Würtemberg, Westphalia, Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine. No less than 41 per cent. of the total machines enrolled are normally used in the brewing trade. In this connection, an official report from Bavaria is rather instructive and amusing:

“There are so many breweries in Bavaria, and these are so densely distributed, that there is no need anywhere to convey beer for long distances. Hence there are practically no vehicles employed.”

This seriously expressed implication that beer is the only really essential commodity seems to show that lack of humour which appears to be a national characteristic of the German race.

Next after the brewing interests, but far behind in their practical support of the Government scheme, come concerns engaged in the transport of goods for export, followed by those concerned in brick transport, flour manufacture, carriage of building materials, agricultural work, and haulage of iron and steel goods.

In endeavouring to estimate how far the existing fleet meets the requirements of the Germany Army, we have to remember that it consists, at least partially, of machines that have been in service for several years, and that consequently may not be equal to any long strain under peculiarly difficult conditions. It must be presumed that the German Government has made provision for the continued manufacture of considerable numbers of heavy motor lorries throughout the war, and has not permitted the leading motor works engaged in this class of production to be too far denuded by the mobilisation of their men.