"You have proposed what I conceive you think is the only alternative to which I must flee, when I give up the truth of divine revelation. But may I not stop to inquire whether there is not some medium between the two extremes which you have mentioned? Must I believe that there was no such man as Jesus, or if there were, that he was an impostor; or else believe all that is stated concerning him? Must I also believe the same of the apostles or else believe them impeccable? May not even good men be honestly deceived? and being deceived, honestly lead others into an error?—That honest men do not bear 'testimony to falshood,' I admit; neither could such a principle be justified even under a 'pretence of doing good;' yet I will not undertake to say that no such pious frauds have ever been practiced in the world, and even among professed christians; and how soon it was practiced after the days of the apostles, and whether or not by some even in their day, would be very difficult now to determine. Neither is it necessary I should say any thing more upon the subject, as you admit this principle 'has been practised upon by a wicked priesthood for ages!'
"In remarking on my fourth proposition, which I added to the three which you had proposed, you say, 'I will not be too positive that I rightly apprehend your meaning on this subject, but as you propose to allow my three propositions, and as you make no attempt to do away my reasoning, especially on my last,' &c. Here permit me to observe, I am well persuaded you did not fully understand me, whatever you did yourself, on this subject. You will perceive, sir, both by my fourth number, and also by my fifth, that my answer to your three propositions was not completed. Probably if you had waited for the whole of my answer you would have understood me much better, and also would have seen the use and propriety of my fourth proposition.
"I think, as you will perceive by my fifth number that even honest men may be mistaken. And if so, it is very important to know whether the apostles judged only from outward circumstances, or whether they had some internal evidence, called inspiration, by which they always knew the truth of the things whereof they affirmed. This was the object of my fourth proposition.
"That you did not fully understand me appears by your saying, 'If it be allowed that my propositions are true, then you consent to the validity of the apostles' testimony respecting a future state.' If this could be allowed, it might then be admitted, that in this argument it makes no difference how the apostles come by their 'knowledge of futurity.'—But I did not know, neither do I now perceive, that my admitting the apostles to be honest men makes it necessary also to admit the validity of their 'testimony respecting a future state;' unless it can be shown that honest men are never mistaken respecting the things whereof they affirm. I admit the 'honesty' of my good friend, in the above quoted proposition; but I can hardly be willing, purely on this account, to 'consent' to its truth.
"As it respects an inheritance given in a WILL, &c. I have some doubts whether reason always carries things as far as you would wish to carry this metaphor to make it a parallel. Reason sometimes moves in a small circle; and that too without being unreasonable. If the benefit is said to have been absolutely made, and reason is informed of the fact, it has a right to take it for granted, that the donor had the property to give, and that it is not given to the injury of any one else. But yet he consults his own interest, and that only, when he says, 'this is very important to me, if true, yet I doubt, yea I have reasons for not believing it true.' Would any one say that such a man talketh unreasonably?
"You have called on me to prove 'that no revelation was needed;' and have acknowledged, 'that if none was necessary, a being of infinite wisdom would make none.' And at the same time you have argued very pathetically indeed to prove the necessity of a revelation; that is, if that can be called argument which grows out of a man's own feelings: A man, however, of different feelings might bring forward arguments equally energetic, and perhaps equally conclusive, but diametrically opposite.
"I know not what evidence you wish, or what evidence would be accepted, to prove that a revelation is not necessary. Even if such were the fact, it appears to me to be hardly susceptible of proof. It may be no more difficult, however, than it is to prove that a revelation is true. I presume that nothing short of a revelation would convince you that a revelation is not necessary! For who but God can know what either is, or is not necessary for God to make known?
"But if arguments drawn from our feelings are admissible, hear, for once, the voice of simple nature, proclaiming in her simplicity by every thing which exists either in or around you, that a revelation is neither necessary nor useful. That every thing which can be enjoyed in life can be enjoyed equally as well, and often better, without either its knowledge or belief. That every duty, either to God or man, can be performed as well, and with the same beneficial effect. And finally that man may be brought, without either the aid, knowledge, or belief of revelation, not only to be reconciled to his conditions and station in life, but also to curtail all his anxious desires to which he not only believes but knows there is a natural possibility of obtaining.
"If one could be brought who would solemnly testify to the truth of the above paragraph, would you believe his testimony? I presume not. But why not? Will you say it is impossible it should be true? No one can know this for a certainty, except those whose misfortune it is, if it be a misfortune not to believe in a future state of existence. If such there are, however, and yet their lives are exactly correct, their examples in society equally good, and their enjoyments apparently equally as great as other men, why should you doubt their testimony? Would you say they were bad men?—could you say they were dishonest men?—and if honest, according to your argument, why not believe them? I can see no inducement that any one could have to deny a revelation, if he believes it true; but I can see a very great inducement for mankind to maintain the reality of a revelation, although at the same time they may doubt its truth.
"If you doubt whether the human mind can be brought to such a state as has been mentioned above, it is only for the want of proper evidence; the fact, however, is susceptible of proof. Yea, it can be more than proved; the happy unbeliever in idle tales, but believing in eternal principles, knows it for a certainty. I do not mean that he knows for a certainty, that there is no revelation, but he knows for a certainty that a belief in revelation is not absolutely necessary to a happy life. Now, if such characters exists, will you receive their own testimony in support of the above fact? If not, it will be of no use to produce them.