"Here you will perceive, sir, that, according to your own statement, to prove this divine mission, you must first prove the certainty of those miracles, &c. on which the truth of the divine mission is predicated. And these are things about the truth of which, as I indicated all along, there may be serious doubts.
"I am at a loss also to understand, what you mean by a 'divine mission.' You inform me that I misapprehended you 'in supposing that' you 'mean to contend, that what the apostles have said respecting a future state, was spoken by way of conclusions from certain known facts.' Here, I must confess, I am really at a loss to understand you: how that either Jesus, or his apostles, could understand a divine mission, even if they had received one, unless it were by conclusions from certain known facts, that is, facts well known to them, I cannot conceive; and therefore must have some further explanation on this subject before I can fully answer you. For I must be better informed than I am at present, what you mean by a divine mission, before I can see the necessity of 'denying the reality of those miracles—or of granting the authority of their (Christ and his apostles) testimony;' that is, in regard to a future state. But even if I should be made to see this, it would be of no use for the present; because as it respects the final issue of the argument, I have not, neither do I now admit the reality of those miracles: as you must have seen by my seventh number.
"The next particular which demands notice is the quoted passage which
I pronounced Most excellent!
"Here a serious query suggests itself to my mind. I ask myself: am I, or am I not, as capable of writing my sentiments, so as to be understood by a rational man, as those plain illiterate men who wrote the gospels? And yet if my words are so wrested by logical twisticisms (if I may be allowed to use that expression) so as to mean what never entered my heart, and all this with apparent serious candor too, what may have been the fate of the writings of the evangelists? Now this is something in which I cannot be deceived, i. e. as it respects myself; for any man of common sense does know his own meaning, whether his words fully express his meaning or not, or whether they may be made to mean something else or not.
"Permit me therefore once more to explain. The expression, Most excellent! was not so much intended to have been applied to the sentence preceding it, as to the author of that sentence, whose goodness, in stating so explicitly what he understands by the christian faith, I commended. And you must excuse me for not being able to see any inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction in my words which follow that expression. Suppose a case. You have a good and faithful servant, who feels happy in your service, and is perfectly contented with his fare. You promise him with some favours which you had never before made known to him. He is elated with the idea of your goodness, which he has never doubted, but did not know till now that it was to be manifested in this particular way. You tell him that a knowledge of this, with his former knowledge, 'is as much as his present welfare requires.' He very readily assents to the truth of the proposition; and further adds, it is even 'more than is necessary for his present welfare,' for he was contented and happy before. Would any rational man say that your servant talked unreasonably? Would he say that such reasoning was absurd? I think not. Your servant does not despise either your goodness or your bounty; he considers that his master knows best, what is best for his servant; and he receives with gratitude whatever is bestowed. Your argument would have appeared to me more just, if, after fully understanding me, which I perceive, by the use you have made of the quotation from my sixth number, you now do, you had proved from well known facts, or from conclusive argument, the absolute necessity of the hope of a christian in order for the 'present welfare' of mankind. In doing this you would have ingenuously refuted the proposition which I say would have been exactly right.
"You do not seem, sir, yet to have fully understood me as to my object in searching for truth. You ask, saying, 'Do you not appear to be solicitous to have your doubts removed, without expecting the least advantage by it?' You must know, sir, that this is only on supposition, that my doubts are founded in error; in which case I should reap the advantage, as my object is truth. You will recollect that my first object was to search for moral truth; without being at all solicitous where, or on what ground it shall be found. Truth only is my object. In this only I feel at all interested in this argument. Hence I shall be just as much obliged to you to confirm me in my doubts, admitting they are founded in truth, as I shall to remove them, admitting they are founded in error.
"I once thought just as you, viz. that the idea and contemplation of enjoying future life was absolutely necessary to present enjoyment; but I am now fully convinced, yea, more, it is absolutely known to be a fact, that the idea is altogether visionary and illusive. I admit that a knowledge of the truth, so far as the truth may be known, is perfectly congenial with the present happiness of mankind: though it is often the case that a partial knowledge of the truth, in relation to any particular subject, produces distress and misery rather than enjoyment. I now am very happy in knowing some things, which, once, only the idea of their being true would have given me pain. I am inclined to think that the idea of now enjoying the pleasures, or now enduring the pains of a future life is altogether chimerical. I can enjoy the life or lives of others in a future tense just as well as I can now enjoy my own future life. I have as much reason to believe that rational intelligence always did exist, as I have to believe it always will; yea, one idea is just as certain to me as the other, and no more so. And as I cannot reflect on the idea of eternity past, only with a kind of reverential awe mingled with sublime pleasure; so the idea of eternity to come produces in me the same sensation; yea, feeling myself equally ignorant of both, (which must be the case on the supposition that revelation is not true.) I can perceive no difference. I feel anxious to know, however, every thing which can be known on this subject; and yet, at the same time, I am inclined to think I should doubt of every revelation of which I can have any conception, unless it should be so made that I could see its truth, (or at least the evidences of its truth) over and over again, and that they should still remain by me at all times, so that I could examine them, and re-examine them, the same as I now look at the stars in the firmament.
"Thus I have opened my mind to you, more fully than I have ever done before, on this subject; and notwithstanding your writings may be very beneficial to others (as well as mine, for some may stand in need of one, and some of the other) yet, here comes up my doubts again, if I am benefited by them, I expect it will be in a different way than that of being any more persuaded of the truth of divine revelation. Nevertheless, I am no less anxious to continue the correspondence on this account.
"Your address to TRUTH, which you are pleased to put into the mouth of my argument, is closed with an idea which does not grow out of my hypothesis. 'The joyous expectation of soon losing sight of thee (i. e. truth) forever in the ellysium of non existence!' Non-existence, sir, does not exist! Neither does the term convey an idea to my understanding of any thing. I know of no existence, neither can I conceive of any, except that which I believe to be eternal in its nature. And the idea of something being formed or made out of nothing, or of something's returning to nothing again, I have long since exploded. Every thing, however, excepting first principles, is liable to change. Hence arises the various modes, states, circumstances, conditions and situations in beings and things: also their different properties, relations and dependences.
"I know not whether consciousness is a being, or whether it be only a mode of being. If it be the former, it always did, and always will exist, in some state or other; if the latter, the state of the being may be so changed that although identity exists, yet consciousness is not there. And there is no more absurdity in this idea than there is in supposing that the same matter which forms a cube, may become a globe. I can as well conceive of a conscious being to day, becoming unconscious to-morrow, as I can conceive of a person in a sound sleep. But non-existence (strictly speaking) sounds to my understanding something like the falsity of truth!