"I will only observe here that a miracle, as I conceive, must be performed agreeable to, or else it must be a violation of the laws of nature. If the former, whatever it might be to others, to those who understood the means of its operation, it could be, strictly speaking, no miracle; and if no miracle, no evidence, to them, of divine inspiration: but if the latter, and those who performed the same were ignorant of the power by which they were performed, I do not see how that the performance of a miracle could give them any knowledge of futurity. And if not, what did give it to them, and in what way was it given?
"It will still be recollected that I do not admit the existence of miracles, although I speak of them as though they were true, merely to shew that even if they were true I should still have my difficulties respecting the truth of divine revelation.
"6th. Your remarks under the sixth article are satisfactory, though they have not convinced me of the incorrectness of my opinion; because that which is founded in truth is, after all the only thing that is 'good and nourishing' to the understanding. The sound mind pants only after truth; and as he knows eternal truth is unalterable, he is not foolish enough even to desire, it should be what it is not. The reason why we often desire that which we cannot have is because, not knowing the whole truth, we do not know but that we may have the things we desire.
"7th. As it respects 'not even deserving a future existence,' I was not fully understood. I only meant an anxious desire, as I expressed a little before, and as also I expressed anxious concern a little after; that is a desire which is incompatible with reconciliation to truth whether that truth gives us little or much. Had not truth been favourable to our existence we certainly should not have existed; and I can see no reason to fear a truth which has been so favourable as to give us being. It is true, a desire to exist as long as we can enjoy life seems to be inseparably connected with our moral nature; and yet I can see no terror in that which takes away our sensibility, whether it be for a night, for ages, or for eternity. I should just as soon think of being terrified at the idea of a sound and sweet sleep. If the truth be what I suspect it is, I see no good reason why it should be revealed to us, any more than the hour of our death! This truth is wisely concealed from us.
"8th. You have seen me so long in the dark that I begin to doubt whether you would be willing to own me correct, even if I should come fully into the light; i. e. according to your understanding. Is it possible sir, that you should suppose me capable of writing so great a solecism as the following, viz.: If a revelation were ever necessary, it was necessary only to convince mankind that a revelation is not true! But it seems that such must have been your construction, or very near it, or else you could not have found the error of so great magnitude, of which you speak. Although I did not express my idea so full and explicit as I might, and perhaps ought to have done, yet I can assure you that, by reconciling man to his present state, I meant nothing less than what you have expressed in a former letter; and I meant to include all for which you have contended in the article now under consideration. For 1st. If divine revelation were necessary, the thing revealed is undoubtedly true. 2d. If true, I am fully satisfied with your views on the subject.
"9th. Your explanation relative to what you suggested in a former letter (i. e. that I must mean that the apostles stated falsehood) is satisfactory; though what you now say you meant, as I have already informed you, was not exactly my meaning. The fact is, I did not mean to express any opinion as to the truth or to the falsity of the apostles' testimony. I very readily grant, however, that, if I 'do not believe that they stated the truth' 'I must believe that they stated falsehood;' unless (which would be very extraordinary) the weight of evidence be so exactly balanced in my mind that it is impossible for me to form an opinion on the subject.—But supposing I disbelieved their testimony altogether; what could I do more than to give my reasons for not believing it? Would it be reasonable to call on me to prove their testimony false? It is a very hard thing to prove a negative!
"You will have already perceived by my seventh number that I have no idea that the facts on which the Christian religion is said to have been founded can now be proved false. No, whatever might have been the case in the time of it, they were neglected too long before any attempt of this kind was made, though the accounts should have been supposed ever so erroneous as to promise any success in their refutation. And I am inclined to think that one century then would involve facts in as much obscurity as five centuries would now. But I have already expressed my doubts whether the facts on which the religion of the Shakers is said to be predicated, although not half a century standing, can now be proved false; and yet if they are true they are nothing short of miraculous.
"The Christian religion therefore, true or false, undoubtedly will stand, in some shape or other, and be believed more or less, as long as man remains upon the earth. For if it was introduced without any violations of the laws of nature, i. e. without miracles, which probably was the case, if false, we cannot expect any such violations for the sake of destroying it; and without such violations I do not see how it could be destroyed, because the believers of it, invariably, believe it to be established on such mysterious supernatural principles; and I expect but very few, comparatively, will ever have sufficient strength of mind to throw off the mystic veil.
"Yours, &c.