"Here let me close my preamble, which is already made too lengthy, and come immediately to discourse 'ON DIVINE REVELATION.'
"In order to know the truth or falsity of any proposition, we must in the first place understand the terms by which the proposition is made; for without such previous knowledge, we cannot know what is meant either to be affirmed or denied. By divine revelation, I understand 'a communication of sacred truth,' made directly from God to man. In order for any man to know that a revelation has been made to him from God, it must be made in such a way, that neither his perception, nor his judgment or understanding, can possibly be mistaken. For, as man by his reason alone, never could have foreseen that a revelation would be made, therefore, unless it should have been made in such a way that he could not have been deceived, a rational man would be more likely to conclude that he was deceived, than that, which to him would seem more unlikely, should be true. It seems, therefore, that a revelation from God to all our conceptions of the fact, must be considered, if existing at all, as something supernatural; otherwise it could be nothing more than discovery, or a fortuitous event. Hence a revelation from God, however true, and however clear, to the person or persons to whom it was first communicated, must lose its evidence, in some degree, when it comes to be communicated by him or them to others; for, being communicated to others, although it is still revelation, yet not being received immediately from God, it cannot be accompanied with the same evidence which it was in the first place; therefore, to say the most of it, it is nothing more than the history of a revelation. It is made no less true than it was before; but its truth now rests upon very different testimony.
"The principles in nature all existed, before they were discovered by man. Their being discovered, neither changed their nature, nor made them any more true. What consternation a total eclipse of the sun, or of the moon must have produced, before their cause was known? They are now viewed, especially that of the latter, among the common occurrences of nature. Yea, many of the operations of nature, which are now perfectly understood by chemists, could they be viewed by the common people, who know not their causes, they would be inclined to believe they were supernatural. At least, it would not be difficult to make them believe so, especially when this knowledge was confined to a few, and those few were so disposed. These remarks are not designed to do away the force of any arguments which may be founded on miracles; for this is no proof that miracles may not exist; but then, how is a miracle a revelation of any thing more than what is contained in the miracle itself? This is what I cannot see, but I shall have occasion to say more on this subject hereafter. It will be needless for me to object to the inferences drawn from miracles until a miracle is proven.
"If a man absolutely knows something of which I am ignorant, and informs me of it, it makes no difference to me how he come by his knowledge—it is revelation to me. It may not be divine revelation; but supposing it is, or is not, in either case, how am I to believe? Is it any thing that will admit of mathematical demonstration? If so, I shall take up with nothing short of being convinced in this way. Is it any thing which he has discovered? If so, he must give me evidence of such a discovery. Is it something to which he was an eye witness? Then the truth to me, depends for the present, entirely on his credibility. I must be convinced in the first place that he was not deceived himself, and secondly, that he has no motive in deceiving me. And evidence equally conclusive must accompany the truth of divine revelation, or it ought not, nay more, it cannot, rationally be believed. But supposing that I am convinced of the truth, and therefore believe; and I relate the same to a third person; is it equally revelation to him as it was to me? Yes, it may be so considered, in one sense, at least, for it informs him of something of which he was before ignorant, as much so as it did me, but then the truth of the fact does not rest with him on equal testimony, and therefore he is more excusable if he does not believe. If, however, he can believe all that I believe, and in addition to that, believe also in me, then, and not till then, he will become a believer in the same truth. But if he even suspects my veracity, it weakens in his mind, all the other testimony; and though he may still believe in the main proposition, yet he believes with less strength of evidence.
"Here a very important question arises in my mind. Is divine revelation something that rests entirely on matters of fact; or is the most essential part, which concerns us to know, a mere matter of opinion? On a few moments of reflection, however, it appears that this can hardly admit of a question. For all that relates to a future, and an eternal state, must be a mere matter of opinion only; and the facts recorded in the scriptures are supposed to corroborate and substantiate those opinions. Now, as they respect matters of fact, I believe the scriptures are substantially the same in all versions, and in all languages into which they have been translated. And if so, there is no need of learning the original languages in order to become acquainted with the matters of fact recorded in the bible. We never should have seen, nor even heard, of so much controversy and biblical criticism, if the disputes had been wholly relative to matters of fact. No, all the various readings, different translations, and interpolations, have little or nothing to do with a dispute of this kind. But if the facts can he disputed, they must be disputed upon other grounds than that of biblical criticism.
"Take, for instance, the 'death and resurrection of the man Christ Jesus,' which you have mentioned; can any one suppose that there ever was, or ever will be, a translation which makes any thing more or less in favour of this fact? This is not pretended. And if not, how does a knowledge of the Greek language help me to believe this fact?
"This brings me again to my main subject; and now two very important questions arise in my mind.
"1. In relation to the facts, as stated, respecting the life, death, and resurrection of the 'man Christ Jesus;' are they positively and absolutely true?
"2. Admitting the truth of the facts, does it necessarily follow, or is there any thing which renders it certain, that, in regard to other things, neither he, nor the apostles, so called, could be mistaken? And that, in all their writings, they have stated nothing which is incorrect? That is, what certain evidence have we that the writers of the books, which being compiled, are called the New Testament, were all honest men? That they could not have been mistaken relative to the things which they have written? And that in every instance, they have written the truth?
"Respecting the first proposition, I have already observed that the truth of it does not, neither can it, depend on biblical criticism. They are either facts, which are substantially correct, or they are fabrications. The circumstantial differences between the original copies themselves, as recorded by the four Evangelists, are much greater than what can be found in all the different versions, translations, &c. that have been collated. Hence no argument can be brought against the truth of those facts from either a real or supposed difference between the translation, and their respective originals. For even if not only the original copies, but the language also in which they were originally written, should be entirely lost, it would not militate, as I can see, against the truth of the facts therein recorded.