"When I look around on the circumstances and condition of men, I am so fully convinced that the aggregate of happiness so far overbalances the aggregate of misery, that I am firmly of opinion, yea, I do not entertain the least possible doubt of its truth, and therefore think I ever shall contend, that this life is a blessing, and we have abundant reason to be very thankful for it, without the least reference to a future state. But, nevertheless, I am very ready to admit, that, when futurity and immortality are taken into the account, and are connected with the same view of the character of the Deity, these blessings are all extended and magnified to infinity.
"But on the supposition that truth is any where connected with endless misery, the scene is wholly changed. On this supposition I am not reconciled to truth at all; I can find nothing in my moral nature, which I call good, but what stands directly opposed to it; Hence, the very brightest and most brilliant part of the picture is deformed by the awful idea; it takes away all the pleasure of investigation, and if this be truth, my only desire and prayer to God, is that I might be permitted to remain eternally ignorant of it! It is my confidence therefore in the goodness of the truth, and this only, which has reconciled my mind to it. You may contend that I have not obtained this confidence without the knowledge of divine revelation. Be that as it may; on this supposition only I am reconciled, and something must destroy this confidence before I can become unreconciled to truth. I think now I must be fully understood, and will therefore add no more on this subject.
"4th. What you say under the fourth article is satisfactory. Errors, no doubt, may be, and often are committed by applying instructions 'differently from their primary design.'
"5th. Your remarks under the sixth article are very judicious. Much injury no doubt is often done to the truth of divine revelation by contending so tenaciously as some do for things, which, if true, are not essential to its support.—It is often the case that, by trying to prove too much, we weaken the evidence, in the minds of many, respecting the main thing we wish to establish. Hence, the opposer, not being able, or else not disposed, to make proper distinction, considers it all of one piece; and not being able to see the propriety of many things, which are contended for with equal zeal, sets the whole down as a fallacy.
"6th. It is true, I thought you strained the argument a little too far in supposing that the apostles could not have been convinced of the truth of the resurrection by any evidence which could be counterbalanced. This induced me to state that supposed absurdity in still more glaring colors, with a hope that you would thereby be induced to take a review of your argument, and not without some expectation, that you would be able to see some defects in it. But in this I have been disappointed. You still hold on upon your argument, and turn the error wholly on your friend.
"But, as this is the turning point, I shall not blame you for straining every nerve, and holding on upon every fibre which gives you the least possible support.
"It would not do for you to give up the idea that the apostles could not have been convinced of the truth of the resurrection by any evidence which could have existed short of the fact's being true; (which, by the way, was what I meant by the first member of my criticism, though not exactly so expressed;) for the moment this is admitted, doubt and unbelief will soon contend that they were so convinced. Imagination may soon call up such evidence in the mind, without supposing any thing miraculous, and all the rest of the account may be supposed to be fictitious. I did not mean to insinuate, however, that you have contended that the apostles must have seen Jesus rise in order to be convinced of the fact. I suppose their seeing him after he was risen was as full a demonstration to them as though they had seen him rise. And if they could not have been convinced of its truth by any thing short of this, then they could not be convinced by any thing short of the fact; i.e. what was the same to them as the fact. The second member of my criticism, viz. 'If the fact did exist there is no evidence which can counterbalance it,' does not, as I conceive, suppose that you contend 'that the fact of the resurrection could not exist without proving itself to the apostles in such a way that no evidence could counterbalance it;' but it supposes that if the fact did exist, no evidence could prove that it did not exist, as it is always difficult to prove a negative, and utterly impossible when the positive is true.—Hence my conclusion; viz. As the apostles were convinced of the truth of the resurrection, which they could not have been only by evidence which could not have existed had not the fact been true, the fact did exist. How far does this criticism fall short of my other? (for it is exactly what I meant by my other.) Or how far does it go beyond your argument?
"Finally, I cannot conceive of any evidence that could sufficiently support the fact that Jesus who was crucified, did actually rise from the dead, if nothing could be brought to counterbalance it, that could possibly admit of being counterbalanced; and again: 'Thus we are brought to the suggestion, that any evidence which could be sufficient to prove such a fact, if no evidence appeared against it, must be such as admits, of no refutation.'
"Unless it may be reasonably supposed that the apostles were not absolutely so guarded against an error of this kind as this argument suggests, I know of no way to withstand its force. And I am sure I feel no disposition to withstand it, even against probability. It is the improbability of the fact it goes to prove, i. e. in my mind, that ever induced me to oppose it.
"I shall now take notice of the external evidence in support of the truth of divine revelation, which you have quoted from Paley in his view of the evidences of christianity.