Camp Siah Sung, 20th October.
To-day we have had the satisfaction of seeing marched out to execution in the Bala Hissar five prisoners, more or less directly concerned in the events of the last few weeks, whose guilt was very clearly established in our eyes. As might have been expected, it has been no easy matter to collect evidence in Cabul, many witnesses being afraid of after-consequences if they bore testimony to the conduct of men under suspicion. We have not notified in any way what is to be the duration of our stay here, and once our protection over our well-wishers is removed, their fate may be readily imagined. There is no one who cherishes revenge more fervently than an Afghan, and every witness would be marked down by the kinsmen of those against whom he had appeared. By a little judicious management, however, in which Hyat Khan, Assistant Political Officer, has been chief agent, pretty full evidence has been obtained without publicity, and after being carefully sifted, it has been submitted to the Military Commission,[[19]] of which General Massy is President, as the various prisoners implicated have been brought up. Yesterday this Commission had before it five prisoners, all of whom it sentenced to death by hanging, and to-day this sentence was carried out. The terms of the proclamation issued by General Roberts from Zerghun Shahr left no outlet of escape for all such persons as were concerned in the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his companions, or who offered armed resistance to the British troops advancing with the Amir under their protection. Death was the penalty incurred in either case; assassination being the one offence, and treason against their lawful sovereign the second. This dual mode of dealing with offenders was no doubt due to the inference that those who chose to fight against us must have so far committed themselves in prior events as to make them in technical term “accomplices after the act.” To aid and defend a murderer is to participate in his crime; and the leaders at Charasia and on the Deh-i-Afghan Heights, though nominally only accused of high treason against Yakub Khan, were really guilty of abetting the men who had fired the Residency and slaughtered its inmates in the early days of September.
In the attack upon our Embassy and in the after-tumult and organized resistance to our troops, it was known that the city people had borne a prominent part, and it was therefore necessary that one of their leaders should be made to suffer for their offences. Accordingly, the Kotwal, or chief magistrate of Cabul, was arrested immediately after the proclamation of Sir F. Roberts had been read in the Amir’s garden, and he was the chief personage among the five tried yesterday. The evidence against this man, Mahomed Aslam Khan, was that after the Residency had been stormed, he ordered and superintended the throwing of the bodies of the Guides over the Bala Hissar wall into the ditch below, where they now lie in a deep hole covered over with stones and rubbish. This was his active participation in the first series of events, and there was no doubt the influence his position gave him was exercised in every way in favour of the mutineers, and that he made no effort to control the city rabble. When it became known in Cabul that our forces were encamped at Charasia, he showed himself most active in organizing measures to drive us back. On the night before the fight, when all the fanatical passions of the soldiery and the populace were excited to the utmost, he issued a proclamation in which all faithful Mahomedans were called upon to assemble and march out to do battle against the British. This was circulated throughout the city and neighbourhood, and brought in many recruits; while, to keep the ill-organized army up to its work, he gave Rs. 1,000 to the bakers to cook food for the troops. This they were to carry with them to the Charasia Heights. The police were further employed to turn out, in the early morning of October 6th, all faint-hearted citizens who shirked the duty imposed upon them of meeting our army. With a boldness that seemed almost like bravado, Aslam Khan did not seek safety in flight when we encamped before Cabul, but actually acted as our guide, when Sir Frederick Roberts visited the ruins of the Residency. He explained very vividly all that took place, and even pointed out the grave of the Guides below. His defence before the Commission was, that the bodies were thrown over the wall by his people without his knowledge; and that in respect of the proclamation, he issued it at the instigation of Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the rebels, who said the Amir had given orders to that effect. There was just a colourable excuse in this, as it is now established beyond doubt that Nek Mahomed visited the Amir in our camp the night before Charasia. The Amir was really a puppet in the hands of the men then about him, and it is quite on the cards that they authorized Nek Mahomed to use his name freely; and that in this way the proclamation was published. The double dealing of the Wazir, the Mustaufi, and Zakariah Khan and his brother, have since come to light, and they are now under arrest awaiting trial, though sufficient evidence to hang them is not yet forthcoming. It is an ill-return on the part of the Amir’s retinue that the freedom granted to them on the march to Cabul should have been thus abused. The messengers we allowed him to receive and despatch in all good faith seem to have been merely emissaries of the mutineers preparing a trap in which to destroy our force. That Nek Mahomed should be in our camp on the 5th and fight against us on the 6th, in command of 4,000 or 5,000 troops, was the outcome of our generosity towards Yakub Khan, whom we treated as a guest instead of a prisoner. He himself is so weak-minded and helpless, that one hesitates to accuse him of direct treachery. But the case is very different with his most trusted ministers, who are now in safe custody in the quarter-guards of our British regiments. Nek Mahomed is a fugitive, and it is doubtful if we shall ever capture him, unless he is ill-advised enough to try conclusions with us in the winter months; but if he is ever caught, and can be tempted to make a clean breast of it, the truth of the whole business in which he was the leading spirit will be made clear. It is only bare justice to Yakub Khan to give his own version of Nek Mahomed’s interview with him. The Amir states that he entreated Nek Mahomed to return and order the dispersal of the mutinous regiments then in the Bala Hissar: to forbid the city rabble from showing any resistance to us; and to issue a warning against any one appearing armed in or near Cabul. This is the Amir’s statement, and until Nek Mahomed is forthcoming, it must be looked upon as trustworthy.
The second prisoner, if lowest in rank, seems to have been most intimately connected of the batch with the revolting scenes following the Massacre of the Embassy. This was Aghir Khan, chowkidar of Mundai, who was sworn to as having carried the head and shoulders of one of the English sahibs from the smoking ruins of the Residency to the ridge on which stands the Upper Bala Hissar, overlooking the city. This was on the morning after the place had been sacked, and it was generally believed that it was Sir Louis Cavagnari’s head that was carried along. Aghir Khan’s defence was, that he took the head with the intention of preserving it until the British should come; but that on reaching the ridge the Kotwal’s people seized it, and that he could not learn what afterwards became of it. His story was quite unsupported, and the man’s general demeanour and known character were all against him. A more ruffianly-looking face could scarcely be found in the whole of Afghanistan, which is very prolific of such growths.
In this outbreak of fanaticism in Cabul, it was quite impossible that the moollahs could remain quiet, their known hatred to foreign intrusion being always a dangerous element in local politics. One of the five prisoners was Khwaja Nazir, a priest of great influence, who preached a jehad, collected large numbers of his most fanatical followers, gave them a standard, and sent them out to Charasia. The fourth man tried was Sultan Aziz, a Barakzai, son of the Nawab Mahomed Zaman Khan, ex-Governor of Khost. Being related in blood to the reigning family, it was all the more significant that Sultan Aziz and his father should have fought at Charasia, after being leading spirits in arming the mob which flocked into the Bala Hussar on the evening of the 5th October. The fifth and last prisoner was Kaisruh Khan, ex-General in rank and Superintendent of Army Clothing: he played a similar part to that of Sultan Aziz. All five prisoners were condemned to death by the Commission, and this sentence was confirmed by the Major-General Commanding. This morning they were marched out of camp at half-past nine, under escort of a company of the 92nd Highlanders, a fatigue party following with picks and shovels as grave-diggers. There was very little ceremony observed, and only a few Cabulis from the city looked on as the men were escorted towards the Bala Hissar gate. Two scaffolds had been raised, the Kotwal being honoured with a special rope outside the door which young Hamilton so gallantly defended, and which was eventually battered in by the fire of the field-piece dragged up by the mutineers. The other four were hanged on a scaffold built in the courtyard, round which the Guides had been quartered. With the usual apathy of Mahomedans, the men did not seem to appreciate their fate, and gave no trouble when told to mount the scaffold. They were buried in a rudely-dug grave near where they were hanged, and the gallows still remain ready for any other prisoners who may be considered worthy of death. The news of the execution is said to have had a healthy effect upon the city, it being now made clear to the populace that our old, absurd mode of dealing with assassins as if they were saints, has no longer a place in our policy. However distasteful the office of hangman may be, it has to be filled; and in the present case our army is but taking the place of the executioner by pressure of circumstances. The mutineers had not the courage to defend the city they had incriminated by their acts; and having spared the city, all that remains for us to do is to punish such of the rabble whose guilt is brought home to them.
There have been few changes in camp beyond a reduction in the number of regiments encamped on Siah Sung Ridge. The 5th Ghoorkas, 23rd Pioneers, and F-A, R.H.A., are now in Sherpur cantonments busily engaged in hutting themselves. The place is so filthy that a systematic cleansing and fumigating process is being instituted by Dr. Porter, in chief medical charge. The floors of the rooms are being scraped to a depth of three or four inches, and new floors laid down, while the wholesome influence of whitewash is also being brought to bear upon the walls. Our troops are very healthy now—no cholera has been reported for a week—and it would be absurd to risk the chance of typhoid fever and kindred diseases by neglecting ordinary sanitary precautions. The barracks are expected to prove very comfortable quarters for the winter, as it seems plain we shall have to stay here for four or five months. Since the capture of the twelve guns, abandoned so hastily on the Ghazni Road, we have heard no more of regiments marching down upon Cabul, and for the present at least the enemy may be looked upon as non-existent. From the Shutargardan, too, we hear of the dispersion to their homes of the Mangals and Ghilzais who have worried Colonel Money so persistently, and perhaps there may now be a chance of our fortnight’s post reaching us. It will be the last from that direction, as it has been resolved to trust in future to the Jellalabad route. What is the reason of the slow advance from the Khyber? This is what every one is asking, and the answer is generally brief enough: “Want of transport.”
Camp Siah Sung, 23rd October.
Yesterday two ressaldars of the Afghan cavalry, who were proved to have been in the Bala Hissar during the attack upon the Embassy, and to have shared in the after-events, were marched out to execution in the Bala Hissar. When told they were to suffer death ignominiously by hanging, they showed no alarm, answering merely “It is well.” This indifference to death stands these men in good stead; for, if found guilty, they are executed within twenty-four hours, thus leaving them only a very short time in which to consider the awkward termination of their careers. As a little trait of character it may be mentioned that one of these ressaldars, a fine portly man, picked out the stone from his signet-ring during the night, his pride no doubt prompting him to destroy the stone sooner than it should fall into infidel hands. It may be that he found means to convey it away secretly to his friends; but so close a watch is kept upon condemned prisoners that this seems unlikely. Ten o’clock is the hour at which men are generally hanged; and now, daily, a little crowd of soldiers, camp-followers, and traders from the city gathers near the 72nd quarter-guard, from which starts the road down the ridge. The soldiers, in shirt-sleeves and with the favourite short pipe in their mouths, betray but faint curiosity, looking upon the culprits with hearty contempt, and only regretful that they have not had to meet them in fair fight. “If we’d been the French,” I heard one man plaintively say, “there’d have been more than two or three.” No doubt there would; but our mode of warfare with men, compared with whom the Arabs of Algeria are gentlemen, is very different to that followed by the generals of Napoleon III. The few Afghans who watch the little company of British infantry marching down with the prisoners in their midst are almost as much attracted by the bayonets of our men as by the presence of their unlucky countrymen; and they soon turn back to our tents to mulct us in rupees by sharp bargaining in poshteens (sheep-skin coats), furs, carpets, and Russian chinaware. The two ressaldars stepped out boldly enough to keep pace with their escort; and whatever their feelings may have been, they concealed them stolidly enough. They looked less brave when standing pinioned, with the rope about their necks, facing the ruins of the Residency; and not one on-looker felt the least pity for them, for the shot-marked walls on every side call up bitter memories and silence any thought of mercy. Our Black Assize is a very small one so far; for the majority of the leaders have escaped, and we have to content ourselves with the small fry. Even as it is, men are remanded from day to day if the evidence is at all faulty, and the Military Commission are careful to avoid jumping to conclusions. To-day a sepoy of the 1st Herat Regiment was hanged; and as he was caught in the city by a Kizilbash, it is expected that more of his companions are still hidden within the walls. With a temerity that showed his desperate case, this man had his rifle and ten cartridges with him, but he made no show of resistance. The difficulty of obtaining evidence is gradually disappearing, the Kizilbash who handed the sepoy to General Hills, Military Governor of Cabul, coming forward openly and stating all that he knew. It is to these Kizilbashes that we shall have greatly to trust in examining into the details of the Massacre, as the city people are all against us. Being semi-independent, and forming a powerful section among themselves, the Kizilbashes have less to fear, than others, from any measures of revenge that may afterwards be taken against them; and if we can once get them to speak openly, our work will be greatly simplified. Of the secret combination which Kushdil Khan, Nek Mahomed, and the other influential chiefs about the Amir’s person promoted, it will be far more difficult to take up the threads; but there is still some hope of tracing the conspiracy to its source. As the investigation proceeds, and the various statements forthcoming are dove-tailed into each other, it will become plain upon whom the chief guilt is to rest. There are still several prisoners to be tried, and each day adds its little quota of evidence against the large class of “suspects.”
There will no doubt be exception taken to the course Sir F. Roberts is pursuing, and political capital may be made out of it;[[20]] but unless the mission of the army now before Cabul is to be a failure, there is no option but to follow out to the end the lines of policy laid down. The murder of our Envoy and his escort was, as the Proclamation in the Bala Hissar of October 12th sets forth, “a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people,” and there is but one punishment for treachery and cowardice of this kind. If daily executions are to be the rule for the next few weeks, they can only be those of isolated persons who may fall into our hands; and their death is a very small atonement for the crime in which so many participated. The city rabble is unpunished; the Herat regiments have escaped; and if we are nominally in possession of Northern Afghanistan, that possession means very little to the ruffians we have to deal with. They will pocket our rupees and thrive upon us as long as we remain; and the instant we take our departure, their arms, now hidden, will soon be furbished up again for future mischief. Apart from this view of the case—which is, of course, only taken as regards the discontented and fanatical part of the nation more nearly concerned in the events of the first week in September—there are two other considerations which have to guide us in all that we are doing. The first is that our presence is not desired by any Afghan of spirit in the country, and the second and far more serious is that we have on our hands and are proclaiming ourselves the protectors of a sovereign who has scarcely a vestige of power. Of our position towards the Amir Yakub Khan I will speak presently; but the sullen submission of the people can more readily be disposed of. Whatever despot has governed Afghanistan his subjects have always preferred to suffer under his rule than to submit to outside[outside] interference; and this jealousy of foreign intruders has always been a stumbling-block in our dealings with Amirs in days gone by. We have had to calculate not only upon the sincerity of the ruler, but upon his capacity for controlling the fanaticism of his subjects. Up to the Treaty of Gundamak, we blindly believed that such capacity could exist. Now, after being roughly undeceived, we have taken for a time these subjects under our immediate control, and we find them submitting to superior force, but yielding in no way cordially to their fate. We can trust them while an army is among them, but our acts are only looked upon as temporary, and not the least active assistance can be counted upon in our search after those whom we have come to punish. The people will give supplies when each village is visited by a purchasing party, strongly escorted by our cavalry; but otherwise they would gladly let us starve sooner than open their grain-stores for our benefit. The few days on which we had to fight, every villager who thought he could do so with safety to his own skin pulled trigger upon detached parties of our men; and if the headmen are now coming in, seeing Cabul is at our mercy, it is because they dread a visitation from our troops. They are as insincere in all their protestations of friendship as forty years ago; but we put the proper value now upon their promises, and are strong enough to punish them if occasion arises. Such is the attitude relatively of our army and the people: the only sign we give of our supremacy being by keeping a tight hand upon Cabul itself, and by hanging such of our prisoners as participated in its crime.
Our relations with the Amir are on a very different footing, though it would puzzle a Russian diplomatist to say what is the basis of our policy. It is a mixture of suspicion, forbearance, and contempt. Once Yakub Khan had thrown himself upon our protection and disowned the acts of the mutineers, his personal safety was assured, and this, no doubt, was his first aim. But how much further did he mean to go? That he heartily desired his turbulent regiments to be punished one can well believe, and that he schemed to save Cabul from the fate it had courted is quite possible; but unless an accomplice in their acts, he could not have expected that his most trusted ministers and kinsmen would be arrested and himself confined to our camp. Here he must see our suspicion peeping out: but, then, mark our forbearance. In our proclamations rebellion against the Amir has been cited as worthy of death; we are living upon tribute grain collected as due to him; the citizens of Cabul have been declared “rebels against His Highness,” and our Military Governor of the city is “administering justice and punishing with a strong hand all evil-doers” with his “consent.” This is one side of the picture, and these acts are the direct outcome of our efforts to re-establish something like order after the anarchy which prevailed when we began our march upon the capital. There is nothing of contempt in them; it is merely laying the foundation for replacing the Amir on his throne more securely for the future. Our forbearance is further shown by the consideration displayed towards his subjects: nothing is taken that is not paid for—and, in most instances, exorbitantly paid for—and there is not the slightest affectation of treating the country through which we pass as conquered territory. But there is another side of the picture where new aspects appear and some anomalies crop up. The Amir’s authority is proclaimed as justification for many of our acts; and yet at the same time we loot his citadel, and seize upon, as spoils of war, all guns and munitions of war which for a few weeks only had passed out of his hands into those of the rebels. Did he, by abandoning his capital and its defences, lose all right and interest in the cannon which guarded them, in the ammunition collected for years past in the Bala Hissar, and in the very clothing prepared for his regiments? Apparently he did, for the two hundred and fourteen guns now in our camp are looked upon as captured from an enemy who used many of them against us; the untold quantity of gunpowder which the explosion of the 16th untouched is to be destroyed; and our camp-followers are masquerading in the warm uniforms of Afghan Highlanders. This is the feature of contempt in our policy. Our war, unlike that of last year, is against the subjects of the Amir, and not against the Amir himself; and, so far as we have gone, we have assumed the functions of the sovereign in their fullest sense, using his name only to smooth away difficulties that would otherwise have to be overcome by force. This assumption has had to be made for the simple reason that Yakub Khan is too weak and vacillating to exercise the authority which we have so ostentatiously recognized, and his ministers too corrupt to be trusted near his person. But beyond the immediate exercise of military power in Cabul and its neighbourhood, we can do nothing. There is no responsible Government which could take out of our hands the task of hunting up the men who have been guilty of treachery and murder; and as our first duty is to our dead Envoy and not to the living Amir, it follows that our present work is that of judges and not of king-makers. That work has to be done, and we are doing it unflinchingly, and until it is completed, the Amir must be content to accept his position as a sovereign in leading strings. By the time we have dealt with all the culprits that can be captured, the cloud of suspicion now resting upon Yakub Khan will either have deepened or been dissipated, and our second duty of punishing or aiding him under his difficulties will then have to be fulfilled. The drift of evidence seems now fairly in his favour, i.e., he was not involved in the work of Nek Mahomed and Kushdil Khan; and taking it as most probable that he will finally be convicted of nothing worse than weakness, it will remain with us to say if he is again worthy of our trust. With his army dispersed, and his artillery (which goes for so much in the eyes of Asiatic nations) in our hands, the only semblance of power he can derive will be reflected from our arms—if we reinstate him in good faith. And if his weakness is held as our justification for reducing him to the rank of a political pensioner, comfortably housed in India, are we to fit out his successor with new war-trappings, which may at any moment be seized by mutinous regiments and turned against us at the first opportunity? More unlikely things have occurred than this; but unless our army carries back with it to India the trophies it now boasts of, there will be sad disappointment in every mind.