They played the same prominent part during the siege, but they were ill-supported, and though a few succeeded once in placing a flag within 250 yards of the corner bastion looking towards Deh-i-Afghan, not a man remained, when night fell, to remove their cherished trophy: our Martinis had proved too fatal at so short a range. In the final assault on December 23rd the fanatical leaders were again in the van; and if they had been followed by the thousands who hung back so irresolutely, then there might have been a hand-to-hand fight in our trenches. In isolated instances, a ghazi would be seen within a few score yards of our defences, only to go down riddled through and through, though one more desperate than his companions reached the abattis, and had begun to pull away the intercepting branches, when he also was shot. To quote more instances of the audacity of the ghazi would be useless. I have said enough to prove his recklessness, and to show that, with an army of such men against us, even our splendid arms and steady discipline might avail nothing. But the true ghazi is a phenomenon—he at least deserves the scientific and sonorous title—and even Afghan fanaticism cannot bring forth many, however great may be the eloquence of the moollahs. Of the more despicable ghazi—the man who runs amuck in an infidel camp or waylays a Kafir in the streets of a city—I have nothing to say. Cabul has been free from such pests, and we do not wish to hear the cry of “ghazi!” raised. The fanatic generally takes so much killing that our revolver ammunition would run short were he to put in an appearance periodically.
CHAPTER XXIV.
The Outlook at Cabul in February—Appointment of Mr. Lepel Griffin to be Chief Political Officer—Abdur Rahman Khan in Badakshan—Nek Mahomed in Turkistan—Probable Movements of the Two Sirdars—Biography of Abdur Rahman Khan—His Struggle with Shere Ali—Takes Refuge with the Russians in Turkistan—Sir Richard Pollock’s Estimate of his Character—His Relations with the Russians—Biography of Mushk-i-Alam, the Moollah—His Power over the Tribes—Mahomed Hasan Khan’s Life—His Russian Proclivities—Asmatullah Khan and the Northern Ghilzais—Daoud Shah’s Career—Serves under Akhbar Khan and Shere Ali—Reasons for his Deportation to India.
It would be scarcely worth while to reproduce letters which dealt chiefly with current rumours of Mahomed Jan’s movements, and I will therefore only give extracts sufficient to make clear the course of events. Our Governor of Kohistan was never able to get beyond Baba Kuch Kar, and Mahomed Jan’s agents in Logar, Wardak, and Maidan were constantly heard of. Writing on February 1, I said:—
It seems likely that we shall have to visit Ghazni, which is now the head-quarters of the malcontents, unless some declaration of policy by the Home Government puts an end to our occupation of Cabul. General Roberts has asked for the heavy battery to be sent up from Peshawur, and with three 40-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers, we could batter the Ghazni fortress about the ears of its defenders. In Sherpur the guns captured from the enemy in October are being tried, and a certain number found serviceable are being put in order. Some garrison artillerymen from Peshawur are being sent up, and will form our garrison battery here.
The political dead-lock remains unchanged. Our policy of “benevolent inactivity” has not altogether pleased some of the local sirdars, who are nothing, if not place-hunters. They have seen Wali Mahomed made Governor of Cabul, and no doubt it was expected that positions of “trust” would be assigned to them. But they have been disappointed, and, in return, have vented their anger and disgust by posting four or five seditious placards on the walls of the city. The tenor of these was to point out how much better off the people were under the old Amirs than under General Roberts, whom they accuse of sinning “through foolishness and ignorance”—perhaps of their own personal wants. Such abuse hurts no one, and can have but little effect upon the popular mind, for there can be no mistake as regards our leniency towards Cabul itself. The appointment of Mr. Lepel Griffin to be Chief Political Officer here has been announced by the Government of India, and has given general satisfaction in cantonments, as the political work now done by the General will be minimized, and his hands will be free to deal more fully with matters purely military. One thing is fervently desired, and that is that Mr. Lepel Griffin will come with a programme of policy in his pocket, as it is too aggravating to have a General and his army in the unpleasant position of a ship at sea without orders: liable to be knocked about by every gale that blows, and yet without any port to make for. The best crew in the world would grow discontented under such circumstances. We have had our buffeting, and have weathered it, and now we should like fair weather and clear instructions as to our future destination.
16th February.
It is rather difficult at present to follow the movements of Abdur Rahman Khan, whose name now is oftener in men’s mouths than that of any other Afghan chief of importance. As I predicted, Abdur Rahman seems likely to play a leading part in Afghanistan, and his reported arrival in Badakshan shows that his influence may be felt upon local politics at any moment. We have always had much trouble in getting news of Turkistan affairs; and though we heard from European telegrams that Abdur Rahman had been dismissed by the Russians, and had started to try his fortunes again in Afghanistan, we could not gain trustworthy reports of his arrival south of the Oxus. Once, it is true, he was said to be at Balkh; but no confirmation of the report was forthcoming, and it was soon disbelieved. Now, at last, we have new accounts of his movements. Merchants in Cabul have received letters from agents at Balkh, in which it is distinctly stated that the exiled son of Mir Afzul Khan is in Badakshan, with 3,000 Turcomans, and is preparing to make good his claims to the Amirship. Without jumping to any rash conclusions, it may be possible to explain clearly enough the train of circumstances which have brought Abdur Rahman once more to the front. The death of Shere Ali and the accession of Yakub Khan might have tempted him to make another effort for the throne; but without the assistance and countenance of Russia he could scarcely hope to be successful. To raise an army money is needed; and though the Russians were considerate enough to pay the exiled prince a liberal pension, they were too anxious to keep on good terms with England to subsidize a pretender to the Amirship just when the Treaty of Gundamak had been signed. Abdur Rahman may have been convinced, also, that Yakub Khan would never be strong enough to carry out the treaty, and that his downfall, either at the hands of his own subjects or of the British, would leave Cabul open to other competitors. The massacre of our Envoy, the march of Sir F. Roberts’s force upon Cabul, and the dispersion of the rebel army, followed each other so rapidly that the country was paralysed, as far as active resistance went. The flight of Nek Mahomed (uncle of Abdur Rahman) to Russian territory was the signal for the collapse of the Afghan army, and doubtless the fugitive General warned his nephew that, to attempt any campaign while the British were posing as the protectors of Yakub Khan and the conquerors of Cabul would be little short of madness. Besides, if Yakub Khan were to be reinstated, and his rule made secure by a new British alliance, rebellion against him would be full of danger. That, in case of certain contingencies, a plan of action was arranged between Abdur Rahman and Nek Mahomed would appear certain; and it is half-suspected that Russian sympathy was freely extended to them, and a hint given that practical aid would also be afforded when the plan was ripe for execution. They were waiting upon Providence; and the first reward for their patience was the deportation of Yakub Khan to India on December 1st, and the assumption by the British of the temporary sovereignty of Cabul. The Amirship thus became vacant; and Abdur Rahman, as the son of Mir Afzul Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, could fairly lay claim to the throne. Yakub Khan’s son was a mere child; there was no one of any great influence in the British camp who could hope to be successful as Amir; and who so likely to be welcomed by the people as Abdur Rahman, a favourite alike with the army and the tribes? The jehad preached by Mushk-i-Alam, and the temporary success of Mahomed Jan’s army at Sherpur, must have more than ever convinced the exiles that their chance had come and their plan might be put to the test. What that plan was can only be judged by after-events; but its broad outlines seem to have been the raising and equipping of a body of Turcoman horse and the crossing of the Oxus at two points. Abdur Rahman directed his steps towards Badakshan, where his wife’s kinsmen are in power; while Nek Mahomed passed into Turkistan by the Kilif ferry, fifty miles north-west of Balkh. Abdur Rahman’s force is said to have been 2,000 or 3,000 Turcoman horsemen; and his treasure-chest, by native report, contained 12 lakhs of rupees in Bokhara gold tillahs when he crossed the river. Nek Mahomed’s escort is also made up of Turcomans; and his object seems to be to gain over Gholam Hyder, Governor of Turkistan, while Abdur Rahman raises levies in Badakshan. A powerful combination would thus be formed north of the Hindu Kush; and by the spring, which brings with it the melting of the snows and the opening of the Passes about Charikar and Bamian, the pretender to the throne should have under his orders a well-equipped and numerous army. Perhaps the most important work to be done before Abdur Rahman could move out of Badakshan was the gaining of Gholam Hyder’s co-operation. In a letter written two months ago I showed that the Governor of Turkistan really held only the country south of the Oxus between Aebak and Akcha; a Kirghiz chief having raided into the districts west of Akcha, while the Khan of Kunduz (120 miles east of Balkh) was supreme in the hill-country between Aebak and Badakshan. Gholam Hyder’s power lies mainly in his possession of one or two field batteries, and in having under his orders several regiments of cavalry and infantry, many of whom are well-armed with rifles made on English patterns. From reports which have reached Cabul it would appear that he was very uneasy when the fact of Abdur Rahman’s and Nek Mahomed’s presence to east and west of him became known. He was at first doubtful of their intentions, and, as a precautionary measure, massed his cavalry and guns at Mazar-i-Sharif, one march south-east of Balkh. In the meantime Abdur Rahman, with the aid of his 12 lakhs (of which it is shrewdly suspected that at least half was given to him as a subsidy by the Russians), was making it clear in the eyes of the Badakshanis that his new expedition was something more than a visionary attempt to regain Cabul. One of his wives is a daughter of Jehandar Shah, late Mir of Badakshan, whose son now governs at Faizabad, the capital of this northern province. So successful has Abdur Rahman been, that he has not only won over the Badakshanis, but also the Khan of Kunduz, who has offered him help in his new venture. Rumour also states that Gholam Hyder has cast in his lot with the pretender, and that an amicable meeting between their forces is to take place at Mazar-i-Sharif. Of course it is possible that affairs have not run so smoothly as represented; but still native rumour is wonderfully correct as a rule, and the appearance of Abdur Rahman is a new and most important factor in the Afghan problem. He has with him Ishak Khan, son of Sirdar Azim Khan, who was Amir for a short time when Shere Ali’s fortunes were at their lowest ebb. I have before spoken of Abdur Rahman’s popularity, and his soldierly qualities are universally acknowledged. What his future plans may be can only be conjectured. The timid and characterless sirdars we have now with us are rather alarmed at his approach, and their uneasiness is, perhaps, justifiable. Probably, in the spring, he may march an army from Balkh through Khulm, Aebak, and Saighan to Bamian, or he may try the more easterly route over the Hindu Kush to Charikar and Kohistan. What our course of action will be in such a case I am not prepared to say; but that Abdur Rahman may yet be Amir of Afghanistan is quite within the range of possibility. But for the fatal taint of Russian influence which it is only fair to suppose has affected his character during his stay in Tashkend, he would make a nominee whom we could trust, for his ability is beyond question.
The following is a short sketch of his life—a life which has been stormy even for an Afghan prince. His father was Mahomed Afzul Khan, eldest son of the Dost Mahomed; but on his mother’s side he has Populzai blood in his veins. In 1863-64, when the death of the Dost had rendered the throne vacant, Afzul Khan, as eldest son of the deceased Amir, objected to his claims being set aside in favour of his younger half-brother, Shere Ali, and soon the country was in a state of civil war. Abdur Rahman was placed by his father in charge of Takhtipul, in Turkistan, and showed some genius as a soldier, but was eventually obliged to confess himself beaten by Shere Ali’s forces. He made a half-hearted submission, and, being suspected of still intriguing in favour of his father, was summoned to Cabul. This order he refused to obey; but, dreading the consequences, fled across the Oxus into Bokhara, where many other sirdars had taken refuge. Turkistan was still very unsettled, and Abdur Rahman induced many of the garrison of Balkh to desert Shere Ali and cross into Bokhara. The Amir of that Khanate openly espoused his cause, and aided him in many ways. With a small, but well-equipped, force he at last recrossed the Oxus and made for Akcha, then in charge of Faiz Mahomed Khan. The latter, finding himself unequal to any successful resistance, threw over Shere Ali and united his garrison with the force from Bokhara. The Governor of Turkistan, Fateh Mahomed Khan, was not so easily won over, and resisted the new army. His soldiers, however, proved faithless; and, leaving them to continue their own course of action, he fled from Turkistan. Abdur Rahman thus found himself, in a few weeks, at the head of a fairly powerful army; and, pushing on to Takhtipul, he resumed his old position as Governor. Turkistan had thus fallen easily into his hands, and so striking was his success, that he resolved upon a march to Cabul. His uncle, Azim Khan, a man of some ability, joined him; and Shere Ali, still having with him Afzul Khan, a prisoner, was forced to leave his capital. On the 24th of February Abdur Rahman entered the city without opposition; but he had still to deal with Shere Ali, who was collecting an army in the South. In May the two armies came into collision at Sheikhabad, on the Ghazni Road, and Abdur Rahman gained a complete victory. His father was released, and was proclaimed Amir in place of Shere Ali. But Afzul Khan, a confirmed drunkard, was but a weak and incapable ruler, and his brother, Azim Khan, practically held all power in his hands. Abdur Rahman then, full of energy and flushed with success, tried to counteract his uncle’s schemes; and the quarrel might have widened into a serious breach between the two had not the presence of Shere Ali, with a second army at Candahar, made it imperative to sink all differences before a common danger. Uncle and nephew again took the field, and marching southwards through Ghazni, met and defeated Shere Ali’s army at Khelat-i-Ghilzai. This was on the 16th of January, 1867. But opposition still had to be encountered, Faiz Mahomed, half-brother of Shere Ali, having raised another army in support of the ex-Amir’s cause. Abdur Rahman was again successful in his military operations, defeating Faiz Mahomed at Kila Allahdad on the 17th September, 1867. But, while thus fighting with invariable success for his father, he had to meet the designs of his uncle, whose ambition was to be himself Amir. Afzul Khan died in Cabul while his son was absent with the army; and when Abdur Rahman returned to the capital, he found his uncle, Azim Khan, in possession of the throne. The old quarrels broke out afresh, Abdur Rahman naturally feeling aggrieved that, after all his successes, the Amirship had slipped through his hands. Again fresh complications in Turkistan saved an open rupture: Abdur Rahman started for the northern province and tried to subdue the Usbeg chiefs. In this he was unsuccessful, the Mir of Maemena, a district between Balkh and Herat, sturdily resisting all attack, and eventually forcing Abdur Rahman to fall back upon Takhtipul. The absence of the young soldier in the north had been Shere Ali’s opportunity. His forces were successful in Western Afghanistan, and he was soon de facto Amir. Abdur Rahman’s position in Turkistan then became untenable; his soldiers, hearing that Shere Ali was once more in possession of Cabul, lost heart and deserted; and in January 1869, in conjunction with Azim Khan, he was once more a fugitive. After Azim Khan had appealed to the Indian Government for help, and had been refused, the two sirdars sought refuge in Persia, and afterwards, in the trans-Oxus Khanates. Azim Khan died in October 1869; and Abdur Rahman, still entertaining his idea of regaining Cabul, went to Khiva. Here his intrigues to raise a force with which to conquer Afghan-Turkistan met with such slight success that he turned his steps to Bokhara. Living as a refugee in that Khanate was Jehandar Shah, ex-Mir of Badakshan. This chief had heartily aided Afzul Khan in his struggle for the throne, and to cement the alliance had given his sister in marriage to Azim Khan, and his daughter to Abdur Rahman. Shere Ali, in August 1869, induced the Badakshan sirdars to depose Jehandar Shah, who was imprisoned in his own capital of Faizabad. He persuaded his late subjects to grant his release, and crossed the Oxus to Kulab, where Abdur Rahman joined him. Their intrigues to gain possession of Badakshan were on the basis of raising a force of Turcomans on the north, while the Mir of Maemena, with an army of Usbegs, co-operated with them from the west through Balkh and Kunduz. The want of money was a great obstacle to success, and Abdur Rahman conceived the idea of supplicating aid from Russia. While Jehandar Shah went to Chitral, to seek aid from Aman-ul-Mulk, chief of that country, Abdur Rahman left Bokhara for Samarcand, and reached Tashkend in May 1870. General Kaufmann received him hospitably, but was deaf to all his appeals for troops to aid him in conquering Afghan-Turkistan. A pension of about £5,000 sterling was assigned to him, but a refusal was given to his request to visit St. Petersburg and represent his case to the Czar. When Schuyler saw him he expressed a confident belief that with £50,000 to raise and equip an army he could once more make himself supreme in Afghanistan. With this one idea in his mind he was saving nine tenths of his pension, and hinted that, under favourable conditions, he might be aided by Russia. Jehandar Shah, after raising an unsuccessful insurrection in Badakshan in 1878, joined his son-in-law at Samarcand in 1875, but has since died.