“Your paper of requests has been carefully considered, and until some decision is given by the Government it is your duty, and it will be to your advantage, to remain quiet in your villages. Do not vainly imagine you will obtain anything by clamour and opposition. You have seen that the people of Ghazni, Logar, Maidan and Wardak have not been able to withstand for a moment the British arms, and have been punished for their hostility. The only fruit of their opposition is that they have to pay every penny; their revenue would otherwise have been remitted. You will tell those of your leaders who are not now present that the British Government will not tolerate disturbances, and collections of armed men in the neighbourhood of Cabul. All now assembled must disperse at once home. If they do not attend to this advice any misfortune they suffer will be their own fault. Two Sirdars of position are now being sent by the Government through Kohistan, and you will ensure their safety. The hostages sent by Mir Butcha as a guarantee of their security I do not require; the British army is itself to be sufficient guarantee for the observance of promises made by you. Your professions of friendship are accredited, and you may rest assured that while the Government will at once punish any hostile action, its chief desire is to be and remain friends with you.”
Two maliks, Mir Agha Sahibzada and Mir Gholam Hyder, were especially mentioned as having done good service during their stay, and three other minor chiefs were singled out as deserving credit for aiding the British Government in the current negotiations. The most important feature in the Durbar was the announcement that the chiefs had guaranteed the safe-conduct of two Sirdars on Mr. Griffin’s staff through Kohistan. These are Ibrahim Khan, Khan Bahadur, of the Punjab Police, and Wazirzada Afzul Khan, Ressaldar of the Bengal Cavalry: and their mission is to visit Abdur Rahman at Kunduz. What their instructions are I cannot say; but if the Kohistani chiefs, Surwar Khan and Mir Butcha, have promised to ensure their personal safety, it seems probable that we are at last on the eve of direct negotiation with Abdur Rahman, who has unquestionably won the goodwill of the Kohistanis. We can punish any breach of faith easily with the force now in Cabul; and this being known to the chiefs at Baba Kuch Kar, the dispersion of bands of men such as are now scattered about Koh-Daman is probably only a question of a few days.
5th May.
There is, of course, great difficulty in describing an action from hearsay, and in making at all vivid an account of severe fighting one has not seen; but it is the privilege of even the humblest historians to deal with important events almost as confidently as the coolest eye-witness, and I meekly claim that privilege in regard to the late action south of Ghazni. There will, almost of necessity, be errors in the story of the fight, but they are only such as will arise from causes beyond my own control. I can only write upon the lines laid down for me by my informants, and defects of omission are more likely to occur than would have been the case if I had been a spectator of the engagement. This half-apology, if accepted in the spirit in which it is offered, should absolve me in the eyes of those critics who are most able to estimate the fairness and accuracy of the story, namely, the men who fought in the action. They did their work right nobly and well, and if appreciation of their efforts is lacking, it will be rather because they are too modest to do justice to themselves than to any unwillingness on the part of others to concede to them the honour they so well deserve.
Sir Donald Stewart’s march upon Ghazni was uneventful as far as Shahjui, the limit of the Candahar province, but from that point a change took place; it began to be understood that opposition was likely to occur before Ghazni was reached. At Shahjui the Taraki country begins, and the moollahs had been so active in preaching & jehad that several thousand men had collected on the hills to the east. These were at first Tarakis, ghazis from Candahar, and contingents from Zamindawar and other neighbouring districts. They kept well away from the British force, but marched day by day, parallel to it, along the foot of the high hills on the right of the valley along which our troops were making their way. They gathered strength daily, but it was deemed unwise to attack them, as they would probably have retired up the hillsides out of reach, and our men would have been unable to scatter them. Besides, the baggage train of the column was over six miles in length (the elephant battery with its bullock-teams yoked to the ammunition waggons stretched away for a mile or more), and to have detached a brigade to make an attack upon the enemy would have left the baggage open to molestation from the right flank. The tribesmen, therefore, were allowed to march quietly along, our spies keeping Sir Donald Stewart well informed of all that was happening in their camp. Their numbers, the names of their chiefs, and their probable intentions were made known to Major Euan Smith, Political Officer, and from the first it was certain that they would try issues with the British before Ghazni was reached. The aspect of the country, too, showed that war was meant; the valley was fertile and well cultivated, but every village had been deserted, all supplies buried, and the women and children carried away to the hills for safety. It was as if the people had fled from pestilence; the moollahs had done their work well, and had so wrought upon the fears and fanaticism of the ignorant peasants that they had left their homes to the tender mercies of our soldiery. Perhaps, also, it was believed that by cutting off supplies the march northwards might be retarded or checked altogether; but this belief can never exist again, as our foraging parties unearthed the hidden stores, and the troops were never really short of food. The leaders of the tribesmen were Shir Jan (Taraki), and Mahomed Aslam Khan (Tokhi), and so overawed were the villagers by their threats that even those who would willingly have traded with our purchasing agents had to throw in their lot with the more fanatical spirits.
With the British force were several thousand Hazaras, who, as is usually the case with native allies, were rather a source of anxiety than any real aid. They marched in wild irregularity on the flanks of the column, and every deserted village was plundered by them without compunction. They thus appropriated large quantities of supplies which would have been welcome to our army, and it was at times annoying to find they had cleared a village of grain before our own men could arrive. Their inveterate hatred of the Afghans had full swing, and they hailed our march upon Ghazni with savage satisfaction as giving them an opportunity of wiping off old scores. Now that they find we do not intend staying in the country their spirits are somewhat damped, as their future presents nothing more pleasing than a war of revenge by the southern tribesmen as soon as our armies have returned to India. The excesses likely to be committed when that return takes place can only be thought of with pain and humiliation by us. We may exact what promises we choose from the new Amir, but he will be helpless to check his unruly subjects, and we cannot march again to Cabul to save the Hazaras from their fate. There will be nothing for them but to retire into the fastnesses of their high table-land between Bamian and Herat, there to hold their own until the bitterness of the vendetta shall have died away.
With such allies and with his force well on the alert, Sir Donald Stewart encamped at Mushaki, two long marches south of Ghazni, on the 18th of April, the enemy’s camp being a few miles away. Our spies visited the camp, and returned with the news that on the morrow the tribesmen would attempt to drive back the column, and would probably take up their position on a low spur running eastwards from the Gul Koh Mountains and dominating the road. With this warning to guide him, Sir Donald Stewart formed his order of march, so as to place his infantry on his left flank, upon which the brunt of the attack would be likely to fall. It should be remembered that the column was marching in a valley running almost due north and south, and that the road from Mushaki was much nearer the hills on the west (or left flank) than the Shilghur ranges on the east. The order of march from Mushaki was as follows:—
| 19th Bengal Lancers, 300 sabres. |  | Leading brigade under the command of Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, C.B. | ||
| A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, six 9-pr. guns. | ||||
| 19th Punjab Native Infantry, 470 Rifles. | ||||
| Field Force Headquarters |  | 1 company 2-60th Rifles, 63 Rifles. | ||
| 1 company 25th Punjab Native Infantry, 85 rifles. | ||||
| 1 troop 19th Bengal Lancers, 50 sabres. | ||||
| Nos. 4 and 10 Companies Bengal Sappers and Miners, 80 rifles. | ||||
| 59th Foot, 436 rifles. |  | Under the command of Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes. | ||
| 3rd Ghoorka Regiment, 289 Rifles. | ||||
| G-4th, Royal Artillery, six 9-pr. guns. | ||||
| 6-11th, Royal Artillery, |  | Two 40-prs. Two 6-3-in. howitzers. | ||
| 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 349 sabres. | ||||
| Field Hospitals. | ||||
| Ordnance and Engineer Field Parks. | ||||
| Treasure. | ||||
| Commissariat. | ||||
| Baggage. | ||||
| 2-60th Rifles, 443 Rifles. | | Under the command of Brigadier-General R. Barter. | ||
| 15th Sikhs, 570 rifles. | ||||
| 25th Punjab Native Infantry, 380 rifles. | ||||
| 11-11th, Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery) six 7-pr. guns. | ||||
| 1st Punjab Cavalry, 316 sabres. | ||||
The length of the column was about six miles, so that the 19th Bengal Lancers were close upon Ahmed Khel when the rear-guard was leaving Mushaki. Upon nearing the spur of the Gul Koh hills the enemy were seen drawn up in the shape of a huge parallelogram at right angles to the road and completely barring the way. The road passes over a low kotal just where the spur loses itself in the valley, and it was clear that Shir Jan and Mahomed Aslam Khan meant to contest the advance at this point. The village of Ahmed Khel was marked in the maps as lying in a hollow below the spur, but really no village exists, though the halting-place at a karez is called Ahmed Khel. The enemy were three miles away when first sighted, and Sir Donald Stewart made his disposition to attack by deflecting General Hughes’s brigade to the left so as to face the Gul-Koh spur. A squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers was sent out on the extreme left to reconnoitre the enemy’s position in that direction, while A-B and G-4 batteries were placed on the right, under escort of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the second squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers. The heavy battery was halted about a mile in rear on a low hill. The Lieutenant-General and Staff with the reserve (composed of the 19th Punjabees, the Sappers, and the General’s escort) were on a hill in rear commanding a good view of the country. Soon after seven o’clock orders were sent to General Barter to double forward half his infantry, and to send on two squadrons of the 1st Punjab cavalry without delay. At eight o’clock the troops moved forward in order of battle. The two batteries of artillery with their cavalry escort were on the extreme right; the 59th Foot were in the centre of the line, with the 2nd Sikhs on their left flank, while the 3rd Ghoorkas were in the extreme left with their ranks deflected a little to the rear. There was a gap of 400 or 500 yards between the artillery and the 59th, and to fill this up Sir Donald Stewart’s escort of a troop of the 19th Bengal Lancers, a company of the 60th Rifles, and one company of the 25th Punjab Native Infantry were told off; but even then the gap could not altogether be filled. A company of the 19th Punjabees were moved to the left of A-B battery, thus protecting both batteries at the same time. Such was the first formation, but it was afterwards modified, the guns of G-4 being moved to various points between the infantry regiments, and directing their fire wherever the numbers of the enemy seemed to threaten persistent attack. The two squadrons of the 19th Bengal Lancers were also extended upon the left flank to check any turning movement from that quarter, and also a guard to two of the guns of G-4, which came into action in that quarter. The infantry were thus flanked on either hand by a battery of artillery, while the cavalry formed the wings, as it were, of the column ready to strike to right or left, or to charge on converging lines upon a common enemy in front. The baggage stretched away in the rear for several miles, and it was all-important to prevent the head of the column being out-flanked, as in such a case the line would have been broken, and a stampede of men and animals have taken place upon General Barter’s brigade. The enemy, seeing the preparations for attack, moved down bodily from the crest of the ridge to the lower slopes with standards waving and tom-toms beating; and a fair amount of order was preserved among the horsemen and foot soldiers, who numbered 12,000 or 15,000—the Tarakis, Andaris, Suleiman Kheyls, and Tokhis having mustered their fighting men in obedience to the summons of the moollahs sent by Mushk-i-Alam. Our artillery (A-B and G-4) got into action and began shelling the slopes preparatory to the infantry attack; but suddenly a commotion was observed in the most advanced lines of the opposing army, the moollahs could be seen haranguing the irregular host with frantic energy, the beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then, as if by magic, a wave of men—ghazis of the most desperate type—poured down upon the plain and rushed upon General Stewart’s force. The main body of the Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch the ghazis in their reckless onslaught, and to take advantage of any success they might gain. The fanaticism of the 3,000 or 4,000 men who made this desperate charge has perhaps never been equalled; they had 500 or 600 yards to cover before they could come to close quarters with our infantry, and yet they made nothing of the distance. They advanced, or rather rushed forward, in three lines; many of the men were on horseback, and nearly all well armed with tulwars, knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and matchlocks, while a few—and these must, indeed, have been resolute fanatics—had simply pikes made of bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened upon long sticks. The ground right and left of our troops was more open and level than that immediately in front, and consequently the ghazis’ attack broke with greatest violence upon our flanks. On our left flank the two squadrons of the 19th Bengal Lancers were still at the trot moving into position when the ghazis rushed among them. Lancers are always at a disadvantage when infantry have broken their ranks, and the 19th were no exception to the rule. In an instant they were lost to sight in the cloud of dust and smoke caused by the fight; and in the confusion, owing, perhaps, to some misunderstood order, or to the men losing their heads, a troop charged to the right in rear of the infantry line and came smashing into the 19th Punjab Native Infantry, in rear of the Lieutenant-General and his Staff. All was confusion for a moment; the ammunition mules were stampeded, and with the riderless horses of the Lancers killed or wounded in the mêlée, dashed into the head-quarters’ Staff. The ghazis had continued their onward rush and were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. Some penetrated to within twenty yards of the spot upon which the Staff were watching the action, and so critical was the moment, that Sir Donald Stewart and every man of his Staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence. The impetuosity of the ghazis on the left carried them right in rear of our infantry, and but for the cool promptitude of Colonel Lyster, V.C., commanding the 3rd Ghoorkas, this rush might have had terrible results. Colonel Lyster formed his men into company squares, and poured volley after volley into the fanatics as they surged onwards. In the meantime the attack had also burst all along the line, and in the hurry and confusion some of our men did not fix bayonets.
