One might well apply the words of the Jewish proverb-monger to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan: “The prince that wanteth understanding is a great oppressor.” The people of Afghanistan are now oppressed with the burden of a Kafir occupation, because the prince to whom we have appealed to take the government of the country off our hands lacks understanding. He is cunning and cautious to a fault, but he is in close danger of over-reaching himself. We have so far lowered our pride as to treat with Abdur Rahman in order to secure peace for Afghanistan, and now we are in the awkward position of finding our words twisted, their meaning perverted, and the Pretender posing before the nation as a patriot of the first water. During the past three months Mr. Lepel Griffin, acting under the orders of the Government of India, has been striving to place himself thoroughly en rapport with the Sirdar, who seemed at last to be quite earnest in his expressed wish to become and remain on friendly terms with us. There was, however, such hesitation in all his actions, and so strong a current of vacillation in his replies, that in sheer self-defence we had to pin him down to certain definite conditions, which he could either accept or reject as his inclination dictated. An ultimatum, really, was sent to him, though we have avoided using the term under the peculiar circumstances in which we were placed—viz., that of being in possession of a kingdom which our armies could easily retain, but which we were most anxious to leave at the earliest moment. In this state document the Indian Government stated clearly and distinctly that the Sirdar would be welcomed as Amir of Afghanistan, and could rely upon our future countenance and support so long as he remained faithful to his engagements with us, but that Candahar and the Kurram Valley could not be surrendered to him, as their fate had once for all been settled. So distinctly was the latter part of the proposed settlement laid down, that it was added “No discussion is possible on this subject.” Nothing could have been more simple than this: Abdur Rahman could by a word become Amir of Afghanistan less Candahar and Kurram; he had but to say “I accept,” and the matter was at an end. But his perversity is so great, that he has chosen to construe our terms into an offer of a united Afghanistan, such as his grandfather the Dost ruled over, and with calm assurance to say that he accepts such offer. This dishonesty of purpose has been pushed to such extremes that he has sent circulars to all the tribes, proclaiming with more or less insolent triumph that the British have given him the Amirship of the whole country, and that he will shortly arrive among them to take up the reins of power. What sinister motive may have prompted such a course we cannot imagine, unless it be that the Sirdar wishes to assume the rôle of a great patriotic leader, to accuse us of treachery in our negotiations, and thus to unite all parties in a supreme effort to force us out of the country. It may be urged with equal consistency that he wishes the people to believe he is no friend of the British, and that he only accepted our real terms after holding out for the restitution of territory acquired by us during the campaign. The effect of his extraordinary action upon the people has been a very unhealthy one: they cannot believe, in the face of our protestations, that we have included Candahar and Kurram in the terms of the settlement, and, on the other hand, they are in a feverish state of expectancy as to whether the Pretender will insist upon such districts being surrendered to him—which would mean a revival of the war—or whether he will, under protest, take Afghanistan shorn of two of its provinces. Take Hashim Khan’s case: he was about to leave for Candahar, which place, under our protection, would have proved a safe asylum for him, even if his sworn enemy, Abdur Rahman, were ruler of Cabul. But no sooner did he see the Pretender’s circular stating that Candahar was to revert to the new Amir, than he hastened to prepare for flight, suspecting us of having treacherously deceived him regarding the southern province. The circular was received in Cabul fifteen hours before Abdur Rahman’s answer reached Mr. Lepel Griffin, and Hashim Khan made an effort to see the Chief Political Officer to gain knowledge, once for all, of the truth of the Pretender’s assertions. Unluckily, Hashim Khan could not see Mr. Griffin at once, and refusing to wait, he rode off to Cabul, and in company with Abdulla Khan fled in the night to Chakri, in the Ghilzai country beyond Khurd Cabul. The two Sirdars gave out that they were ghazis, probably to blind the tribesmen, and we have since heard that Hashim Khan is trying to gather about him the disbanded sepoys of Yakub Khan’s army. He has two lakhs and a half of treasure with him, and by offering regular payment, both to armed and unarmed men, he has already a little army under his control. As he has so far taken no action against us, a friendly letter was sent by order of General Stewart, inviting him to return, and assuring him that the statement about Candahar was a falsehood. His answer was that he was no enemy of the British, but that under existing circumstances he had been “advised” to leave Cabul and watch events from a safe distance. Abdulla Khan, it is believed, is the “adviser” referred to; that over-fed Sirdar having, like Jeshurun, waxed fat and kicked out savagely. He was apparently tired of playing the part of a nobody in Cabul, and has now incited Hashim Khan to commit himself to a very foolish course of action.
Since penning the above strictures upon Sirdar Abdur Rahman, our envoy, Sirdar Afzul Khan, ressaldar 10th Bengal Lancers, has arrived after a trying journey from Khanabad. Strangely enough, he brings letters of most friendly import from Abdur Rahman, whom he reports to be already on his way southwards. The Pretender marched with 2,000 men and twelve guns from Khanabad on the 28th of June, the day on which he had promised to leave, and on the 29th he was encamped at Chasma, on the Ishkamish Road. By this time he is probably at Khinjan, where no doubt he will wait the arrival of our messenger, who left Sherpur three days ago. This time, it is hoped, the negotiations will really end, as Abdur Rahman will learn that his fast-and-loose mode of dealing has exasperated the British Government, which will not give him another chance. The arrival of Afzul Khan is most opportune, as he can explain fully, and without the caution he had to use in his letters, what the Sirdar’s intentions are, and why it is that he has dishonestly perverted the meaning of the terms so generously offered to him. I believe I am right in stating that both General Stewart and Mr. Lepel Griffin incline to the opinion that the Sirdar will shortly cross the Hindu Kush into Kohistan, and will accept the Amirship at our hands. Of course, his circular came upon us as a great surprise, and it was impossible to reconcile it with his previous avowals of friendship and a desire to come to terms, but Afzul Khan has cleared away some of the mistiness hanging about the affair, and what is facetiously called in camp “the political horizon” is once more looking clearer. There are still, however, many conflicting interests to be reconciled, and the news from Logar shows that the supports of Yakub’s Khan’s family—whom, to adopt Cavagnari’s term, I will call “Jacobins”—are actively engaged in stirring up the tribesmen against the British.
Yesterday (July 1st) the tribesmen grew so bold that they advanced to within a few miles of General Hills’ force, and gave our cavalry an opportunity of punishing them, which was not neglected. The Ghazni Field Force had been ordered to march to Charasia, and Mahomed Hasan Khan, the stanchest supporter of Yakub Khan (whose imprisonment in the time of Shere Ali he shared), took advantage of General Hills’ march to Charasia to occupy the Logar Valley with a mixed force of men from Zurmut, Kharwar, Maidan, and Wardak; but the gatherings dispersed upon the Ghazni Field Force again marching southwards. Finding General Hills did not move beyond Zerghun Shahr, Hasan Khan took heart again, and induced 1,000 or 2,000 men to occupy the large village of Padkhao Shana, on the Kushi side of the Logar, only twelve miles from the British camp. Here they remained till yesterday morning, when Palliser’s cavalry brigade, 550 strong, came down upon them and scattered them in all directions.
The particulars of the action are as follows:—General Hills heard on June 30th that the village had been occupied in force, and he ordered the cavalry brigade to move out at 3.30 A.M. yesterday. Brigadier-General Palliser’s instructions were to reconnoitre their position, and if an opportunity occurred, to attack them in the open. His force was made up of 231 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, 158 of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and 188 lances of the 19th Bengal Lancers. Upon nearing the spur which runs down from Kushi towards the Logar River, small parties of the enemy were seen, and the advanced cavalry scouts, on gaining some rising ground from which Padkhao Shana could be seen, reported the main body to be in full retreat in the direction of the Altimour Hills, which separate the Logar district from Zurmut. Their strength appeared to be about 1,500 footmen and a few cavalry. General Palliser detached a troop of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry to watch the village, and with 502 sabres and lance went in pursuit of the enemy. The latter, seeing the cavalry bearing down upon them, broke into detached knots, and took advantage of the difficult ground to make good their flight. The cavalry, however, followed them up very quickly, in spite of the stony nature of the ground and the difficulties presented by nullahs and ravines, and the two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and the 19th Lancers in the front line were soon hotly engaged. The enemy fought with desperation, and tried to reform their line, but without success. They sheered off to right and left, and were cut down by the supporting squadrons of the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry. The pursuit continued for two hours, until the mouth of the Altimour Pass had been reached. Here the cavalry were halted. They were then about eight miles from Padkhao Shana, whither they quickly returned. Two hundred bodies are said to have been counted on the ground. Our casualties are now reported as four sowars killed, twenty-three wounded, and one British officer, Captain Barrow, wounded. The ground was such as to give many opportunities for severe hand-to-hand fighting, in which Major Atkinson, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and Captain Leslie Bishop, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, are specially mentioned by those present as having displayed determined bravery. There were many hairbreadth escapes among the officers and men, notably in the case of Colonel Yorke, 19th Bengal Lancers, who received a bullet through his helmet, a second ball grazing his forehead. His orderly was shot dead at his side. This man, Jewand Sing, had distinguished himself earlier in the day, when Captain Barrow was wounded. Captain Barrow, who was acting as orderly officer to General Palliser, engaged single-handed with an Afghan malik, who fought with great coolness and bravery. He was armed with rifle, shield, tulwar, and the usual long knife. As Captain Barrow rode at him he fired his rifle, wounding the officer’s horse in the neck. He then betook himself to his sword, and warded off all blows with his shield. Captain Barrow received two severe cuts, the first disabling his bridle-hand, and the second cutting deep into his right fore-arm. Just at this moment Jewand Sing and Sowar Gholam Khan, of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, rode up, and the Afghan, who had already been badly wounded, was killed out of hand. In the ranks of the enemy was one of the deserters from the Sappers and Miners, who would not fight, but begged for mercy. He was shot in the mêlée, and his Snider rifle recovered. Hasan Khan deserted the tribesmen at the commencement of the action, riding away to a place of safety as soon as our cavalry appeared. The cavalry did not reach camp at Zerghun Shahr until half-past six at night, having been fifteen hours uninterruptedly in the saddle, and having ridden over forty miles since morning. As they rode into camp, all the regiments turned out and cheered them heartily. The results of this brilliant little action cannot fail to be most beneficial for a time at least, as Logar is once more cleared of malcontent tribesmen.
It is said that Hashim Khan intended sending a contingent from Chakri over the Ghilzai Hills, but the prompt action taken by General Hills stopped this, and Hashim Khan has again written in to say he is “no enemy of the British.” He may well be afraid of putting himself at the head of men in the field when he sees how easily our troops scatter the forces opposed to them. Our cavalry have never done so well as at Padkhao Shana during the present campaign; no English cavalry regiment was present, the honours of the fight resting with the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the 19th Bengal Lancers.
CHAPTER XXX.
Arrival of Abdur Rahman at Tutandarra in Kohistan—Preparations for the Evacuation of Cabul—A Deputation sent from Cabul to the Sirdar—The Friends and Enemies of the future Amir—Attitude of the Kohistanis, Ghilzais, and Wardaks—Mahomed Jan and Mushk-i-Alam’s Acceptance of Abdur Rahman—Durbar at Sherpur on July 22nd—Formal Acknowledgment of Abdur Rahman as Amir by the British Government—Mr. Lepel Griffin’s Address to the Chiefs—Sir Donald Stewart’s Appeal to their Patriotism—Abdur Rahman’s Departure from Charikar—Resignation of Wali Mahomed, Governor of Cabul—News of the Maiwand Disaster—Probable Movement of 10,000 Troops to Candahar—Interview between Mr. Lepel Griffin and the Amir—Discussion of Terms—The Amir’s Demeanour—Second Interview—A Satisfactory Settlement arrived at.
Early in July Sir Donald Stewart sent a final message to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan, requesting him to come to Cabul to discuss the terms of a settlement, and on the 15th of July the Sirdar reached Tutandarra, near Charikar, in Kohistan. His passage over the Hindu Kush had been a very trying one. On the 9th of July we had sent a deputation of Cabul gentlemen to Kohistan to pay their respects to the future Amir. Among these men were Abdul Kadir, the head Kazi of the city, who was the bearer of a letter to Abdur from the chief Political Officer; the Ghilzai Chief of Tezin, and Sirdar Yusuf Khan, Barakzai. The negotiations seemed to be progressing so well that all preparations were made for evacuating Cabul by the 16th of August, and large convoys started daily from the Bala Hissar with stores and surplus ammunition for India.[[44]] The following letters describe the close of the negotiations:—
19th July, 1880.