Organization: How Armies are Formed for War

by Hubert Foster

Governments have not always been wise in their control of the Military Commander or in their direction of operations. Glaring instances may be found in history, notably in the conduct of war by the younger Pitt, by the Aulic Council in Vienna, and by Abraham Lincoln.

On the other hand, the correct principles on which a Government should control its Commanders in war are exemplified in the highest degree in those of the elder Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham. To his wisdom and judgment in conducting operations by sea and land over all the world must be credited much of the brilliant success of the Seven Years’ War.

He himself defined the object of the operations, but left the method of attaining it to his Commanders, to whom he allowed a large measure of latitude and discretion. He never failed to make use of every incentive which could spur them to action and ensure success. He insisted on the initiative being taken, and risks run, but he was always as generous in case of failure as he was appreciative of good work. He succeeded in inspiring the Admiralty and the War Office with his own spirit and energy, and seconded their efforts with all the resources of the country. The lesson which his practice may teach every Government engaged in war is, that while the Statesmen alone can direct all the Departments of State, and combine Navy, Army, Diplomacy, and Finance to the common end, those responsible for the actual operations must be unfettered in their decisions, and in their method of carrying them out.

Command has in the large armies of the present day become rather a Direction of Operations, differing essentially in character and execution from the actual Command of the Troops. Frederick, Napoleon, and Wellington commanded; Moltke and Oyama directed their armies; while it was mainly the Prussian and Japanese Division Commanders who commanded in the true sense in the wars of 1866, 1870, and 1904. Thus we seldom see Moltke and Oyama on the battlefield, where Napoleon, Wellington, and Lee were always to be found.

The Subordinate Commander, like the Commander-in-Chief of old times, differs from the Supreme Commander of to-day by the fact that his action on his Command is personal and direct. He is in close touch with his subordinate leaders, knows the condition and spirit of his men, is always among them in person to inspire and control their movements. Troops take their tone from their immediate Commander, and reflect his vigour or hesitation, his confidence or caution. An intuition of his mental attitude seems to pass through all ranks of the Command. On the other hand the Army Commanders, and still more the Commander-in-Chief, are but nebulous figures to the soldiers in a very large Army.

Military Command is exercised in three ways, which differ in character and scope. The Supreme and Army Commanders prescribe Instructions to their Subordinate Commanders; the latter issue Orders; Commanding Officers of Units give Words of Command. The latter method needs no comment. The former modes will now be discussed.

Instructions

The system of Command customary before the French Revolution survived well into the nineteenth century. By it there were issued to each tactical unit of the Army, Orders containing minute, and even pedantic, details for carrying out the plan decided on by the Supreme Command. These details were not only wearisome to peruse, and unnecessary for experienced subordinates, but the time spent in merely copying and distributing them was so great, that it had a most prejudicial effect on the rapidity of the movements of the army. This system may be said to have greatly contributed to the ill success of the Austrians in their many wars against Napoleon, owing to the slow and dilatory movements it entailed.

The dissemination of the French Armies of the Revolution led to the plan systematized later by Napoleon, of giving short and general Instructions, prescribing to each Subordinate only his own part in the dispositions, with, perhaps, some information about the position of adjoining bodies of troops. This system had a great effect on the success of the French forces, but it only won its way very gradually in other armies. It is that now universally adopted; but the modern practice differs in one respect from that of Napoleon, who seldom indicated the general object of the movements, no doubt in order to avoid the danger of its becoming known by the enemy. The tendency is now to look on the latter danger as less than the evil of imperfect co-operation. If subordinates do not know the general situation, the object of the operations, and the position of the enemy, they will not always be able to act in accordance with the Commander’s purpose. The size and dispersion of modern armies make the independence of subordinates far greater than in the days of Napoleon, and have led to the practice of giving them general information about the situation, so as to ensure their co-operation to the common end.