6. That the heavy toll of $3 a ton on ships would prevent such vessels as could pass the canal from doing so, inasmuch as on a vessel of 1,000 tons the toll would be $3,000, or more than the average earnings of such vessels on their voyages.

7. That a canal of the proposed size could only be used by small passenger-steamers, the returns from which would not be adequate to pay the current expenses of the enterprise.

While unhesitatingly conceding the immense local advantages of a canal to the United States, these capitalists confessed themselves utterly unable to discover how it could prove of compensating value to the men who should invest their money in the enterprise. They therefore, for these and other reasons, declined to meet the views of the projectors and their agents.

Guarantee of the United States, etc.—By the convention of 1850 between the United States and Great Britain, a qualified guaranty was extended to this enterprise, in common with several others. There was also a clause inserted with direct reference to this company, which provided that it should 'have a priority of claim over every other company to the protection of the United States and Great Britain,' on condition that it should, within 'one year from the date of the ratification' of the convention, 'conclude its arrangements and present evidence of sufficient capital subscribed to accomplish the undertaking.' The treaty was ratified, and the ratifications exchanged July 5, 1850. No subscription of stock having taken place, and no evidence of capital having been presented in the time specified, or indeed at any other time, the company forfeited this special protection in July 1851; and as the twelve years within which the work was to be constructed will expire in 1861, it may be assumed that its prosecution will depend upon new conditions and combinations. Indeed, it may be questioned if the opening of railways between the oceans may not indefinitely postpone the project of a canal; for, however desirable such a work may be, its realization will depend upon precisely those practical considerations which apply to the simplest works of public utility. It will not do to foot up the commerce between Europe and Asia, and assume, as has generally been the case, that the totals will pass through the canal, if constructed. Now, the simple truth is, that, so far as Europe is concerned, that part of her trade which goes to ports on the Pacific coast of America, to the Sandwich Islands, Japan, the northern ports of China, to New Zealand and Australia, is all that will be materially benefited by the construction of a canal. As regards Australia, the principal advantage would be in having a safer, easier, and consequently quicker and surer means of communication than is afforded by the Cape of Good Hope; for the Pacific Ocean is preëminently the sea of steamers, and where steam navigation, in respect of speed at least, is destined to achieve its most brilliant success. So far as the United States is concerned, the advantages of such a work would naturally be greater than to Europe.

Assuming a canal to be built across the Isthmus of Nicaragua, the following table will illustrate the relations of Liverpool and New York with the principal ports of the east, in respect of distance:

Via Cape of Good Hope. Via Proposed Canal.Net Loss.Net Gain.
From Liverpool—
To Canton12,90013,800900
Calcutta11,44015,4804,040
Singapore11,88015,1204,240
Sydney14,98012,5502,320
From New York—
To Canton14,10011,8203,280
Calcutta12,36013,6801,320
Singapore12,70011,420280
Sydney15,7209,4805,240
[The distances to Sydney are calculated via Torres Straits.]

THE COURSE OF TRAFFIC.

The following table will illustrate the relations of Liverpool and New York in respect to the principal western ports of America:

Via Cape Horn.Via Proposed Canal.Gain.
From Liverpool—
To Valparaiso8,7007,5001,200
Callao10,0206,8003,220
Sandwich Islands13,5008,6404,860
From New York—
To Valparaiso8,5804,8603,720
Callao9,9003,5405,360
Sandwich Islands13,2006,3006,900