The bad climate of Jutiapa soon began to decimate the Salvador army, reducing it to about 3,000 men. Moreover, the government of Salvador, then in charge of Vice-president Guzman, could not easily procure means for the support of such a force. It was quite evident that the time for upsetting Carrera had not yet come; and Malespin's defeat would only bring greater outrages upon the people. Patience was necessary under the circumstances. It was consequently decided to abandon Jutiapa and recross the rio de la Paz, which was effected on the 17th of June.[X-17] The assembly empowered the government to negotiate for peace, and a convention was entered into at the hacienda de Quezada on the 5th of August, 1844,[X-18] under which friendly relations were restored, and Guatemala promised to accredit a commissioner near the confederate government.[X-19] This convention was, however, annulled by the Guatemalan commissioners, because the supremo delegado had refused to ratify it.[X-20] But the government of Guatemala determined that it should be held valid by Malespin's accepting it as law for the Salvadoreños. Bishop Viteri undertook to accomplish this, and succeeded.[X-21] Malespin gave his assent to the convention being ratified by the supremo delegado, and made a declaration of peaceful intentions toward Guatemala.[X-22] He refers to the liberals residing at Leon, who had been driven from Honduras by Ferrera, and from Salvador by himself; and he accuses them of being the cause of much trouble, for which they should be discountenanced by honorable men. The pacto de Chinandega, as we have seen, had become a dead letter. Honduras and Salvador entered, on the 10th of July, 1844, at San Salvador, into a treaty, which was ratified by both governments.[X-23]
Chamorro's government was notified by Ferrera that auxiliary forces from Nicaragua would no longer be allowed to traverse Honduran territory.[X-24] Chamorro's minister, M. Aguilar, remonstrated against a measure which would prevent the arrival of friendly troops to defend the confederacy, whereof Honduras was a component part.[X-25] Chamorro, using his lawful authority, ordered J. Trinidad Muñoz, who commanded the Honduras force of operations, not to obstruct the passage of the Nicaraguan troops. Muñoz disobeyed the order; and upon the Nicaraguans arriving at Choluteca, on the 17th of August, he required them to leave the territory of Honduras forthwith; which not being done, he assailed and conquered them on the 19th, after a three hours' fight.[X-26] This action had a great influence on the fate of Central America; for it satisfied the aristocrats of Guatemala that the supremo delegado had no means for enforcing his authority or for carrying out his plans. It was virtually a declaration of war between Honduras and Nicaragua. Malespin was likewise emboldened by it to assail Nicaragua. The latter must then move with the utmost activity against Ferrera, before Malespin, now at peace with Guatemala, could come to his aid. But difficulties that could not be overcome were in the way; and it was only on the 23d of October that upwards of 1,000 Nicaraguans appeared before Nacaome, which they assaulted the next day, and after two hours of hard fighting, were repulsed.[X-27]
WAR ON NICARAGUA.
Trinidad Cabañas and Gerardo Barrios, two of Morazan's officers, made, on the 5th of September, 1844, an attempt at San Miguel to overthrow Malespin without bloodshed; but having failed, they went off to Nicaragua by way of La Union. Malespin's minister, José Antonio Jimenez, then demanded of the Nicaraguan government that Cabañas and Barrios should be either expelled or surrendered to Salvador for punishment. The demand was rejected. The two officers were by no means discouraged. They persevered in their efforts, which, more than anything else, finally brought about the tyrant's overthrow. By virtue of a special decree, Malespin took, on the 25th of October, personal command of the state forces, placing the executive office in charge of the vice-president, Joaquin Eufracio Guzman, who on the same day entered upon the discharge of his duties, giving Malespin unlimited powers for the defence of the state. Such authorization did not justify Malespin's carrying the war into Nicaragua.[X-28] This state, after the defeat of its troops at Nacaome, had removed them from Honduran territory, and sued for peace. And yet Malespin, in violation of the laws of Salvador, made preparations for an offensive war against Nicaragua.
It will be well, before relating the events of this campaign, to cast an eye upon the present lamentable condition of the four states thus bent upon each other's destruction. Guatemala was ruled by the aristocrats with a rod of iron. Her financial affairs were completely disorganized. In Salvador Malespin had no other rule of conduct than his own will and Bishop Viteri's evil counsels. He believed himself surrounded by enemies, and indeed he was.[X-29] Honduras was in a disturbed state, and the victim of Ferrera's despotism. Nicaragua was in anything but a satisfactory situation. The men who with their superior talents, statesmanship, and influence might have carried the ship of state safely through the coming storm, Francisco Castellon and Máximo Jerez, were in Europe working to undo the evils wrought against Central America by Pavon and Chatfield. The director of the state, Manuel Perez,[X-30] lacked the prestige that the occasion required. Casto Fonseca, the commander of the forces, had been given the rank of 'gran mariscal.'[X-31]
The pacto de Chinandega had ceased to exist. Owing to hostile acts of Malespin, Chamorro had to seek safety in flight. Ferrera treated Chamorro with contumely, and shamefully abused him in a report to the chambers of Honduras, in January 1846.[X-32] Malespin and his army against Nicaragua entered Honduras, and at Nacaome made an address to the president and army of Honduras.[X-33] The two allied presidents had a conference at Sauce on the 7th of November, and agreed that Malespin should be recognized as the general-in-chief of their forces. At Choluteca proposals for peace came from Leon; and on the 21st of the same month the treaty of Zatoca[X-34] was concluded, which was disgraceful to the Nicaraguan negotiators.[X-35] A secret clause was also agreed to, binding Nicaragua, among other things, to retire her troops from Chinandega to Chichigalpa. But the authorities and people of Leon preferred death with honor to submission to such degrading demands. The treaty and secret clause were indignantly rejected. Perez, the director, surrendered the executive office to Senator Emiliano Madrid.
ATTACK ON LEON.
In the night of November 21st the allied forces encamped in the barranca de San Antonio.[X-36] On the 26th, at 8 in the evening, they were in front of Leon, and threw bombs into the city. The next morning at 3 o'clock Malespin, being drunk, ordered an assault, which resulted disastrously for the invaders; for at sunrise he found his camp strewn with corpses.[X-37] The attack was, however, continued that day till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the allies found themselves short of ammunition, and with many of their chief officers killed or wounded. Discord now broke out among them, and the Hondurans wanted to abandon the campaign; but J. Trinidad Muñoz, acting for Malespin, quieted them, and the struggle went on. That night Muñoz erected intrenchments, and at break of day on the 28th the allies were in condition to act vigorously.[X-38]
Commissioners came out to the allied headquarters, and on the 1st of December a treaty was negotiated,[X-39] to which no ratification was given in the city, and the war continued. Meanwhile there was much agitation in Salvador, with occasional revolutionary attempts, which becoming known at Leon, emboldened the authorities and citizens to keep up the fight, notwithstanding the other departments had turned against them.[X-40]