[312] ‘Los mandé tomar á todos cincuenta y cortarles las manos,’ says Cortés, Cartas, 63; but the phrase may be loose, for Bernal Diaz specifies only seventeen as sent back with hands or thumbs cut off. Hist. Verdad., 49. ‘El marques les hizo á algunos de ellos contar (sic pro cortar) las manos.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 570. ‘Mandò cortar las manos a siete dellos, y a algunos los dedos pulgares muy contra su voluntad.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. vi. cap. viii. Gomara places this occurrence on the 6th of September, but it is most likely later, and makes the spies a different party from those bringing the slaves and feathers, who arrive on the preceding day. Hist. Mex., 77-8. Bernal Diaz accounts for this difference by stating that the party had been in camp since the previous day. Robertson reverses the order by assuming that mutilation of the spies so perplexes the Indians that they send the men with the slaves and feathers to ask whether they are fierce or gentle gods, or men. He does not understand why so many as 50 spies should have been sent, but had he read Cortés’ letter more closely, he would have divined the reason, that they intended to fire the camp, and otherwise aid in the attack. He stigmatizes as barbarous the mutilation, Hist. Am., ii. 42, 451, but forgets, in doing so, that the Spanish conquerors belonged to an age when such deeds were little thought of. Spies even now suffer death, and the above punishment may therefore be regarded as comparatively lenient, particularly by a people who daily tore out the heart from living victims. The mutinous pilot of Villa Rica had his life spared, but lost his feet. Cortés, as the captain of a small band, was obliged to conform to his age and surroundings in the measures taken for its safety.
[313] ‘En yendose las espias, vieron de nuestro real como atrauessaua por vn cerro grandissima muchedumbre de gente, y era la que traya Xicotencatl.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 79.
[314] Cortés, Cartas, 63-4; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 78-9; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 569; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. vi. cap. viii. Bernal Diaz describes a night attack with 10,000 warriors, made a few days before, in which the Spaniards drive back the Indians and pursue them, capturing four, while the morning revealed twenty corpses still upon the plain. Two of the diviners appear to have been sacrificed for their bad advice. He now reappears with 20,000 men, but on meeting the mutilated spies he becomes disheartened, and turns back without attempting a blow. Hist. Verdad., 46, 49-50. He is the only authority for two night expeditions. Having already been defeated in one night attack, Xicotencatl would be less likely to attempt a second, particularly since nocturnal movements were contrary to Indian modes of warfare. Cortés distinctly intimates that the present occasion was the first attempt at a night raid. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 291.
[315] He begins to suspect that their object may also have been to spy. Cortés was suffering from fever at this time, and one night he took pills, a course which among the Spaniards involved the strictest care and seclusion from affairs. Early in the morning three large bodies of Indians appeared, and regardless of his pills Cortés headed the troops, fighting all day. The following morning, strange to say, the medicine operated as if no second day had intervened. ‘No lo cuẽto por milagro, sino por dezir lo que passo, y que Cortés era muy sufridor de trabajos y males.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 80. But Sandoval assumes ‘que sin duda fue milagro.’ Hist. Carlos V., i. 173. Solis applies this story to the night attack, which seems plausible, and smiles philosophically at Sandoval’s conclusion. Hist. Mex., i. 271; Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 291; Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 47-8. ‘Tenia calenturas, ò tercianas.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 47. Some place the story with the later capture of Tzompantzinco, where it is entirely out of place, if indeed worth recording at all, for this expedition was a voluntary project, calling for no sick men to venture out. Duran relates that, tired of being besieged, Cortés one night made a sally in different directions. One party surprised all the native leaders together and asleep, and brought them to camp. In the morning they were sent back to the army, which had awakened to find them missing. In recognition of their kind treatment the chiefs raised the siege. This is told on the authority of an eye-witness, who evidently reserved his choicest stories for Padre Duran. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 419-20.
[316] Bernal Diaz places it one league from the camp, and Tapia four leagues. Ixtlilxochitl calls it Tzimpantzinco; others vary.
[317] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 80. Tapia allows the horses to overcome their attack and proceed. It appears to have been due to the cold night winds.
[318] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 80-1. According to Herrera, Alcalde Mayor Grado counselled Cortés, on seeing this populous country, to return to Villa Rica and send to Velazquez for aid. Deeply grieved at such advice, the general remarked that the very stones would rise against them if they retreated, dec. ii. lib. vi. cap. viii.; Cortés, Cartas, 64-5. Bernal Diaz places this raid before the final night attack. Hist. Verdad., 47; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 568-9.
[319] ‘Nos vimos todos heridos â dos, y â tres heridos, y muy cansados, y otros dolientes ... y faltauan ya sobre cincuenta y cinco soldados que se auian muerto en las batallas, y dolencias, y frios, y estauan dolientes otros doze.’ Bernal Diaz, 46. Prescott, i. 458, is careless enough to accept this verbally, but the run of the text here and elsewhere indicates that the sentence is rather figurative. The last four words, ‘twelve others were on the sick-bed,’ indicate that only three per cent. were laid low, and that the general health and condition must therefore have been tolerably good. This also indicates that the 55 missing soldiers could not have died since they left Vera Cruz, as certain writers assume. The only obstacles under which the soldiers could have succumbed in any number were the several battles with the Tlascaltecs, wherein the total number of the wounded nowhere foots up to more than 100. Of these 50 per cent. could not have died, to judge from the warfare engaged in, and from the very few, a couple at the most, it is said, who fell on the field. Nor could diseases have killed many during a month’s march through a fine and fertile country, for the passage of the Cofre de Perote did not affect the Spaniards seriously. Hence it must be assumed that the 55 dead include the 35 who fell out of the ranks ere the army reached Villa Rica. This leaves, say, fifteen casualties for the present expedition since it left Villa Rica, and that appears to be a fair proportion. The only one who rightly interprets Bernal Diaz on this point appears to be Torquemada, who says, ‘desde que salieron de Cuba, se avian muerto cinquenta y cinco Castellanos.’ i. 428. The old soldier confirms the interpretation by stating in more than one place that the Spaniards numbered 450, or nearly so, on entering Mexico City. ubi sup., 65, 109.
[320] Gomara gives a long speech, and intimates that it was delivered before a regular meeting. Hist. Mex., 81-3; Cortés, Cartas, 65; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. vi. cap. ix.; Torquemada, i. 428-9; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 571. Bernal Diaz addresses the speech to the committee, and states that Cortés, on finding them still unconvinced, abandoned the gentle tone he had used, and exclaimed with some asperity that it was better to die like brave men than to live dishonored. The men being appealed to upheld him, and declared that they would listen to no contrary talk. Hist. Verdad., 48-9; Solis, Hist. Mex., i. 259-63.
[321] Surnamed Tlachpanquizqin, it seems. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 292; Veytia, Hist. Ant. Méj., iii. 380. Bernal Diaz calls them five leading men.