History of Mexico, Volume 1, 1516-1521

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

Cortés was exultant. During the last brief hour how completely had his fortunes changed! Again was his star ascendant, filling the whole heavens with its brightness. Alas now for Montezuma and Mexico! And Velazquez; this was his fourth attempt on Mexico, and in some respects his greatest failure. Instead of annihilating the outlaw with his grand army, the outlaw in one fell swoop had secured the grand army, and was now master of all the ships, and men, and munitions of war, which he so much needed in consummation of his further designs. It seemed to be the fate of the fat governor out of his solid substance to feed his enemy with wealth and honors.

Before it was fairly light Cortés had seized and placed in confinement such persons as might question his rights as victor; the remainder on surrendering their arms were permitted to go at large.[711] In order to make more secure his magnificent prize before the all-searching sun should disclose the paucity and poverty of the victors, Cortés seated himself in state, arrayed in a wide orange-colored robe, and ordered the conquered troops to pass before him, and swear allegiance to the king, and fealty to him as captain-general and justicia mayor. This was done by nearly all, some humbling themselves and kissing his hand, while the late hostile leaders and old acquaintances were recognized with friendly greetings and embraces.[712]

Meanwhile Olid and Ordaz, each with a corps, set out on the captured horses to summon stragglers and seek the forty troopers in the field. Duero and other friends of Cortés being among them, little persuasion was needed to win the party over, and shortly after dawn the whole cavalcade came in to the sound of fife and drum, shouting vivas for Cortés.[713] High above this noise were heard from a window the voices of two women, named Ordaz, filling the air with their loud philippics. “Villainous Dominicanos!” they cried to the soldiers of their own party, “the distaff would better suit you than the sword. A good account have you given of yourselves! Unfortunate women we to have come to the wars with such men!” Truly might Narvaez exclaim with Xerxes, as he beheld his fair ally, Queen Artemisia, outwit her Athenian pursuers, “My men fight like women, and my women like men.” The Ordaz women, however, fought only with their tongues, and that after the issue of battle. And thus relieved they immediately descended and did homage to the victor. The general did all he could to check this excess of zeal, which he feared might engender ill feeling, and he even seized some of the noisiest enthusiasts, although they were afterward rewarded.

The cacique of Cempoala, who had been slightly wounded during the battle, appeared like the rest to offer fealty to the victor by crowning him with flowers. Cortés received his demonstrations as if nothing had taken place to mar their intercourse, and took up his abode with Catalina, whose hand he had accepted during his previous occupation of the place. The chiefs vied with one another to obliterate their unfortunate mistake by increased attention and hospitality, while many among Narvaez’ men thought it necessary to excuse their tardy surrender by pleading that they had been deceived by their principals, who had assured them that Cortés was a traitor. Great was their chagrin in the morning on discovering how few the victors were and how poorly they were armed. And where were the much talked of native auxiliaries? At the same time they could not but admire a leader who had achieved such results with such means. Narvaez and his supporters declared that the victory was due wholly to treachery, particularly noticeable in the action of the artillerists.[714] In this there was much truth, but the consummate tact and soldierly qualities of Cortés shine no less brightly for all that. And the cost of this glory and advantage, how insignificant it was! Four of his own men and fifteen of the enemy, including a captain, beside a number wounded on both sides; this was all.[715]

In his report to the king Cortés seeks to gloss over the occurrence by stating that only two men were killed, intimating that it was on both sides. There was a deeper reason for this and other falsehoods than the wish to hide the bloody result of fratricidal conflict. He was still doubtful as to the view taken in Spain of his conduct, and could not afford to prejudice his case by laying bare every misfortune. He was aware that even to the impartial observer he must appear as a defaulter in the duty owing by him to a principal, and in the agreement or partnership which he had formed, and also as the usurper of an expedition fitted out in the name and under the auspices, at least, of Velazquez. His plea rested on his brave and masterly conquest of a rich country, and on his election to independent command by a party formed on the pretence that the superior interests of the sovereign demanded the immediate subjugation of the country. But his acceptance of that command was a breach of duty and of contract; the right of the party to act as it did was doubtful, and its pretence hasty, or perhaps usurped from Velazquez, who had first entertained it; while the commission to undertake the conquest had already been conferred on the latter. Velazquez held besides the right of a discoverer to this coast, and above all the royal grant to it, vaguely worded though it was so far as indicating the situation and extent of territory. He had a right to claim his own; though circumstances had so changed, Cortés claimed, as to render this perilous to the interests of God, the king, and the people, which rose above those of individuals; and in ignoring the orders of the audiencia to desist from war on his countrymen he followed only natural law and justifiable impulse. In this respect Cortés was equally guilty, since his duty was to yield to the rightful claimant. He pleads in his letter to the king, however, that self-preservation obliged him to resist, for Narvaez had determined to hang him and several of his followers. Here he again hides the fact that favorable terms were at one time offered. “Had Narvaez carried off the victory,” he continues, “it would have been with a great loss, which must have so weakened him as to surely enable the Indians to succeed in their meditated revolt. This would have lost the country to the king and to the faith, and twenty years would not have sufficed to regain it.”[716] In brief, howsoever we admire Cortés, however much we would prefer his banner to that of Velazquez or Narvaez, we must admit that he had hardly a shadow of right on his side, and that no position in which he could possibly place himself was tenable. He was a defaulter, pirate, usurper, renegade, traitor, outlaw, hypocrite; but he was a most lovable villain, an admirable soldier, a rare hero. On the other hand, Velazquez was right. But, though deeply injured, he was disagreeable; though foully wronged, he was vanquished. And the Spanish monarch was not the first or last to smile on iniquitous success, or turn the cold shoulder to whining, disappointed virtue.

In the course of the morning the soldier Barrientos, who had been staying in Chinantla, arrived with the promised Chinantec warriors, two thousand in number.[717] They had reached the rendezvous on pentecost day, as ordered, but Cortés had found it convenient to advance on Cempoala sooner than he had intended. An imposing sight they presented as they marched by amidst vivas in a file of three abreast, gorgeous with plumes and shields, the centre man with bow and arrows, while his companions on either side carried the formidable pike, tipped with glistening iztli. It was fortunate that they had failed to arrive in time, since much bloodshed was saved thereby. In fact the soldiers of Narvaez expressed a fear that they would have fared badly with such opponents. Cortés was nevertheless delighted with their coming, since this proved not only the sincerity of their friendship, but showed the conquered that he did indeed control native armies. Distributing some beads and trinkets, he bade them return peaceably under the supervising care of Barrientos.

One of the first measures after the fight was to secure the fleet; and for this purpose a suitable force was sent down to the port to take the vessels to Villa Rica, and remove the sails and rudders, so as to prevent the escape of any to Cuba.[718] Shortly after, when the masters and crews had tendered allegiance, the vessels were placed in charge of Pedro Caballero, captain of one of the vessels under Narvaez, in whom Cortés had great confidence.[719] The fortress was again garrisoned, with a larger force,[720] and thither were sent Narvaez and Salvatierra in chains.[721]

As for the rest, Cortés applied himself with his usual skill to recompense those who had remained true, and to conciliate the yet unreconciled. He reminded them that they had come not to risk their lives for Velazquez, but to gain honor and wealth under the banner of the king, and he was prepared to aid in this by offering them equal terms with his veterans. As an earnest he restored within two days their arms to all except a few leaders, and ordered his men to return the horses, weapons, and other effects taken by them as spoils of war.[722] What with their admiration of the liberality and soldierly qualities of Cortés, and the prospect of speedy advancement, there were but few who did not immediately and cheerfully accept the terms. But this was by no means to the taste of the aforesaid veterans. They had seen with envy that rich presents were made to the conquered, while they, whose courage and devotion had achieved such magnificent results, received nothing, and were even told to return what they regarded as lawful spoils; and, further, to share with these late comers and intended despoilers the fruits of their years of toil and victories. A general murmur arose, and many soldiers refused to surrender the appropriated effects. Captain Ávila and Father Olmedo being requested to remonstrate, did so earnestly, and told Cortés that he acted like Alexander, who honored more the conquered than those who won the battle. He and all he possessed belonged to his comrades, was the reply, but at present it was necessary to conciliate their invaluable acquisition, whose aid was needed to overcome the threatening danger in Mexico, and who being the more numerous party might otherwise rise against them. Their aims effected, the entire resources of a vast and rich country were theirs. Olmedo was convinced of the wisdom of the course, although he considered that too great liberality had been shown. The headstrong Ávila pressed the point with his natural haughtiness, whereupon Cortés said: “I am for Mexico; those who please may follow; those who do not, may leave it alone. There are yet women in Spain to bear soldiers.” “Yes, and captains and governors,” retorted Ávila. Cortés deemed it discreet to bandy no further words at present. So spirited a tongue must be curbed with gifts; but Cortés awaited his opportunity. He never forgot anything.

With a view chiefly to divert the troubled spirits two expeditions were sent out, each of two hundred men, mostly from the ranks of the late enemy. One was directed to Goazacoalco, as before, under the command of Velazquez de Leon, who had already held this commission, and two vessels were placed at his disposal to send to Jamaica for live-stock, seeds, and other requirements of the proposed colony. The other expedition was intrusted to Ordaz for the occupation of Pánuco, with a view to anticipate Garay. Two vessels were given him to explore the coast.[723]

While Cortés was thus risking all on the cast of fortune at Cempoala the troops at Mexico had been exposed to even greater perils. At the time of his departure for the coast, Toxcatl, the fifth month, had begun, and with it the most solemn festival of the year. It was in honor of Tezcatlipoca, the highest of the divinities, and identified with a supreme god, although less conspicuous in the daily worship of the people, for they appealed rather to the nearer minor deities, whom they regarded as intercessors, than to their supreme divinity, whom they greatly feared, and who was very far away. The Mexicans had been permitted to hold the celebration in the great temple, which had been partly dedicated to Christian worship, on condition that no human sacrifices should take place.[724] A festival of this prominence could not fail to recall with all its force to the natives the indignities to which they and their gods had been subjected. We have seen how narrowly an uprising on account of the occupation of the great temple by strange religious emblems was escaped, and how it was restrained only by the promise of the speedy departure of the Spaniards. Before Cortés had left the capital he saw the smouldering fire, and it was this that led him to strengthen the defences of the fort, to obtain extra supplies from Tlascala, and to enjoin the strictest watchfulness and moderation.