[737] Torquemada says 50 men; the Tlascaltecs are seldom counted.
[738] ‘Que no quedaron sino el dicho Montezuma y quinze o veynte criados,’ says the charge against Alvarado. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 20, 37, 43. This generally ignored part of the massacre finds also indirect confirmation in the diffuse testimony to the finding of concealed weapons among the attendants of Montezuma. Alvarado would not have failed to punish them for this.
[739] Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412. ‘Este bayle es como el Netoteliztli.’ ‘Mazeualiztli: que quiere dezir Merecimiento con trabajo.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 150.
[740] See Native Races, ii. 288-9.
[741] ‘Fue al patio donde estava el Oechilobos e vi mucha gente junta para le subir e defendiendolo venia mucha gente los quales comensaron a pelear con nosotros.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 67. This is a mere excuse evidently, which none attempt to support, definitely at least; but it sounded well to say that the actual fight began on the native side, as had the plotting. One of Brasseur de Bourbourg’s unique manuscripts states that the first attack by the Spaniards was upon those who were advancing with the idol. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287. ‘Este testigo desfizo el ydolo que los dichos yndios tenian para sobir donde estava Nuestra Señora.’ Nuño Pinto, in Ramirez, 134.
[742] There were from 300 to 400 dancers, nearly all chiefs, and an audience of from 2000 to 3000, says Tapia; and from the wording of the accusation against Alvarado it appears that all the chiefs were killed, and a number of the rest, besides those slaughtered in the fort. Ramirez interprets the native painting to signify 400, most likely of the nobles only, Id., 4, 37, 286; 400 killed, Cortés, Residencia, i. 41; over 600 nobles slaughtered in one hour, Cano, in Oviedo, iii. 550; 600 to 1000 nobles and caciques, Gomara; over 1000 nobles, Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412, and Brasseur de Bourbourg. ‘Fué tan grande el derramamiento de sangre, que corrian arroyos della por el patio como agua cuando mucho llueve.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 100. He gives sickening details of truncated bodies, of dismembered hands and feet, and of draggling entrails. Father Duran goes to an extreme in his account, according to which Alvarado prompted the deed, and Cortés executed it. From 8000 to 10,000 illustrious men were summoned through Montezuma to assemble in the temple, in order to permit Cortés to kill them and thus become master in the country. He places ten soldiers at each gate, and sends in ten to commit the slaughter. Hist. Ind., MS. ii. 456-9. Las Casas is not so absurd, this time at least, but close behind him in the estimate, for he states that the slaughter was carried on in different parts of the city at the same time, and in one place alone about 2000 young nobles fell. Prescott misinterprets him. ‘Non procul à palatio aberant, duo circiter millia juvenum nobilium.... Ad hos se contulit Hispanorum Capitaneus, & alios ad reliquas urbis partes, in quibus hæ choreæ celebrabantur, misit, ... non cessabunt celebrare & lamentari ... calamitatem,’ etc. Regio. Ind. Devastat., 32.
[743] Tapia, and others, in Ramirez, 38, 67, 131. Torquemada assumes that the arms used by the assailants were those which had been collected for the outbreak in the houses adjoining the temple, i. 490. As regards the motives for the massacre, the Spanish authorities seek as a rule to justify them, while the native accounts are equally inclined to ascribe them to greed or to wanton cruelty. According to Sahagun the celebration was held at the instance of Alvarado, who slaughtered the devotees without known cause. Hist. Conq., 27 (ed. 1840), 100. Duran, who is as prejudiced as he is blundering, dates the massacre after the return of Cortés from the coast. Alvarado persuades him to secure the submission of the country by killing all the lords and chiefs, and they are accordingly allured to their death. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 456-7. Las Casas inclines to a similar motive; ‘quo magis cresceret, & augeretur in his provinciis formido illorum crudelitatis.’ Regio. Ind. Devastat., 30. Nearer the truth comes Ixtlilxochitl, who, while disposed to credit his countrymen, dares not accuse the Spaniards, and so takes the prudent middle course of casting the blame on the Tlascaltecs. Prompted by the hatred bred of former wrongs inflicted by Mexicans, and by greed for spoils, they invent charges of treason and speedy revolt. Alvarado, being also avaricious, is readily induced to believe them, and considers it besides a good opportunity to obtain control by dispatching the assembled chiefs, unarmed as they are. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Ixtlilxochitl is not to blame for his assumption, since his admired guide, the biographer of Cortés, does not attempt to defend Alvarado, but merely mentions that he was influenced either by reports of a proposed uprising or by avarice. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. The commentator Chimalpain says bluntly that the latter motive ‘es mas de creer.’ Hist. Conq., i. 281; Benzoni, Mondo Nuovo, 94; Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 92. Vetancurt rather condemns Alvarado for acting on insufficient evidence. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139-40. Cortés’ silence respecting the cause may be attributed to his usual prudence in suppressing unpleasant facts. He states, however, that Montezuma supplicated him not to be annoyed at what had happened, since he regretted it as much as the Spaniards. This implies that the Indians were regarded as originators of the trouble. The severity with which he treated the emperor on his return to Mexico, notwithstanding the efforts made by him to save the Spaniards, indicates still more strongly that Cortés was convinced of Mexican treachery. Cartas, 126 et seq. In the letter of the army to the emperor the uprising is attributed to Narvaez’ plots. Carta del Ejército, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 429. Herrera notices the native versions, particularly that which accuses the Tlascaltecs of having trumped up charges against the Mexicans, but he affirms, ‘la verdad fue, que pensaron matar los Castellanos.’ He thereupon enumerates proofs of the plot. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. Torquemada, who is more fully acquainted with native accounts, condemns them as unreliable, and states that Sahagun accepted them without investigation, i. 489-91. The charge that Alvarado was influenced by avarice is promptly rejected by Bernal Diaz. ‘No lo creo, ni nunca tal oí, ni es de creer que tal hiziesse.’ His motive was to inspire terror and inflict such injury as to prevent the Indians from attacking him. That they intended to attack, Bernal Diaz fully believes. Hist. Verdad., 102. Solis is quite indignant at the supposition that avarice impelled the Spaniards. Hist. Mex., ii. 117. According to Oviedo the intention of the natives was to kill also Cortés on his return. He inserts without comment the version of Cano, married to Montezuma’s daughter, that avarice was the motive, iii. 510, 550. Acosta, who generally adheres to native versions, does not apparently find them reliable in this case, since he merely says that a ‘chastisement’ was inflicted, but that it was excessive. Hist. Ind., 522. This is also the opinion of Clavigero, who believes that the Spaniards were deceived by Tlascaltec stories of a plot, and wished to anticipate it, on the principle that ‘chi assalisce vince. Checchessia, la sua condotta non può scusarsi d’imprudenza, e di crudeltà.’ Storia Mess., iii. 119. This view has been widely adopted, even by the modern Mexican historian Carbajal Espinosa, plagiarist though he be. Hist. Mex., ii. 339. His confrère Bustamante, as editor of Sahagun, is inclined to magnify even the exaggerations of the latter. Prescott wavers between Clavigero’s views and disbelief in Alvarado’s apology. But in expressing his opinion he misconstrues Bernal Diaz and raises some meaningless questions. Mex., ii. 284-6. There is no doubt that the Indians were bent on mischief. A large faction had been hostile to the Spaniards ever since their arrival, as intruders who menaced the existing politic, economic, and religious order. This feeling had been steadily spreading under the threatening attitude assumed by the unbidden guests in seizing the emperor, in extorting tribute, and in assuming mastery. With the occupation of the temple by the Christian emblems the climax was reached; and now the whole population became possessed with a desire to avenge not only the outraged idols, but themselves and their sovereign, and to uphold the tottering throne. The observations of the Spaniards and the reports of their informers were correct in pointing to an uprising, to take place during the gathering of pilgrims for the war-god festival, when the reduced number of the Spanish garrison favored the design. The confession of several natives, whether extorted by torture or not, confirmed the charges and justified belief. Alvarado could not as a prudent commander ignore them, and duty required him to use prompt measures for the protection of his force, and of the interests of his king and the expedition. It might be urged by those who seek to defend this kind of thing that seizure of the victims for hostages would have been equally effective and more humane; but from the precedence established by the general himself at Cholula the conduct of the rash Alvarado is scarcely to be wondered at. Cortés’ object had been to strike terror as the only effective lesson for a people who seemed to recognize no other sway, and if this was regarded as necessary with the Cholultecs, Alvarado must have held it to be doubly so now. His position was far more critical than that at the former city, for his resources were smaller, the prospect of aid was hopeless, and escape was cut off. He had to strike promptly and strike well. Here were the leaders, and here the temple, wherein a punishment would apparently have greater effect. It was natural to suppose that the installation of the war-god would be attended by the leaders or representative men of the enemy; and to level the blow at this class must be considered as less cruel at least than to strike the multitude, as at Cholula. Perhaps the recognition of this was a reason for the silence of Cortés. All this discussion, however, as to the minor motives prompting a dastardly deed I do not regard as very relevant. I am very sure that the motives of the Spaniards in this massacre were not plunder. They were playing for a higher stake, for the whole country, and, in case they won, all in it would be theirs. The present heavy blow was but one of the points in the game.
CHAPTER XXIII.
UPRISING OF THE AZTECS.
May-June, 1520.
Character of the Aztecs—Spanish Quarters—The City in Arms—Growing Hatred toward the Invaders—Perilous Position of Alvarado—Montezuma Called to Interfere—Failing Provisions—Miraculous Water—Cortés to the Rescue—Rendezvous at Tlascala—The City and its People—The Army Joins Alvarado—Desperate Encounters.
The Spaniards had mistaken somewhat the character of the Aztecs. Ground to the dust by political despotism and bloody superstition, their features had assumed a melancholy cast and their form the attitude of humility. Yet beneath all slumbered a ferocity the most blood-thirsty among the Nahua nations. And now, though their nature might be as cold and impassive as the stone of the pavement, the iron heel of the conqueror had struck fire from it.