History of Mexico, Volume 1, 1516-1521

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

For this caution several reasons existed, based on momentous consequences of the late defeat. In their exultation the Mexicans had imprudently published the oracular utterance that within eight days the Spaniards would be destroyed, though many Aztecs would also perish.[1179] Care was taken that this divine proclamation should be known in the Spanish camps, with the intent of disheartening the allies and procuring their desertion. This main object accomplished, it was hoped that neighboring districts might be again persuaded to join in hostile operations, or at least assume a neutral attitude against the isolated Spaniards. Severely harassed by all the strength of the capital and its allies, the Spaniards would be unable to maintain the siege or even to sustain their own position, particularly if supplies were cut off, and so be obliged to retreat. Many indeed looked upon the Spaniards as doomed, and tired besides of the long siege, so contrary to native ideas of warfare, corps after corps of their allies disappeared, in secret retreat to their homes. Others were sufficiently shaken in their belief to lose all ardor, the more so when they recalled the prophecy of disaster uttered by the hanged Xicotencatl. Cortés and his officers did all they could to counteract this influence by referring to previous failures of oracles, to the comparatively small percentage of the late losses, the critical condition of the besieged, and their efforts to gain advantages by spreading lies. Let the allies but abide till the end of the term mentioned by the oracle and they would be convinced of its falsity. The last argument was perhaps the strongest that could be offered under the circumstances, and it was decided to take no risks that might imperil the proof.[1180]

These precautions were imperative in view of the effect of Aztec machinations in the lake districts and outlying provinces. The lake towns last to join the Spaniards relapsed into a frigid neutrality, and might have risen but for the imposing proximity of the fleet and army. Remoter districts assumed a more decided attitude, and from Quauhnahuac came an urgent appeal for help against the attacks of the Malinalcas and Cohuixcas, prompted by Mexico. Immediately after the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and other provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and that the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at the hands of victorious Mexico. Thus, while many were frightened into severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state of affairs.

To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable, and many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be far more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage such hostile movements by a passive demeanor. “It was now more necessary than ever,” he writes, “to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as to hide our weakness both from friends and foes.” Andrés de Tápia was accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together with a considerable force of allies.[1181] In order to calm the many remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return within ten days. Tápia found the enemy awaiting him in large force near a hamlet not far from Malinalco, and at once prepared to attack, assisted by the Quauhnahuacs. The ground being level, the horses proved of great service, and the hostile army was presently in flight toward Malinalco. This place was strongly situated on a height, well supplied with water, so that Tápia considered it useless to attempt an assault, much less a siege when so short a term had been allowed him, and he accordingly returned.

The complaint from Quauhnahuac was followed by a deeper wail from Toluca and adjoining Otomí settlements in the mountain region west of the lake. The Matlalzincas, devoted adherents of Quauhtemotzin, had been induced to openly declare for him and to invade their districts, preparatory to advancing against the Spaniards. This intention had been already vauntingly proclaimed by the Aztecs, and since the Matlaltzincas were both powerful and warlike, the necessity for prompt measures became even more apparent in this case. The tried Sandoval was intrusted with the expedition, composed of eighteen cavalry, one hundred infantry, and a large force of allies chiefly Otomís, which soon grew to about seventy thousand. After a quick march he came to the smoking ruins of some settlements and startled into flight a band of marauders, who left behind them a quantity of plunder and provisions, including some tender children still roasting on the spit. He pursued the raiders, and after crossing a river[1182] came upon a larger force, which turned as he approached, to seek safety within the town of Matlaltzinco, over two leagues distant. The cavalry made terrible havoc among them, and the infantry following in their wake, killed more than two thousand. Those who escaped made a stand at the town to cover the conveyance of families and effects to a fortified hill close by. This was pretty well accomplished before the infantry came up to assist in capturing the town. The defenders now fled, and the place was entered and burned, after being rifled of what remained to take. Since it was late, the assault on the hill was deferred till the morning. There the natives maintained a loud uproar until some time after midnight, when all became quiet. With early dawn the Spaniards prepared to storm the hill only to learn that it had been abandoned. A number of people were seen in the field, however, and eagerly the soldiers revived the fading expectation for a fray. In a twinkling they were among the rabble, and a number were slain before the explanation gained ears that these people belonged to the friendly Otomís. Sandoval now advanced on another fortified town, whose cacique threw open the gates on beholding the hosts before him, and not only offered his own submission, but promised to effect the submission of the allied caciques and those of Malinalco and Cohuixco. Regardless of the insinuations of the Otomís that such promises could not be relied on, Sandoval returned to Mexico, and four days later appeared there the caciques of all these provinces to tender allegiance and aid for the siege.[1183]

Meanwhile the portentous eighth day had dawned on the Spanish camps. Hardly less concerned than the natives, the soldiers could not control their trepidation as they thought of the oracle, although striving to appear indifferent. Nor were they without tangible reasons for their fears. With a daily growing desertion among the much needed allies, and fading enthusiasm among those who remained; with supplies greatly reduced owing to the neutral attitude assumed by surrounding districts; with fresh wars upon their hands, which demanded not only more hardships but a division of their weakened forces; with constant vigils and alarms amid the harassing attacks of a triumphant foe; with a large number of wounded deprived of needful care and comforts, and above all the ghastly spectacle of a daily sacrifice of late comrades, attended by wild and imposing celebrations—with all this gloom and distress it required stout hearts indeed to remain steadfast. Yet they were firm; they believed in the strength and justice of their cause, and in their ultimate triumph, though momentarily dismayed, prayer afforded them relief. It dissipated fear and infused fresh courage.

Thus passed the day, amidst fear and hope, and the Spaniards still existed. The Mexicans do not appear to have made any special effort to support the oracle by a determined attack. Nor had they been able to open any effective communication with the mainland; for although the lake towns had withdrawn their canoe fleet, they offered no aid to the besieged, while the brigantines maintained too strict a guard to permit many boats to gain the capital with supplies.

The ninth day came, and now it was the turn of the Spaniards to exult, for not only did they feel inspired with the belief that providence was protecting them—and nobly the friars helped Cortés to impart that stirring idea—but they were cheered with revived animation among the allies and the early return of most of the deserters. From Tezcuco, indeed, came additional troops under the command of some Spaniards there stationed.[1184] Cortés greeted the returning corps with rather cold forgiveness. He showed them that besides carrying on the siege without their aid he had undertaken victorious campaigns, and needed not their assistance. Nevertheless, since they had served so zealously before, he would not only overlook the grave crime of desertion, due partly to ignorance of Spanish laws, but let them again share in the final reduction of the city, and thus gain both revenge and riches. Cortés could adopt no other course, for the siege could not be carried on without the allies.

Under Spanish training the latter had besides grown very efficient, as the following instance will illustrate: No sooner had the eight portentous days passed by than Chichimecatl, the leading Tlascaltec captain serving under Alvarado, disgusted with the idle fears which had unmanned his people, and eager to retrieve them in the eyes of the Spaniards, resolved to show both them and the Aztecs what he could do. With the aid of the soldiers the first fortified channel was captured, and the chief advanced into the city with his own people only, the flower of his warriors, after leaving several hundred archers near the passage to keep the route clear for retreat. With unwavering columns he advanced along the main street and captured the next canal passage after a fierce struggle. Then he passed onward to the next, maintaining a sharp contest all the day. Finally came the hour for returning, and the Aztecs bore down with doubled fury on his flank and rear. The retreat was performed in good order, partly owing to the foresight of leaving a rear body; and Chichimecatl came back a lauded hero.[1185]

Messengers had been sent to the allies far and wide to encourage them with the news of the non-fulfilment of the oracle. Ojeda and Marquez went in person to Tlascala, partly also with the object of procuring certain supplies. They left Alvarado’s camp at midnight with only a few natives, and when about half-way to Tepeyacac they perceived a train of men descending from the hills with heavy burdens, which they deposited in a number of canoes. Information was at once sent to Alvarado, who placed a guard along the shore to check this smuggling that had evidently escaped the cruisers.[1186] Ojeda’s party proceeded to Tlascala and brought a large train of provisions.[1187] In addition to this the camps were cheered by the arrival of a party of recruits with quite a mass of war material, chiefly powder and cross-bows, relics of Ponce de Leon’s Florida expedition.[1188] The war stores were particularly valuable; so low had run the actual stock that Cortés was preparing more Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in weapons.

Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities. Over six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end seemed little nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three fourths of the city might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all this advantage had been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets, encompassed by houses which served both for attack and retreat, and the numerous traps in the form of canals and channels. So long as these obstacles remained the progress must not only be slow, ever slower as advance was made, but the troops would be constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One more defeat might ruin all, and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He would tear down every building as he advanced on both sides of the streets, and fill up every channel; “not take one step in advance without leaving all desolated behind, and convert water into firm land, regardless of the delay.” So writes the general, and yet he expresses regret for this destruction of the city, “the most beautiful in the world.”[1189] In pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to summon additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements. They eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.