Failing these, recourse is had back again into the family (εἰς τὸ γένος πάλιν ἐπανέρχεται) and the law makes those related through the mother of the deceased, masters (κύριοι) of the family (and inheritance) in the same order as on the father's side from the beginning.
That is to say, failing first cousins once removed, the inheritance goes back and begins again at the mother of the deceased, who however, being a woman, can only inherit on behalf of her issue, present or prospective.[146] If she has married again and has a son (half-brother to her deceased son) he would inherit. Failing her issue, her brother and so on to first cousin's children [pg 058] of the deceased, through his mother, would have the inheritance.
Failing these, the nearest kinsman to be found on the father's side, of whatsoever degree, is to inherit.
The law according to Demosthenes.
The law as stated by Demosthenes[147] coincides with this:—
“If there are no sons, brothers by the same father (shall inherit): and their true born children, if there are any, shall have the share of their father: if there are no brothers or brother's children the issue of the latter in the same way shall partake: males and children of males shall have preference (over females) if they are born of the same (parents), even if they are further off by birth (γένει) [i.e. are a generation lower down]. If there are none on the father's side as far as cousin's children (μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων), the relations on the mother's side in the same way shall have possession (κυρίους εἶναι). But if there are none on either side within these degrees, the nearest of kin on the father's side shall have possession.”
Whenever this law is quoted the limit of relationship laid down therein for the immediate ἀγχιστεία is always that of ἀνεψιῶν παῖδες, or sons of first cousins, who inherit from their first cousins once removed (oncle à la Brétagne, or Welsh uncle as this relation has been called). Occasionally the patronymic form ἀνεψιαδοῖ is used, apparently with the same signification, though properly ἀνεψιαδοῖ would mean sons of two first cousins, i.e. second cousins.[148]
No ἀγχιστεία beyond great-grandsons.
It appears from the evidence reviewed hitherto, that any great-grandson could inherit from any grandson of a common ancestor, and the conclusion [pg 059] also seems to be justified, that the group of great-grandsons were considered to divide up their right to inherit once for all, and that having done so, with respect to that inheritance they were considered to have begun a new succession. To put it differently, in case of the death of one of these second cousins, after the final division of their inheritance had taken place, the rest of the second cousins would have no right to a share in his portion; an heir would have to be found within his nearer relations. Thus, they share responsibilities towards any of their relations within the group and higher up in their families, and also stand shoulder to shoulder in sharing such burdens as pollution and so on, but are outside the immediate ἀγχιστεία with respect to each other's succession. The reason for this will perhaps be more apparent as the argument proceeds.
That the grandson of a first cousin was outside the ἀγχιστεία is clear from the speech of Demosthenes already mentioned,[149] where the plaintiff, who originally stands in that relationship to the deceased whose inheritance is in dispute, is adopted as son of his grandfather (first cousin of the deceased), in order to come within the legal definition of ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς.