Sir Isaac Brock

by Hugh S. Eayrs

Early in 1807, Brock was greatly heartened by proposals from Colonel John Macdonell, who was lieutenant of the county of Glengarry and had been for four years commanding officer of the Glengarry Militia Regiment, for forming a company of Highland Fencibles. Brock forwarded the scheme to the war office in London and backed it up. It would be, he said, “essentially useful in checking any seditious disposition which the wavering sentiments of a large population in the Montreal district might at any time manifest.” This is an indication that Brock was by no means sure which way the habitant would go in case of war.

Brock thought he had ground for his suspicions, and he decided to get to know the folk of Lower Canada better. When Sir James Craig arrived in Quebec, Brock’s tenure of the office of commander-in-chief ended. Sir James became that and governor-general in one, but he appointed Brock as acting brigadier-general. This was confirmed in London. Brock was sent to Montreal in command of the troops there and quartered in the old Chateau de Ramesay at Montreal, then a rich centre and the only city of pleasure and gaiety in Canada.

In Montreal he managed to see a good deal of the fur lords and great business men of the place. He entered into their social life, and the French-Canadian then, as now, knew how to be hospitable. This gave the brigadier a chance to judge somewhat as to where French-Canada stood, and he had even better facilities when, in September, 1808, he was superseded in the Montreal command by General Drummond and was moved back to Quebec. Here he had many friends and he entertained and was entertained. All sorts of regattas and land sports were held by the officers of the garrison and, here, as in Montreal, he found a good deal of pleasure in social affairs. He writes of “a vast assemblage of all descriptions”—an occasion when he entertained Lieutenant-Governor Gore, of Upper Canada, and his wife at a dinner and ball. During these days he unquestionably became reassured as to the loyalty of the people of Lower Canada.

He had perhaps been unduly suspicious. The people of Lower Canada, of course, were almost entirely of French descent. They spoke French, and Brock feared that in a Franco-America alliance, French Canada would remember its descent and support Napoleon. There were signs of leaning France-wards. The French Canadians publicly rejoiced when news of a fresh victory for Napoleon reached them, and Brock at first certainly deemed them disloyal. He so expressed himself in his letters again and again. He could not understand why they should be, for they were much freer and happier under British rule than they had been when Bigot and others, during the French regime, had governed them. Yet even in the early days, Brock was in two minds about them for he wrote: “It may appear surprising that men petted as they have been and indulged in everything they could desire should wish for a change, but so it is, and I am inclined to think that were Englishmen placed in the same situation they would show even more impatience to escape from French rule.”

But, on the whole, Brock need not have feared. The French Canadians did not want another rule. Their priests and men in high authority were loyal to Britain, and they represented the mass of opinion more than the Napoleonic or American agent who was to be found here and there in Lower Canada.

In these days, Brock was not particularly happy. He was worried by the possibility of war, and taking it on the whole he was not in love with Canada. Perhaps he was homesick. He heard of former comrades winning their spurs on the battlefields of Europe, and he compared their lot to his in a “remote, inactive corner” as he dubbed Canada in a letter to England. And we know that he had enlisted his brother Savery’s efforts to have him transferred. It was natural. He was a man of action and had as keen a desire as any soldier for risk and fame.

Brock’s first measure in strengthening the defences of Canada was to make Quebec attack-proof. Sir Guy Carleton, in 1775-1776, had defended Quebec against American forces under General Montgomery. There might soon be another attack, and Brock wanted to have Quebec in such shape that it could repel invasion. He appealed to the council for a thousand men and sufficient carts for six months to strengthen the walls. But the civil government of Lower Canada thought his move was a political one and gave little or no aid. They told him he must do the work himself, and he did. In a letter to the president of the council he scouts the suspicions of the civil government and states that his “sole object was to state the assistance required by the military to remedy a glaring defect in the fortifications of Quebec, should his Honor conceive that preparatory measures were necessary to be adopted in consequence ... of the ... aggressive proceedings in the proclamation of the American Government.”

He went ahead and erected a battery mounting eight thirty-six pounders in the centre of the citadel at Quebec, commanding the heights opposite. This was first christened “Brock’s Battery,” but when the newly-arrived governor-general, Sir James Craig, saw it, he thought, says Brock, “that anything so pre-eminent should be distinguished by the most exalted name.” It was therefore called “The King’s Battery,” and, wrote Brock, “this is the greatest compliment that he could pay to my judgment.”

Altogether, at great expense, the fortifications of Quebec were greatly improved. Proper drill grounds were made and a good hospital created. Quartermasters at Amherstburg and Kingston were appointed to take charge of new fleets of schooners and military batteaux which he had constructed.

He was not a moment too soon with his work. The international situation was rapidly complicating. Mention has been made of Britain’s stopping and searching American vessels for British deserters. This continued and became more general, and there does not seem to be room for doubt that, in some cases, British commanders were very autocratic. They gave the United States legitimate cause for complaint by sometimes carrying off seamen whom they pretended were British, but who were really American citizens. The case of the Chesapeake brought matters to a head. It was suspected by Admiral Berkeley, stationed at Halifax, that some sailors, whose offence was particularly flagrant, had deserted from the British sloop Halifax and had found refuge on the Chesapeake. The Admiral ordered Captain Humphreys of the frigate Leopard to insist on the return of these deserters. Commodore Barron commanding the Chesapeake refused point blank to surrender the men in question, and Humphreys fired on the United States frigate, which did not return the fire. She was seized, and the deserters secured by the British commander. Naturally the United States threatened war. This was answered by an honorable apology from Britain, however, and the war cloud passed for the moment. But Brock thought it could not long be delayed. The heart of the trouble was still there, and sooner or later the irritation which each nation felt at the other was bound to find outlet in actual conflict. Hence Brock’s rush to make preparations for adequate defence.