The law of the twelve tables indeed required, that the person who took a thief either in the day time, or in the night, should make a noise that, if possible, the magistrates or neighbours might assemble to assist him and give evidence. But as such a concourse could more easily be assembled in the day time than in the night, as Ulpian observes upon the passage before quoted from Demosthenes, the affirmation of a person declaring the danger he was in during the night is more readily believed. To which an additional observation may be made, that, even under equal circumstances, the danger which happens by night can be less examined, and ascertained, and therefore is the more terrible. The Jewish law therefore, no less than the Roman, acting upon the same principle of tenderness forbids us to kill any one, who has taken our goods, unless for the preservation of our own lives.
XVI.[16] What has been already said of the right of defending our persons and property, though regarding chiefly private war, may nevertheless be applied to public hostilities, allowing for the difference of circumstances. For private war may be considered as an instantaneous exercise of natural right, which ceases the moment that legal redress can be obtained. Now as public war can never take place, but where judicial remedies cease to exist, it is often protracted, and the spirit of hostility inflamed by the continued accession of losses and injuries. Besides, private war extends only to self-defence, whereas sovereign powers have a right not only to avert, but to punish wrongs. From whence they are authorised to prevent a remote as well as an immediate aggression. Though the suspicion of hostile intentions, on the part of another power, may not justify the commencement of actual war, yet it calls for measures of armed prevention, and will authorise indirect hostility. Points, which will be discussed in another place.
XVII. Some writers have advanced a doctrine which can never be admitted, maintaining that the law of nations authorises one power to commence hostilities against another, whose increasing greatness awakens her alarms. As a matter of expediency such a measure may be adopted, but the principles of justice can never be advanced in its favour. The causes which entitle a war to the denomination of just are somewhat different from those of expediency alone. But to maintain that the bare probability of some remote, or future annoyance from a neighbouring state affords a just ground of hostile aggression, is a doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity. Such however is the condition of human life, that no full security can be enjoyed. The only protection against uncertain fears must be sought, not from violence, but from the divine providence, and defensive precaution.
XVIII. There is another opinion, not more admissible, maintaining that the hostile acts of an aggressor, may be considered in the light of defensive measures, because, say the advocates of this opinion, few people are content to proportion their revenge to the injuries they have received; bounds which in all probability the party aggrieved has exceeded, and therefore in return becomes himself the aggressor. Now the excess of retaliation cannot, any more than the fear of uncertain danger, give a colour of right to the first aggression, which may be illustrated by the case of a malefactor, who can have no right to wound or kill the officers of justice in their attempts to take him, urging as a plea that he feared the punishment would exceed the offense.
The first step, which an aggressor ought to take, should be an offer of indemnity to the injured party, by the arbitration of some independent and disinterested state. And if this mediation be rejected, then his war assumes the character of a just war. Thus Hezekiah when he had not stood to the engagements made by his ancestors, being threatened with an attack from the King of Assyria on that account, acknowledged his fault, and left it to the King to assign what penalty he should pay for the offence. After he had done so, finding himself again attacked, relying on the justice of his cause, he opposed the enemy, and succeeded by the favour of God. Pontius the Samnite, after restoration of the prizes had been made to the Romans, and the promoter of the war delivered up into their hands, said, "We have now averted the wrath of heaven, which our violation of treaties had provoked. But the supreme being who was pleased to reduce us to the necessity of restoration, was not equally pleased with the pride of the Romans, who rejected our offer. What farther satisfaction do we owe to the Romans, or to Heaven, the arbiter of treaties? We do not shrink from submitting the measure of YOUR resentment, or of OUR punishment to the judgment of any people, or any individual." In the same manner, when the Thebans had offered the most equitable terms to the Lacedaemonians, who still rose higher in their demands, Aristides says, that the justice of the cause changed sides and passed from the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans.
[CHAPTER II.]
The General Rights of Things.
The general rights of things—Division of what is our own—The origin and progress of property—Some things impossible to be made the subject of property—The Sea of this nature, in its full extent, or in its principal parts—Unoccupied lands may become the property of individuals, unless they have been previously occupied by the people at large—Wild beasts, fishes, birds, may become the property of him who seizes them—In cases of necessity men have a right of using that which has already become the property of others—To sanction this indulgence, the necessity must be such that it cannot otherwise be avoided—This indulgence not allowed where the possessor is in an equal degree of necessity—The party thus supplying his wants from another's property, bound to make restitution whenever it is possible. The application of this principle to the practice of war—The right to use the property of another, provided that use be no way prejudicial to the owner—Hence the right to the use of running water—The right of passing through countries, and by rivers explained—An inquiry into the right of imposing duties on merchandise—The right of residing for a time in a foreign state—The right of exiles to reside in the dominions of a foreign state, provided they submit to its laws—In what manner the right of occupying waste places is to be understood—The right to certain articles necessary to the support of human society, and life—The general right of purchasing those articles at a reasonable price—The right to sell, not of equal force and extent—The right to those privileges which are promiscuously granted to foreigners—Inquiry whether it be lawful to contract with any people for the purchase of their productions on condition of their not selling the same to others.
I. Among the causes assigned to justify war, we may reckon the commission of injury, particularly such as affects any thing which belongs to us. Now we establish this claim to any thing as our own either by a right COMMON to us as men, or acquired by us in our INDIVIDUAL capacity. But to begin with that which is the common right of all mankind; we may observe that it comprises what is called by legal authorities, Corporeal and Incorporeal rights.[17]