The Americans

by Hugo Münsterberg

The good times which America has enjoyed for some years have also favoured the development of trusts. When the harvests are good and the factories all busy, high prices are readily paid. The trusts can do even better than single companies by shutting down unprofitable plants and adapting the various remaining plants for mutual co-operation. Then, too, their great resources enable them to procure the best business intelligence. In addition to all this came a series of favourable external circumstances. First was the rapid growth of American capital which was seeking investment. In the seventies, the best railroad companies had to pay a rate of 7 per cent. in order to attract investors; now they pay 3½ per cent. Capital lies idle in great quantities and accumulates faster than it can find investment. This has necessarily put a premium on the organization of new trusts. Then, too, there was the well-known uniformity of the market, so characteristic of America. The desire to imitate on the one side, and patience and good nature on the other, give to this tremendous region of consumption extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean a uniformity of demand which greatly favours manufacture on a gigantic scale. This is in sharp contrast with the diversity of requirements in Europe.

It has been, doubtless, also important that the American feels relatively little attached to his special business. Just as he loves his Fatherland really as a conception, as an ideal system, but feels less bound to the special piece of soil where he was born and will leave his own farm if he is a farmer and go westward in search of better land, so the American passionately loves business as a method, without being over attached to his own particular firm. If the opening is favourable, he gives up his business readily to embark on another, just as he gives up an old-fashioned machine in favour of an improved one.

Just this quality of mind is so different from the German that here would be probably the greatest hindrance to the organization of trusts in Germany. The German feels himself to have grown up in his special business, which he may have inherited from his father, just as the peasant has grown up on his farm, and he does not care to become the mere employee of a large trust. Another contributory mental trait has been the friendly confidence which the American business man puts in his neighbour. The name is here appropriate; the trusts in fact repose to a high degree on mutual trust, and trusts like the American could not develop wherever there should be mutual distrust or jealousy in the business world. Finally, the laws themselves have been favourable, in so far as they have favoured the issue of preferred stock in a way very convenient to trusts, but one which would not have been approved in Europe. And, moreover, the trusts have made considerable use of the diversity existing between the laws of different states.

There have been retarding factors, too. We have mentioned the most important of all—the legal discountenance of all business agreements tending to create a monopoly or to restrain trade. There have been others, however. One purpose of the trusts is to put prices up and so to make the necessities of life dearer. It is the people who pay the prices—the same people who elect Congress and determine the tariffs and the laws; so that every trust works in the knowledge that putting up prices tends immediately to work back on business by calling forth tariff revision and anti-trust laws.

One source of great profit to the trusts has been the possibility of restricting output. This method promised gain where natural products were in question, such as oil, tobacco, and sugar, of which the quantity is limited, and further for all technical patents. Where, however, there is no such limitation the most powerful corporation will not be able to avoid competition, and if it tries to buy up competing factories to stop such competition, still more are built at once, solely with the purpose of extorting a high ransom from the trusts; and this game is ruinous. In other departments again consolidation of business means very little economy; Morgan’s marine trust is said not to have succeeded for this reason. In short, not all industries are susceptible of being organized as trusts, and the dazzling profits of certain favoured trusts too easily misled those who were in pursuit of fortune into forgetting the difference between different businesses. Trusts were formed where they could not be profitable. Perhaps the real founders themselves did not overlook the difference; but they counted on the great hungry public to overlook it, until at least most of the shares should have been disposed of.

As a fact, however, the reluctance of the great investing public has been a decidedly restraining factor too. The securities spoiled before the public had absorbed them; everywhere the complaint went up of undigested securities. The public came early to suspect that the promoters were making their profits not out of the legitimate economies to be saved by the trusts, but by enormously overcapitalizing them and taking large blocks of stock for themselves.

There was still another unfavourable influence on public opinion. The main profits of a protected trust lie in its being able to sell more dearly than it could if exposed to foreign competition. But now if the consolidated industry itself proposes to sell to other countries, it must of course step down to the prevailing level of prices. It must therefore sell more cheaply abroad than at home. But this is soon found out, and creates a very unfavourable impression. The American is willing to pay high prices, as far as that goes; but when he has to pay a price double what the same factory charges for the same goods when delivered in Europe, he finds the thing wholly unnatural, and will protest at the next election. Thus there have been plenty of factors to counteract the favourable conditions, and the history of trusts has certainly not been for their promoters a simple tale of easy profits.

Now, if we do not ask what has favoured or hindered the trusts, nor how they have benefited or jeopardized their founders, but rather look about to see what their effect on the nation has been and will be, some good features appear at once. However much money may have been lost, or rather, however fictitious values may have been wiped out in the market, the great enterprises are after all increasing the productive capacity of the nation and its industrial strength in the fight with other peoples. They give a broad scope to business, and bring about relations and mutual adaptations which would never have developed in the chaotic struggling of small concerns. They produce at the same time by the concentration of control an inner solidarity which allows one part to function for another in case there are hindrances or disasters to any part of the great organism, and this is undoubtedly a tremendous factor for the general good. A mischance which, under former conditions, would have been disastrous can be survived now under this system of mutual interdependence: thus it can hardly be doubted that the combined action of the banks in the year 1903 prevented a panic; since, when stocks began to fall, the banks were able to co-operate as they would not have been able previously to their close affiliation.

Furthermore, economic wealth can now be created more advantageously for the nation. The saving of funds which were formerly spent in direct competition is a true economy, and the trusts have asserted again and again that as a matter of fact they do not put up prices, but that they make sufficient profits in saving what had formerly been wasted in business hostilities. Certainly the trusts make it possible to isolate useless or superannuated plants, without causing a heavy loss to the owners, and thus the national industry is even more freely adaptable to changing circumstances than before; and this advantage accrues to the entire country. The spirit of enterprise is remarkably encouraged and the highest premiums are put on individual achievement. Almost all the men who hold responsible positions in the mammoth works of the Steel Trust have worked up, like Carnegie himself, from the bottom of the ladder, and made their millions simply by working better than their fellows.

On the other hand, the trusts have their drawbacks. One of the most regrettable to the American mind is their moral effect. The American distrusts such extreme concentration of power and capital; it looks toward aristocracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. At the same time the masses are demoralized, and in very many cases individual initiative is strangled. There are, as it were, nothing but officials obeying orders; no men acting wholly on their own responsibility. Work ceases to be a pleasure, because everything goes by clock-work; the trust supersedes the independent merchant and manufacturer just as the machine has superseded the independent artisan.