A few weeks afterwards (21st March) came the decisive struggle on Bradlaugh's Affirmation Bill (otherwise "Oaths Bill"), which he had failed to force through in the previous session. He moved the second reading in a tersely argued and conciliatory speech; and though some Conservatives, as Mr Stanley Leighton and Mr De Lisle (Catholic), made foolish speeches against it, the great majority of the House was with him. One member, Mr Gedge, made a success of absurdity by arguing that the promoters of the Bill had defined an Atheist as one "on whom conscience had no binding effect," and this nonsensical phrase he repeated again and again without recognising its nature, entirely failing at the same time to see the point that the "definition" he meant to quote was that given by a court of law, and not by the promoters of the Bill at all. At length, the second reading was carried over the amendment (which proposed a Royal Commission) by 247 votes to 137. On the substantive motion being put that the Bill be read a second time, obstruction was attempted, which Bradlaugh met by moving the closure. On this he had 334 votes to 50; and the second reading was then formally carried by 250 votes to 100, a majority which surpassed his most sanguine expectations.
To secure the passage of the measure, however, he had to meet the old Christian plea that the permission to affirm—which his Bill gave alike to witnesses, jurors, officials, and members of Parliament, in Scotland and Ireland as well as England—should not be given to believing Christians who, having no conscientious objections to swearing, might seek to evade it because they felt freer to lie on affirmation than on oath. This was urged on the Conservative side as a concession essential to acceptance of the Bill, and Bradlaugh consented to make the provision in Committee. No Liberal opposed; but trouble was to arise later in the matter.
Months after Bradlaugh's undertaking had been given, and after he had put down the promised amendment, some leading Liberal members, who had not before made any protest, raised a strong objection to the concession made, inasmuch as it placed upon every one desiring to affirm the necessity of avowing whether he objected to the oath on religious grounds, or as having no religious opinion. There ought, these members argued, to be no questioning whatever as to reasons. This was a perfectly reasonable objection to make on principle; but it ignored the fact that only by making concessions to the Christian side, to meet the case of superstitious and dishonest Christians, could any relieving measure be carried at all; and it was brought forward surprisingly late in the day. It is not clear, further, that the objectors realised what the amendment actually did, for they protested that while it was all right for Freethinkers, it put a stigma on those who were not prepared to say they had no religious beliefs. The plain answer to this was that such persons, if they objected to an oath, had only to say it was inconsistent with their religious belief. Although the objectors included such able heads as Mr E. Robertson and Dr W. A. Hunter, it must be said that their opposition was not justified by their arguments. It was less difficult to follow the complaint of Mr J. A. Picton, who said he would have no relief from the Bill, inasmuch as he was not without religious belief, but "regarded oath-taking as a humiliating and barbarous custom." In that case, however, Mr Picton might with perfect propriety say that oath-taking was inconsistent with his religious belief. Further, though it is quite fair for Agnostics, Theists, and others to protest that they ought not to be asked for any account of their opinions in a court of justice, it was less than fair for them to propose to leave without any relief whatever the Freethinking jurors who were liable to much worse odium and annoyance than is involved in saying that the oath is inconsistent with one's religious belief; the witnesses who in Scotland could not affirm on any condition whatever, and in England could only affirm on answering a grossly invidious question; and the members of Parliament who had to take the oath while very much disliking it. With the single exception of Dr Hunter, none of the Liberal objectors to the added clause had made any fight against oaths; the whole brunt of the battle had been left to the Freethinkers. Yet some of those objectors, who had not specially moved a finger for any reform whatever, were now prepared to throw over the measure. Mr John Morley, who had voted for the second reading after hearing Bradlaugh's undertaking to insert the qualifying clause, now made some heated remarks against it, which Bradlaugh dryly characterised as "not very philosophic." They certainly came ill from the editor who had deprecated Bradlaugh's willingness to take any oath. By dint of more forcible remonstrances with other members in the lobby, Bradlaugh secured a majority of 87 votes for the third reading, the figures being 147 to 60. Many of the Liberal objectors, recognising that to vote with the Noes, who were mostly bigots, would be to put themselves in a false position, abstained from voting; and of the 147 in the majority, 92 were Liberals.
The trouble, however, was not yet over. The "Liberal and Radical Union" of Northampton passed by a majority a resolution complaining that the value of the Bill was taken away by the amendment; and some Liberal journals accused Bradlaugh of giving away the principle of religious equality by agreeing to the imposition of "a new test." He met these criticisms in a very temperate letter "To Liberal Editors in general, and the Editor of the South Wales Daily News in particular," the latter journal having been one of those which had been most just to him throughout his struggle. The editor replied, acknowledging the courtesy of the criticism, and making his own less extravagant, but making the extraordinary blunder of alleging that even then any member of Parliament could affirm on the ground that oath-taking was contrary to his religious belief—this while avowing that he only dealt with the measure as regarded the Parliamentary oath. His main argument was that there were many people who detested the oath, but could not say it was condemned by their religious belief; and on the score of his measure not relieving such persons, Bradlaugh was pronounced "ungenerous." The truth was that he had done his best to make affirmation absolutely unconditional, but could only carry his Bill at all by making it conditional on the giving of a reason. He had done all he could for all classes of objectors, and he rightly thought it better to relieve those who suffered most than to secure no relief at all. The further relief claimed by believers should be demanded by them from their fellow-believers. The rational course, clearly, is to abolish oaths altogether, and this Bradlaugh would gladly have done; but it is neither rational nor candid to talk as if this or even a somewhat less measure of reform could possibly be secured by him within two years of his admission to Parliament after a desperate struggle with a majority who stood for the grossest irrationality and injustice. Those who condemned him ought in consistency and decency to have begun an agitation either for making affirmation unconditional—a course which would still leave some people open to annoyance—or for the entire abolition of oaths. Yet, after six years have elapsed, there is still no word of any such movement. It is the old story of the half-way people leaving all the stress of the fighting to the more advanced. These may be permitted to say that it is a little too much to put on avowed Freethinkers, fighting for bare rights under all sorts of calumny and ostracism, the burden of securing an effortless immunity for those who all along stood at best in the rear-guard, if they did anything in the matter at all.
Close on the heels of the second reading of the Affirmation Bill (March) came the debate on the report of the Perpetual Pensions Committee, on which he moved a resolution that steps should be taken by the Government to give effect to the Committee's recommendations. He had a Tory seconder, Mr Louis Jennings; and the debate included a friendly speech, with an acceptable amendment, from Mr W. H. Smith, and a very interesting speech from Gladstone; whereafter the amendment (amended) was incorporated, and the Government stood pledged to "determine" all hereditary pensions with due regard to justice and economy, and to revise the pension system in general. In May, Bradlaugh again (as told in the chapter above, on his "Political Doctrine and Work") pressed his resolution as to the expediency of Compulsory Cultivation of Waste Lands, only to see the House counted out after his seconder (Mr Munro Ferguson) and the mover of an amendment had spoken. He was not to succeed alike in everything. Later in May he had an unpleasant experience in respect of the Government's breach of faith over his motion of a new Rule, to the effect that on a new member presenting himself in due form, the Speaker should forthwith call him to the table. Mr Smith agreed to accept the motion as an "amendment to going into Supply," on its being amended by the clause "unless the House otherwise resolve," which Bradlaugh was advised was a harmless provision; but when, on the pressure of Sir Henry James (who in the Courts had argued for the House's right to "resolve" to an extent to which Bradlaugh's clause would not allow) and others, he withdrew the clause, the Government threw over the whole motion, though nobody objected to the withdrawal, and the Unionists who had urged the withdrawal of the clause left the House without voting on the motion. It was accordingly rejected by 180 votes to 152.
His main undertaking for 1888, however, succeeded finally, to a marvel. In the House of Lords, the Affirmation Bill might have been held to run considerable risk; but singularly enough, though amendments were talked of, none were pushed, and the Bill passed its third reading (December 1888) absolutely unchanged. In the absence of Lord Herschell, it was taken charge of by Earl Spencer and Lord Coleridge; but what was no less important, it was endorsed by the Archbishop of Canterbury as a desirable measure. As usual, the Church took credit for lending itself to a reform which it had violently resisted. Outsiders were left asking which policy had been the more insincere—the old outcry against all Affirmation Bills or the new pretence of welcoming one. The Lord Chancellor, who, as Sir Hardinge Giffard, had so often opposed Bradlaugh and all his works, was more true to his antecedents, and confessed his jealousy and dislike of the measure, while grudgingly abstaining from trying to defeat it. To Lord Esher, who as a judge had always administered the law as to oaths dead against him, but who now helped the Affirmation Bill through the Upper House, Bradlaugh tendered grave and chivalrous thanks in his journal, adding that none were necessary in the case of the Lord Chancellor.
While the Affirmation Bill was on its way the libel action by Peters was heard and decided. Before it came on, the editor of the St Stephen's Review (Mr Allison), who had made a libellous attack on Bradlaugh in respect of the case, was on Bradlaugh's suit tried before Justices Manisty and Hawkins, and submitting himself apologetically to the Court (March 22nd), was let off with a fine of £20 and full costs for his contempt of Court, Mr Justice Hawkins observing that he "very much doubted whether such a fine was an adequate punishment for so gross a contempt. He did not think he had ever seen a worse attempt to affect the administration of justice." The judge added some no less forcible remarks on Mr Allison's explanation that he had made his attack "to advance the interests of the Conservative cause." But that principle was destined to have a still more remarkable illustration within the law courts themselves, when the libel suit was tried (April 18th) before Mr Baron Huddleston and a special jury. If the action of Peters for libel, in inception and upshot, be not the most extraordinary libel case of modern times, it is only because the judge who tried it gave a no less extraordinary turn to another libel case which came before him eighteen months later. Peters' contention was, in brief, that Bradlaugh had libelled him by stating that he got money from leading Conservatives, including Lord Salisbury, for the promotion of a "Fair Trade" demonstration in Trafalgar Square. His counsel, Mr Lockwood, argued that "if Mr Peters was doing what Mr Bradlaugh accused him of, then Mr Peters was doing a very corrupt thing"—a plea only intelligible as resting on the fact that Peters was the secretary of the "Workmen's National Association for the Abolition of Foreign Sugar Bounties," and as implying that it would be corruption on the part of such a Society to take money from a lord. The evidence led was to the effect that Lord Salisbury had given money, not to Peters, but to Kelly, who was the fidus Achates of Peters, but was also secretary to the "Riverside Labourers' Association." Both had for years been known to Lord Salisbury in connection with the sugar protection movement. Kelly had gone down to Hatfield and seen Mr Gunton, the secretary, and in consequence of that interview had sent a letter to Lord Salisbury explaining that money was wanted to give a piece of beef each to 120 of "our best men at Christmas." The said best men were "all fathers of families," and "had never been in receipt of parochial relief." Lord Salisbury, who gave evidence, remembered getting this letter and sending Kelly a cheque for £25; but had no recollection of any talk with Mr Gunton as to Kelly's previous visit to Hatfield, in consequence of which the letter was sent. He thought it unlikely that Kelly would have seen Mr Gunton in that way, but confessed his error when shown that Kelly's letter to him actually mentioned the interview. The landlord of a temperance hotel, which was the headquarters of Peters' and Kelly's activities, testified to having spent this money on provisions, which he distributed to "needy working men," all save a small balance, which was otherwise distributed. He kept no books. Peters was on the committee of distribution.
Now, granting that the money had been honestly spent in the way alleged, there was clearly no libel on Peters in saying that the money had been sent him to promote the Trafalgar Square demonstration. There would be no wrongdoing in getting money from any one for such a purpose. He declared in his evidence that Lord Salisbury had never given him anything—"nothing, only his friendship." The buffoonery of the plaintiff's evidence, which kept the audience in chronic laughter, was not more remarkable than the bluster of his statements as to his accounts. Never was a demonstration apparently got up with a more enthusiastic zeal by working-men promoters, or with a more simple-minded financial reliance on Providence. Only £4 had been spent on the demonstration—"to obtain bands and banners." What the placards had cost witness could not say; he could not even say whether they had been paid for. The evidence of his colleague, Kelly, was hardly less edifying. He had been one of those who had received Corporation money to get up meetings against municipal reform.
Bradlaugh's defence was that even on the evidence there was no libel. When Baron Huddleston interrupted him to suggest that he should apologise, he answered that he was ready to do so as regarded Lord Salisbury, but he could not deal with the rest of the case on those lines. On the evidence led he was bound to admit that he had been inaccurate as regarded Lord Salisbury's cheque; but his statement had been wider than that, and neither in general nor in particular had it been of the nature of a libel. Further, he had spoken in good faith and on distinct evidence. Peters had on pressure admitted receiving subscriptions from persons outside his Association; and Peters had refused the investigation originally invited in 1886, when the other facts could have been better traced. And Bradlaugh had led evidence as to the receipt by Peters of such cheques, two of which had been shown to him.