Well, we had Chunuk Bair in our hands the best part of two days and two nights. So far the Turks have never retaken trenches once we had fairly taken hold. Have they done so now? I hope not. Birdie and Godley are at work upon a scheme for its recapture. The Turks are well commanded: that I admit. Their Generals knew they were done unless they could quickly knock us off our Chunuk Bair. So they have done it. Never mind: never say die. Meanwhile we have the East Anglian Division available to-morrow, and I have been over in the G.S. marquee working out ways and means of taking Kavak Tepe which may also give us an outlook, more distant, but yet an outlook, on to the Dardanelles.
11th August, 1915. Imbros. Did not dare to break away from the wire ends. A see-saw of cardinal events between Suvla and Anzac.
A workable scheme of attack has now been put into such shape as to let Stopford dovetail his Corps orders into it, and first thing sent him this cable:—
"G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. General Commanding wishes 54th Division Infantry to attack line Kavak Tepe peak 1195.5. at dawn to-morrow after night march to foothills; G.S.O. proceeding with detailed instructions. See Inglefield, make arrangements and give all assistance possible by landing 53rd Signal Company, water gear and tools. 53rd Division becomes general reserve."
At 4.30 p.m., a letter from Stopford anent the failure of the 53rd Division,—depressing in itself but still more so in its inferences as to the 54th Division. He says these troops showed "no attacking spirit at all. They did not come under heavy shell fire nor was the rifle fire very severe, but they not only showed no dash in attack but went back at slight provocation and went back a long way. Lots of the men lay down behind cover, etc. They went on when called upon to do so by Staff and other Officers but they seemed lost and under no leadership—in fact, they showed that they are not fit to put in the field without the help of Regulars. I really believe that if we had had one Brigade of Regulars here to set an example both the New Army and Territorials would have played up well with them but they have no standard to go by."
Worse follows, for Stopford takes back his assurance given me after my cable of the 9th when he said, "given water, guns and ammunition, I have no doubt about our being able to secure the hills." He tells me straight and without any beating about the bush, "I am sure they" (the Territorials) "would not secure the hills with any amount of guns, water and ammunition assuming ordinary opposition, as the attacking spirit was absent; chiefly owing to the want of leadership by the Officers."
Ignoring our Kavak Tepe scheme, he goes on then to ask me in so many words, not to try any attack with the 54th Division but to stick them into trenches.
This letter has driven me very nearly to my wits' ends. Things can't be so bad! None of us have any complaint at all of the New Army troops; only of their Old Army Generals. Stopford says the 13th Division were not reliable when they were at Helles, whereas now, under Godley at Anzac they have fought like lions.
Rushed off in this, the good tub Imogene (Lieutenant-Commander Potts). There the rushing ceased as she steamed along so slowly that we didn't get to Suvla till 7 p.m. Walked up with Braithwaite and Freddie to the 9th Corps Headquarters. Saw Stopford. Wrestled with him for over an hour; Braithwaite doing ditto with Reed.