1. To justify rebellion, (or what is the same thing, forcible resistance of the laws,) a government must be so bad, as to fail manifestly of its just end, that is, to promote the happiness of the people. If it does promote that general happiness, it answers the just end of government—it is a good government, and ought not to be overthrown.
2. To justify rebellion, the injustice or failure of a government must be so great, that it cannot be endured,—so great, that it will manifestly be better on the whole, to run all the risks of a bloody conflict, of civil war, than to endure the execution of the governmental laws.
3. To justify rebellion, there must be little or no prospect that the government can be peaceably altered, as ours may be, or that the injustice or oppression of the government can be made to cease by any peaceable means. Violence against government, rebellion, civil war, are no small matters. They bring horrid evils along with them. The injury of government must be very great to justify the introduction of such evils; and if the injury can be made to cease, by any peaceable means and within any reasonable time, it would be better to bear the injury for a while, than to involve the nation in confusion and blood, with uncertainty as to the result.—The last four years' experience of nations in Europe may read us a lesson.
A republic is different from a despotism. A nation where a Constitution forming the foundation of Law, limiting its enactments and establishing courts, is plainly written out in language that everybody can understand,—where Constitution and Law provide for their own amendment at the will of the sovereign people expressed in a regular and solemn manner,—where the will of the people thus governs, and (for example,) there is no "taxation without representation,"—where the elective franchise is free, and every man capable of intelligently exercising the right may give his voice for altering the Constitution or Law,—and where, therefore, there can be no necessity of violently opposing the laws, and no excuse for meanly evading them;—such a nation is very differently conditioned from what it would be, if the will of one man or of a few governed. In such a nation, rebellion, or any evasion of Law, becomes a more serious moral evil. Rebellion there can scarcely be called for; and it were difficult to gauge the dimensions of its unrighteousness!
4. To justify rebellion, it is necessary that there should be a fair prospect of successful resistance—of an overthrow of the government. If the resistance is not likely to be successful for good, but is only likely to cost the lives of the resisting individuals and others; then, such individuals are sacrificing themselves and others for no good purpose,—which is a thing that cannot be justified to reason or religion. A man has no right to fling away his life for a mere sentiment, and leave his wife a widow, or his gray-haired parents without a son to solace them. There must be some fair prospect of great good to come from it, before one can justly fling his life into the scale, in a violent contest with the government.
5. To justify rebellion, there must be a fair prospect of the firm establishment of a letter government, and the enactment of more just laws, after the present government is overturned. Nothing can justify a revolution, a conflict, a waste of treasure and blood, which are not going to gain anything in the end.—Again, the last four years' experience of European nations may read us a lesson.
6. To justify rebellion, or what is the same thing, violent resistance to the execution of the laws, it is necessary that something more than a small fraction of the people should rise in such a resistance. If the people in general are ready for it, and are willing to run all the hazards of a rebellious conflict with the government, conscious that they have righteousness and the God of righteousness on their side; this is a very different affair from what it would be, if only a minority of the people were ready for rebellion. Such a minority have no right, on account of their deemed injuries, to plunge the nation into a civil war, for the purpose of over-turning a government which suits the great mass of the people;—a civil war, in which there is every prospect, that the government and the majority who aim to support it will prevail; and prevailing, must crush their hostile opponents, this hasty and reckless minority.
These are some of the things which appear necessary, in order to justify violent resistance of Law. They must all exist, or such resistance would be criminal,—contrary to reason, to benevolence, and to Christ.
It is not a thing to be expected at all among mankind, that all laws should be right, or "just and equal." Human legislation must be expected to bear the marks of an imperfection, which attaches itself to everything human. If obedience to government were obligatory, only on the condition that all the laws of that government are just; then, such obedience would mean nothing at all, and every man would be absolved from all allegiance to the government, and from all obligations to obey. Such is man, so limited his wisdom and so imperfect his holiness, that human laws must necessarily be imperfect, and must, therefore, necessarily operate hardly in some instances, upon more or less of the people. It is impossible, that the thing should be otherwise—in the very nature of the case, it is impossible. And if every individual were allowed to be the judge in his own case, whether or not the law operated so hardly upon him that he might disobey; then his obligation to obedience would mean just nothing at all, and Law would be nothing more to him than mere advice. It might be very good advice, but he might spurn it, if he chose. I may think it hard and unjust upon myself, that, in the great "Empire State," by a sort of "bill of attainder," (I know not what else to call it,—I suppose I must not call it a slave law,) I am prohibited from holding any "office of profit or trust," because I will preach the gospel, and people will hear me;—but notwithstanding this law, (which you will not allow me to call by any hard name,) you think me under obligation to obey the government,—and I think so too. I shall not rebel.
The execution of the Law also, must necessarily be imperfect, for the same great reason—human imperfection: judges and jurors are not infallible. But, what then? God knew all this when he ordained human government, and commanded us to be subject to it. Such government, with all its unavoidable imperfection and errors, on the whole is beneficial—indispensable—we could not do without it.—And rarely, very rarely indeed, is there a single instance of an individual man, here or beyond the Potomac, whom Law has injured more than it has benefited. Even if that Law unjustly takes away his liberty or his life, it may have done him more good than injury; his liberty or his life might have been sooner and more cruelly destroyed without it. It would be hard to prove the contrary, in any one case that ever existed or ever will, here or elsewhere.