So far as we, the United States, were concerned, these reasons were fourfold:
(1) Our Pacific possessions. Until we felt reasonably sure that they were safe from possible attack by Japan, we must keep our navy and strengthen our fortifications.
(2) The England-Japan pact. We suspected it. It might be a threat. So long as it existed could we wisely limit our navy?
(3) Our Open Door policy in China. We meant to stand by that. It had been invaded by Japan in the Great War; could we reaffirm it now and secure assurances we trusted that there would be no further encroachments? If not, could we limit our armament?
(4) Our policy of the integrity of nations—China and Russia. We had announced a “moral trusteeship” over both. No more carving up. Let them work it out for themselves. How were we going to back up that policy?
That is, we had possessions and policies for which we were responsible. Could we protect them without armament? That depended, in our judgment, upon England and Japan. Would they be willing to make agreements and concessions which would convince us that they were willing to respect our possessions and accept our policies in the Pacific?
If so, what assurances could we give them in return that would convince them that we meant to respect their possessions and policies? How could we prove to them that they need not fear us?
It was within the first month of the Conference that the answers to these questions were worked out “in principle” again.
CHAPTER IV
THE FRENCH AT THE CONFERENCE
The morale of an international conference is easily shaken in the public’s mind. Seeming delay will do it. Those who look on feel that whatever is to be done must be done quickly, that things must go in leaps. They mistrust days of plain hard work—work which yields no headlines. It must be, they repeat, because the negotiators have fallen on evil times, are intriguing, bargaining.