Mr. John L. Hayes, chairman of the Tariff Commission, whose duties naturally would be supposed to be over, took rooms in Washington and as agent of the woollen manufacturers began a campaign to get more for them than as commissioner he had consented to. The makers of chemicals and drugs—and quinine particularly—instituted a siege. Agents of iron and steel, sugar, mineral water, wood pulp, of everything which had suffered a reduction, appeared in the corridors of the Capitol at Washington. “No such lobby has been seen here for years,” the correspondents began to write to their newspapers. These agents, attorneys, manufacturers, did not hesitate to say loudly that no bill should pass unsatisfactory to them. They were far from standing together, however, in their demands. Indeed, they were in incessant conflict, for they all wanted what they purchased—that is, their raw material—free; while what they sold—their product—they wanted protected! In every industry came this clash, though it was more acute between the wool and woollen men than elsewhere.
The first bill to come out of committee was that of the Senate. It was at once seen that the duties proposed were in many cases lower than those proposed by the Tariff Commission. For instance: the Tariff Commission had laid $6.72 duty on pig iron, a reduction of only 4 per cent. The Senate Committee, after going over the whole ground, had cut the rate to $6.00. Mr. Sherman had fought the decrease in the committee; he continued to fight it on the floor. He tried for $6.72 and was voted down overwhelmingly. He tried for $6.50 and again was beaten. He argued, threatened, cajoled. He read telegrams from the iron men of his state, brought in letters and testimony, worked day and night, but it took him over a month to succeed, and then it was only, as Beck said, after “he had threatened the Senate with the defeat of the whole bill if they did not give him at least $6.50 on pig iron, and after he had drawn the party whip over the heads of his followers with an audacity I have never seen equalled in any public assembly, by threats and every other means that a great bold parliamentary leader can assert over the men who look up to him.” Beck was none too hard on Sherman. He beat his party into submission, but it should not be forgotten that the lash was on his own shoulder—the lash of Henry B. Payne of Cleveland, of the ironmasters of the Mahoning Valley, of all the highly organized iron interests of his state. He knew only too well what failure to accede to their demand meant for the party in Ohio, for they did not hesitate to tell him privately and publicly.
Sherman fought for an increased rate on wool as he did for one on pig iron. He was as hard pressed in one case as the other. The fight caused more than one hard and open tilt between him and his Republican colleagues, particularly with Allison, who disapproved a higher tariff on wool. Sherman was determined, however, and again and again returned to the attack with threats of defeating the entire bill if he could not have his way.
But Mr. Sherman was not the only Senator who openly held up the party for duties higher than the majority of his colleagues approved of. The Senators of Maine, Michigan, and Wisconsin fought for duty on lumber in the same way. The Tariff Commission had not changed the duties on lumber. It left them as they were without a word of explanation. Better so; for a more indefensible tax than that on lumber could not be conceived. It had already helped work a destruction which a hundred years could not repair, and its continuance seemed little less than crime. The duty on sawed boards was $1.00 and $2.00 per one thousand feet, according to variety. Under this protection, combined with the enormous demand which the growth of the country had created, the cutting of timber had been carried on recklessly and lawlessly, particularly in Wisconsin and Michigan. Ten years before, in 1873, the danger of exhausting the forests beyond repair had been shown and Congress had passed the Timber Culture Act to encourage planting; but while it gave a bonus for planting on one hand, it continued the bonus for cutting on the other. Pine in particular was being stripped off. A Federal Commission had just issued a report showing that there was only about 81,000,000,000 feet of white pine standing in the three principal states—enough for ten years only. The duty, combined with the knowledge that the supply was limited, kept prices so high that in the “treeless states,” like Nebraska and Kansas, new settlers were in great distress. From all over the West, indeed, came the cry for relief. People were living in dugouts, because of this tax, the Western Senators and Representatives told Congress. Their cattle had no shelter, their fodder was covered only with a thatch. What made the tax more vicious was the well known fact that the forests were largely in the hands of the “lumber barons,” men who had in one way or another secured vast tracts of land at from $1.25 to $2.50 an acre and who now were gathering in $8.00 or more an acre by unrestricted cutting of the timber. The Senate of the United States numbered one of the greatest of these barons—Philetus Sawyer, Esq., of Wisconsin.
Naturally it was not the interests of Mr. Sawyer which the timber Senators pleaded! It was the cause of the lumbermen and of the millmen. The tariff must be kept up in order to give them their higher wage. They must not be put into competition with the pauper wages of Canada! As a large percentage of the laborers who received this higher wage were Canadians who came over for the season only, the argument had little effect. It was not argument indeed that saved the lumber duty. It was saved because the Southern Representatives who threatened to defeat it were told they could not have a duty on sugar unless they consented to one on lumber, and they made the trade.
Such barter went on openly in many other items. One of the most determined efforts to force a duty was made by Senator Mahone of Virginia, who wanted $2.00 a ton on iron ore. The Tariff Commission had allowed 50 cents—the Senate Committee had allowed 50 cents, but Mahone made a fierce fight for more. He tried for $2.00, for $1.00, for 85 cents, for 75 cents, for 60 cents. He brought up the point at every opportunity, but again and again was voted down overwhelmingly. “I’ll defeat the bill if this duty is not raised,” he is reported as saying, and Sherman backed him in his threat.
His attitude was the attitude of the representatives of various other interests, big and little; that is, it developed almost as soon as the debate began that leading Republican Senators were determined to keep up duties in which certain of their constituents were interested and that to do this they were ready to trade and dicker with fellow Senators. That this determination of Sherman, Mahone, and others was clearly demonstrated was due largely to the quick wit and the daring of Mr. Beck. He filibustered so adroitly from the beginning of the contest over the schedules that again and again he forced Republicans committed to tariff reform to go on record against a proposed reduction or for a proposed increase. In Sherman’s struggle for the increased duty on pig iron, Senators like Morrill, Allison, Dawes, Frye, Hoar, Hale, Hawley, all voted against an increase at first, but finally were whipped into line, Allison being the last to yield. Mr. Beck gloated over them, loudly pointing out how different ones had solemnly declared on the floor they would not support the increase, yet had yielded at last. Nothing could stop him. An effort was made to limit the debate to ten days. “Never!” shouted Beck, “not to ten weeks.” Not even the effort of his party to put an end to his obstruction availed. He gloried in his insubordination.
It was the 20th of February before the Senate Bill was passed. Two weeks before this the bill had taken on an importance quite unexpected. This change was due to the growing certainty that the House was not going to be able to finish its bill and that if a tariff bill was passed this session, it would be the measure on which the Senate was working. No sooner did this rumor go out than the whole body of lobbyists, whose work up to this time had been concentrated on the House, rushed pell-mell to the corridors of the Senate to see what they could do to make the measure “satisfactory” before it was reported. Some of the things they helped to do have already been alluded to.
The House Bill was having a hard time. The Committee, instead of following the Tariff Commission report and reducing duties 20 per cent, had reduced them less than 10 per cent. Now there was no doubt but that a majority of the Republicans in the House were in favor of real reform. Most of them declared they dared not go home without a reduction of taxes. But there was a powerful Republican minority who believed with Senator Sherman that it was more essential to satisfy the combined industrial organizations besieging the Capitol than it was to satisfy public opinion. This minority was determined no bill which gave anything like a 20 per cent reduction should pass. It is not unfair to say that it wanted a bill, but a bill which gave the appearance of reduction, not actual reduction.
The Democrats, too, were divided. John G. Carlisle, who led the majority, was what may be called a constructive free trader; that is, he believed in scaling down duties as rapidly as industries enjoying them could support it, until a ‘tariff-for-revenue only’ basis was reached. He declared now that if the Republicans had presented a bill which sincerely attempted to embody the reduction of 20 per cent suggested by their commission and demanded by public opinion, he would favor its passage, but Kelley’s bill he would not support. Randall, who led the Democratic minority, was a high protectionist, but Randall was really willing to support any bill which promised to get the tariff out of the way. He expected to be a candidate for Speaker at the opening of the next Congress and did not want to divide his party by supporting protection in opposition to the Democratic majority.