The Tariff in Our Times

by Ida M. Tarbell

But later Mr. Aldrich said: “They (the new rates) are the creation of the committee itself, and no man was consulted either on the Board of Appraisers or anywhere else with reference to these provisions until the committee had decided what they should be”; and again—“The committee having decided what to do, they turned the matter of regulating the schedules to the experts of the government, and never to any manufacturer at any time.”

It is probably true that Mr. Lippitt was not before the Senate committee. It was not necessary. His suggestion made to the Ways and Means Committee had been used by Mr. Aldrich almost intact. Moreover, the work of the “experts” to which Mr. Aldrich referred had been done with Mr. Lippitt. It was an open secret in Washington that Mr. Lippitt spent weeks with Messrs. Sharretts and De Vries, the government experts, whom Mr. Aldrich said first had made every change in the cotton schedule and whom, a little later, he said had done nothing of the kind, but simply regulated them.

Moreover, reference to “experts,” coming from Mr. Aldrich at that point in the making of the bill of 1909 did not inspire confidence. Something of the character of the work “experts” had done for him in 1897 had been sufficiently demonstrated by Frank P. Bennett, in the matter of William Whitman and his top duty. If that was what Mr. Aldrich understood by experts, then it was certain it was the kind of tariff-making which the country had set out to correct—a species of jugglery in the interests of some good campaign contributor made by a specialist willing to turn his knowledge to adroit manipulation. That there was a general suspicion around Washington that one of the “experts” who aided Mr. Lippitt, and was now aiding Mr. Aldrich, had done something of the same kind of work for the Senator in regard to sugar in 1897, only added to the severity of the criticism which greeted his effort to unload the cotton duties. However, in falling back on “experts” Mr. Aldrich was only taking us at our word. We have all talked more or less volubly about “tariffs made by experts.” Mr. Aldrich gave us an example of what it may be in the cotton schedule. It turns out that it can easily be something like the familiar “business administration” of municipalities—administrations ably conducted to give the conductors what they want.

In defending the charges against the cotton schedule Mr. Aldrich made the following statements:

“The existing law, by a series of undervaluations on the part of importers and of erroneous construction on the part of the general appraisers and the courts, has been so emasculated that the interests of the cotton manufacturers of the United States have been largely destroyed in some lines. This is shown by the fact that the importation of cotton manufactures increased from $23,000,000 in 1898 to $73,000,000 in 1907.” Mr. Aldrich was mistaken in his figures. The cotton importations in 1898 were over $27,000,000, and 1898 was an “off-year.” The average importations in the decade 1896–1905 were over $40,000,000. Moreover, nobody knows better than Mr. Aldrich that not over $12,000,000 of the $73,000,000 imported in 1907 referred to cotton cloths—the only thing in dispute. The other $61,000,000 was duty on our large importations of cotton laces, embroideries, and small goods like handkerchiefs and hosiery. It was a misleading statement, not unlike the statements by which the duty on mercerized goods was defended. The task of defending this fell to Mr. Lodge in the main,—the senior Senator from Massachusetts, and Mr. Smoot from Utah, being the senatorial team which backed up Mr. Aldrich in the tariff debate. Mr. Lodge’s speech was most interesting. He had been admirably coached on mercerization, and he had his samples with him. He told how it had become a general process since the Dingley Bill was made—that it required new and expensive machinery and skilled labor—hence for labor’s sake and the honor of our cotton trade we should give it a special duty. What Mr. Lodge did not say was that this process, in so far as it adds anything to the value of a cloth, was already provided for in the Dingley Bill. That under the protection there provided, it had become in some ten years firmly and successfully established in the United States. The latest textile directory gives a list of fifty-seven concerns which do some form of mercerizing. Some of these are on a large scale. When Mr. Lippitt appeared before the Ways and Means Committee one of the strong reasons he gave for not changing the Dingley duty was that under it the trade had been able to develop on artistic lines and to employ new processes, such as mercerization. He repeated that the Dingley duty was sufficient. Mr. Lodge’s speech would lead one to believe that we had been unable to mercerize goods, that it was an infant needing protection, whereas fifty-seven establishments announce that they do the work! Moreover, Mr. Lodge failed to prove that a cent a square yard was necessary to protect the process. As a matter of fact, it was shown by Senator Dolliver that the process costs nothing of the kind. Bills for mercerizing were shown in which the charge was but ⅛ of a cent a square yard. Other figures were quoted, but none higher than ¾ of a cent. It is probable that the process is actually cheaper here than in England or Germany, though we do not as yet do work of as high grade. All the evidence, indeed, leads one to believe that there was no sound protectionist defence of the extra duty on mercerized goods, that it was an abuse of power from start to finish.

The duties on cotton cloth in the Payne-Aldrich Bill were adopted not for lack of ample information of their nature, but in spite of it. The members of the responsible committees, the members of Congress and the Administration, not only had the debates to guide them; they had laid before them repeatedly, by the Wholesale Dry Goods Association of New York, graphic “object lessons” of what the new rates would do. Discovering that Congress was unmoved by its showings, as a last resort the Association appealed to the President for a hearing. They believed that if they could prove to him the effect of the duties on common goods, he would not permit the wrong. But the President would not see them. It is probable that Mr. Taft, knowing that it was futile to oppose the cotton duties, spared himself the ordeal of having to say to gentlemen who had a just grievance, “I can do nothing for you.” It was what he had done in the case of the carded woollen men. And if Mr. Taft had offered any explanation of his inactivity, as he did in the case of the wool schedule, he would probably have said:

The interests of the cotton manufacturers of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, reflected through their representatives in Congress, were sufficiently strong to defeat any attempt to change the cotton tariff, and had it been attempted it would have beaten the bill reported from either committee.

What made the cotton manufacturers so strong? Their alliance in tariff matters with the worsted manufacturers—nothing else. Side by side with worsted in New England and New York and Pennsylvania, in all the textile centres, is cotton. The worsted manufacturers use larger and larger quantities of cotton in their cheap goods. Worsted manufacturers are also frequently cotton manufacturers. The tariff interests of cotton and of worsted manufacturers are identical. Everywhere we find them supporting the same political combinations. Senator Aldrich has always been as liberal in supporting what the wool men wanted as he was in 1909 in carrying out Mr. Lippitt’s suggestions. So loyal is he to the wool schedule that in 1909, when the attack was made by his own party colleagues on its inequalities, he made the following extraordinary statement:

“There is no Senator sitting upon this side of the Chamber, there is no person who is acquainted with the tariffs of this or any other country, who does not know that an assault upon the wool and woollen schedule of this bill is an attack upon the very citadel of protection and the lines of defence for American industries and American labor. If the Senate destroys the relation in that schedule or destroys the schedule itself, you demoralize the whole protective system; and you destroy every line of defence which the people of this country have who believe in the protective policy.”

Now what does this mean? We have seen that the “assault” on the wool schedule was merely the demand that its discriminations be adjusted: there was no demand for lowering duties; but Mr. Aldrich declared if this readjustment should be made, it would “demoralize the whole protective system”—destroy the “citadel” and the “lines of defence for American industries.” Can this mean anything at all but that it would break up the wool “bulwark,” the combination of politicians and favored wool-growers and worsted manufacturers fattening off the competing branch of the industry? It can mean nothing else. Destroy the combination which has kept the old wool schedule in vogue so long, and you destroy a chief financial support of many congressmen. Break down this combination in Congress, and what would happen to cotton? It has no such wide power as wool. It could not count on getting what it wanted quietly and unostentatiously as it has always done. Allied with wool, its case has always been easy. And it was a good alliance for wool, although not a vital one, for cotton is rich, and when it comes to funds to return high tariff Senators, it is generous.