The Critique of Pure Reason

by Immanuel Kant

The Critique of Pure Reason

By Immanuel Kant

Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn

---

Contents

[ Preface to the First Edition (1781)] [ Preface to the Second Edition (1787)] [ Introduction ] [ I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge ] [ II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions “à priori”. ] [ III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge “à priori” ] [ IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements. ] [ V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “à priori” are contained as Principles. ] [ VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason. ] [ VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason. ] [ I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements] [ First Part—TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC ] [ § 1. Introductory ] [ SECTION I. OF SPACE ] [ § 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. ] [ § 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space. ] [ § 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions. ] [ SECTION II. OF TIME ] [ § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. ] [ § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time. ] [ § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions. ] [ § 8. Elucidation. ] [ § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic. ] [ § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic. ] [ Second Part—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC ] [ Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic ] [ I. Of Logic in General ] [ II. Of Transcendental Logic ] [ III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic] [ IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic ] [ FIRST DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC ] [ BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2] [ Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding ] [ Introductory § 3] [ Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4] [ Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements. § 5] [ Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories. § 6] [ Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conception of the Understanding] [ Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general § 9] [ Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10] [ Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding.] [ Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations given by Sense. § 11.] [ Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12] [ The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13] [ What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14] [ The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15] [ All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness. § 16] [ Observation. § 17] [ In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18] [ Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. § 20] [ Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22] [ Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23] [ BOOK II. Analytic of Principles ] [ INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.] [ TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.] [ Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.] [ Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.] [ Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.] [ Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.] [ Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding.] [ Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena.] [ APPENDIX.] [ SECOND DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC ] [ TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION. ] [ I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.] [ II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.] [ TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK I—OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.] [ Section I—Of Ideas in General.] [ Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas.] [ Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas.] [ TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK II—OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.] [ Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.] [ Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.] [ Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas.] [ Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.] [ Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions.] [ Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental Problems.] [ Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented in the four Transcendental Ideas.] [ Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic.] [ Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.] [ Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological Ideas.] [ Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.] [ I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.] [ II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole given in Intuition.] [ III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.] [ IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.] [ Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.] [ Section I. Of the Ideal in General.] [ Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale).] [ Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being.] [ Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God.] [ Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God.] [ Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.] [ Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason.] [ Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.] [ II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method] [ Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.] [ Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism.] [ Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.] [ Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.] [ Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs.] [ Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason.] [ Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.] [ Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.] [ Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.] [ Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.] [ Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason.]

---

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 1781

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.

It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.