Bibliography (2000 words)

Theory and Practice

Next in order the student should turn to the article War (Vol. 28, p. 305; equivalent to 40 pages of this Guide), by Col. G. F. R. Henderson, well known for his books on the American Civil War (Fredericksburg, Stonewall Jackson, etc.), with a section on Laws of War, by Sir Thomas Barclay. Col. Henderson’s article lays down important general principles. An analysis of modern conditions shows that improved methods of communication have made war a much speedier process, in which the victorious general cannot make mistakes at the outset. That intellect and education count for more than stamina and courage was the lesson of the Franco-Prussian War—a lesson learned by the Prussians before that war. Modern war is a science and the amateur has little chance; in this respect things have changed. “It is impossible to doubt that had the Boers of 1899 possessed a staff of trained strategists, they would have shaken the British Empire to its foundations.” There must be a concert between diplomacy and strategy. Civilian war ministers cannot solve strategic problems. The greater deadliness of modern warfare, and the greater moral effect of being under fire call for better foresight, strategy and morale. The relation of army and navy is discussed and the new doctrine of “sea-power” explained. (See the chapter For Naval Officers in this Guide). The remaining topics in the article are: weakness of allied armies; railways and sea as lines of operation; amphibious power; value of unprofessional troops and the need of professional leaders.

Arms of Service

In the articles Infantry (Vol. 14, p. 517; 2 plates; equivalent to 35 pages of this Guide) and Artillery (Vol. 2, p. 685; 2 plates; equivalent to 30 pages of this Guide), both by Capt. Atkinson, and in the article Cavalry (Vol. 5, p. 563; illustrated with 2 plates and 1 cut; in length equivalent to 30 pages of this Guide), by Col. F. N. Maude, the student will find an elaborate treatment of the history, organization and tactics (especially since 1870) of each of these arms. For details of their organization and equipment he should read the articles Engineers, Staff, Mounted Infantry, Supply and Transport (Military), Officers, Ambulance, Fortification, Machine Guns, Coast Defence, Ordnance, Ballistics, Sights, Rifle, Gun, Pistol, Explosive, Gunpowder, Guncotton, Cordite and Nitro-glycerine. In many geographical articles there are descriptions of the world’s great fortifications, e. g., Paris, Antwerp, and Verdun. Other topics of a more miscellaneous character are covered by the articles Army Signalling, Pigeon Post, Signals, War Game, Manoeuvres, Kite, etc.

The military use of aeroplanes and balloons is very fully shown in the articles Flight and Aeronautics.

Strategy and Tactics

Before taking up a systematic course in military history, there are two general articles that the military student should read: Tactics (Vol. 26, p. 347; equivalent in length to 20 pages of this Guide), by Maj. Neill Malcolm, editor of the Science of War; and Strategy (Vol. 25, p. 986; equivalent to 35 pages of this Guide), by Col. F. N. Maude. The former article should be compared with the sections on tactics in the articles Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery. Major Malcolm makes much of the continuity of military history, comparing Metaurus and Ramillies with the fighting in Manchuria, and Wellington at Maya with Oyama in his contest with Kuropatkin. The mistakes that have been made once should not be made again; at least the careful student of tactical history may see to it that if they are repeated, it is done by his opponent and not by himself. Modern tactics are different from ancient because of greater fire-power and improved methods of transportation. Cavalry tactics are in an uncertain condition; there is no recent practice to serve as a guide, since neither in South Africa in the Boer war nor in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese conflict was cavalry much used. Infantry must co-operate to make artillery bombardment effective. An interesting discussion of offensive and defensive fighting is summed up in the words “To the true general the purely defensive battle is unknown” and as evidence are adduced Wellington at Salamanca and Oyama at Sha-ho. Oyama’s victory in the latter battle, it is pointed out, shows the increased ease of the process of envelopment, which has resulted in discarding corps artillery in favour of divisional artillery. The importance—and the possibility—of the counter stroke; the danger of using for the relief of one’s own troops forces which might better be launched at the enemy’s weakest spot; and the similar unwisdom of any negative tactics, adopted to avoid loss, as in “holding attacks”—are the other principal points made in the article.

The article Strategy should be read in conjunction with the articles Army and War. It is impossible to summarize or outline it here, but it is worth noting that the article closes with a definition and discussion of the following terms: Base; Line of Communication; Line of Operations; Exterior Lines; Obstacles.