Policy, Strategy, Tactics
It has already been noticed that the closing part of the article Navy and Navies dealt with strategy and tactics in a general way. This subject is treated in fuller detail by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, G.C.B. (former Director of Naval Intelligence, British Navy, author of Sea-Power and other Studies) in two articles Sea-Power (Vol. 24, p. 548) and Sea, Command of the (Vol. 24, p. 529). Each of these articles will be of great value and interest to the naval officer as a summary and criticism of the theories of Captain A. T. Mahan and Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb; and this will be made evident by the brief outline of the two articles which follows.
Article, Sea-Power—Use of the term to mean (1) a state pre-eminently strong at sea; and (2)—as in this article—the various factors in a state’s naval strength. Thucydides as a forerunner of Mahan; he makes Pericles in comparing Athenian resources with those of her enemies comment on the importance of “sea-power.”
The meaning of sea-power can only be learned historically. Although there have been more land-wars, “the course of history has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water.” Salamis saved Greece and held back Oriental invasion. The loss of the Peloponnesian War by Athens was due to her weakening sea-power. The First Punic War, Roman rather than Carthaginian control of the Mediterranean, was won by Roman naval predominance. Mahommedan conquest spread west in Africa only with the creation of a navy. The crusades could not have continued had not Mahommedan naval power sunk as the Venetian, Pisan, and Genoese grew. The defeat of Genoa by Venice gave the latter a right to perform the ceremony of “wedding the sea” with a ring as token of “perpetual sway.” Lepanto (1571) the end of Turkish sea-power.
Spanish and Portuguese sea-power crushed by English growth and the loss of the Armada. Early English naval history: the importance of the battle of Dover in 1217. Appearance of standing navies. The New World and its influence on sea-power. The sea-power of the Dutch; its sudden rise; its basis in foreign trade; the Dutch wars with England resulted in England’s becoming the first great naval power, but did not crush the United Provinces because of their sea-power. Torrington and the “Fleet in Being” in 1690. Change in naval operations in 17th century—the scene thereafter in the enemy’s waters, not near the coast of England.
The 18th century. Rise of Russia’s sea-power—an artificial creation. Seven Years’ War and its gains to Great Britain. War of American Independence: British mistakes—the enemy’s coast not considered the frontier. Wars of the French Revolution and Empire: Great Britain’s advantage not in organization, discipline or “science,” but in sea-experience.
The War of 1812. “The British had now to meet the élite of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known.... In any future war British sea-power, great as it may be, should not receive shocks like those that it unquestionably did suffer in 1812.”
Later Manifestations of Sea-Power. American Civil War—“By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the Confederacy asunder; and, by the power they possessed of moving troops by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated the occupation of important points.” Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78—Turkish control of Black Sea forced Russians to invade by land through the difficult Balkans. Chilean Civil War of 1891—an army defeated by a navy. Chino-Japanese War of 1894–95—Japanese navy in transport work and in crushing last resistance. Spanish-American War: “Spaniards were defeated by the superiority of the American sea-power.”
Article, Sea, Command of the—Sketch of Sovereignty of the Sea; Command different from Sovereignty or Dominion.
Attempts to gain Command: Dutch Wars.