Realizing that they were strongest in the Senate, the Woman’s Party wanted first to bring the matter to a vote there. They accomplished that on August 13, when ratification passed by twenty-five to four. Until this vote was cast, the Suffragists themselves did not realize what a degree of interest—due to their pressure on and from political leaders—they had developed in Tennessee. The vote proved a great stimulus to the men of the Lower House, who, up to this point, had been much more wavering in their attitude towards ratification.

The Capitol in these last few days presented a scene of activity on the part of the Woman’s Party members such as no ratification campaign had ever known. They were at the House morning, noon, and night. They had to be there all the time because the fact that a member was numbered among their forces in the morning did not at all mean that he would be among them at night. The enemies of ratification made every possible attempt to steal Suffrage adherents. Realizing at last that they could not deflect men who were immovable on the ratification side, they began to introduce measures the passage of which would have been tantamount to defeat. For instance, a resolution was suddenly brought up one morning providing that the question of ratification should be referred to mass-meetings of the people to be held in every district on August 21. This would have meant a fatal postponement of ratification. Many of the legislators would have liked to hide behind a measure of this sort, but realizing this, the Woman’s Party members told them that they would consider such a vote hostile to Suffrage and would hold them responsible. The Suffragists obtained sufficient support against the measure to get it tabled.

When it came to the last few days, the Woman’s Party members seemed to work twenty-four hours out of the twenty-four, and some think they worked twenty-five. The situation was complicated, as always at the last hour, by rumors. Reports started and gained force every day that men were being bribed; so that legislators, about to declare for Suffrage, were often held up by the feeling that that act might lay them open to suspicion. This brought about a condition of such uncertainty that neither side, Suffragist nor anti-Suffragist, could prophesy the outcome. The instant a man wavered, the Woman’s Party members, who, before the Legislature convened, had been working in the legislative districts, immediately got in touch with the political leaders who controlled the situation in those districts. Notwithstanding that nothing seemed stable at this period, the Woman’s Party members met every few hours and compared polls. These polls served a second purpose. They gave political leaders definite data as to the position of every man in the Legislature. In all this confusion, the Woman’s Party always knew where it stood.

On the morning of the vote the Suffrage workers rounded up all their legislative forces and saw that they arrived safely at the Capitol. More rumors were afloat that legislators would change their vote at the last moment. In every case, the Woman’s Party saw these men again and made them realize that they were committed, not only to them, but to their political leaders.

Just before the vote was taken, Seth Walker ruled all the women off the floor of the House.

Two dramatic incidents marked the close of the campaign. The hero of one of these episodes was Banks Turner, of the other Harry Burn. To the very end the Woman’s Party was uncertain of both their votes.

Banks Turner was one of Governor Roberts’ closest friends. In considering the case of Banks Turner, it must always be held in mind that the Woman’s Party steadfastly kept the Democrats to their pledges through Cox’s constant pressure on Governor Roberts. It had at last penetrated Roberts’ psychology that if he permitted ratification to fail in Tennessee, the Democrats would be held responsible by the women in the coming elections. The Woman’s Party saw Governor Roberts before the vote and reminded him of this. The Woman’s Party also saw Cox before the vote and reminded him of this; also reminded him to remind Roberts. When the vote was actually imminent, the Roberts forces began to get alarmed; for they realized they had played with the issue too long. As has been said Banks Turner was one of the Governor’s closest friends. Banks Turner had never actually said he was against ratification, but he had never said he was for it. No Suffragist counted on him.

As for Harry Burn——

When Anita Pollitzer had been working among Republican leaders, she had gone to Harry Burn’s Republican county chairman to ask him if they could count on Harry Burn’s support for ratification. In her presence, he telephoned to Harry Burn and assured Miss Pollitzer that the Suffragists could depend on him. When Mr. Burn appeared in the Legislature, he was approached by Suffragists and anti-Suffragists in close and quick succession. After a while, he announced that he was uncertain. The fact that he was the youngest member of the Legislature—scarcely more than a lad indeed—and that he was immensely popular and beloved—seemed to add an especial acuteness to the situation. To Suffragists who approached him a few days before the vote, he said, “I cannot pledge myself, but I will do nothing to hurt you.”

Of course that could be translated that he would not vote yes, but would not vote no—not vote at all in short.