At the commencement of the war the General Government, taxed to the utmost in subduing the rebellion, was unable to help us, and it became necessary to look to our own citizens for protection. They everywhere responded with patriotism and alacrity. Militia companies were organized in the frontier counties and secured local protection. Much credit is due to Captain Tyler's company of militia for the important service they rendered in opening and protecting our line of communication with the States.
In response to the call of the governor for a regiment of cavalry for one hundred day service, over a thousand of our citizens—the large majority of them leaving lucrative employment—rapidly volunteered, and in that short time, despite the greatest difficulties in securing proper equipments, organized, armed, made a long and severe campaign amid the snows and storms of winter, and visited upon these merciless murderers of the plains a chastisement smiting and deserved. The gratitude of the country is due to the men who thus sacrificed so largely their personal interests for the public good, and rendered such important service to the Territory; and their work, if it can be followed up with a vigorous winter campaign, would result in a permanent peace.
The necessity of such a campaign, and the imperative demand for immediate and complete protection for our line of communication with the States has been, and is now being, earnestly urged on the Government at Washington, and with a prospect of success. These efforts should be seconded by your honorable body with whatever influence there may be in resolution or memorial, setting forth the facts and necessities of our situation.
The testimony of Governor Evans, Major Anthony, Colonel Chivington, Colonel Shoup, and Acting Governor Elbert covers every phase of the matter in controversy. Governor Evans's statement proves beyond question that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were viciously hostile during the entire summer preceding the battle of Sand Creek, and this was admitted by Black Kettle in his letter to Major Colley, the Indian agent, and by the other chiefs in the council at Denver. Governor Evans also makes it plain that he refused to consider the question of making peace, and turned the Indians over to the military. The telegram of General Curtis, commander of the Military Department, sent at the time the council was being held, says, "No peace must be made without my direction." And peace had not been made when the battle was fought. Major Anthony, commander of the military post of Fort Lyon, near the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indian agency, says that the Indians attacked were hostile and not under his protection, and that he would have punished them had his force been strong enough to fight also the large band on the Smoky Hill River. Colonel Chivington's testimony confirms the statement of Governor Evans as to the hostility of both Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and both he and Colonel Shoup say that this was corroborated by Major Anthony, and Major Colley, the Indian agent, each of whom told them, while at Fort Lyon prior to the battle, that the Indians camped on Sand Creek were hostile and should be punished. Major Anthony admits that there were Arapahoes camped near the Fort when he assumed command, and that, in compliance with his demand, they surrendered twenty head of stock, stolen from the whites, and a few worthless guns; and added that a week or two later he returned the guns, and told the Indians that he could no longer feed them and ordered them to go out on the plains, where they could kill buffalo for food; whereupon they left.
The only Arapahoes that by any stretch of the imagination could be said to have been under the protection of the military were the small part of the tribe under the control of Left Hand, a sub-chief; while there is no doubt whatever as to the hostility of the head chief Raven and his followers, who constituted a large majority of the tribe. It is generally conceded that the chief Left Hand and a few of his adherents were peaceably inclined. But, unfortunately, he and the occupants of six or eight lodges of his people, about forty persons in all, including women and children, were in the camp of the hostile Cheyennes and Arapahoes at the time the attack was made, and suffered accordingly. Left Hand knew that the Cheyennes and a very large part of his own people were at war with the whites, and of the chance he was taking in being in company with the hostiles. If it resulted disastrously, he had no one but himself to blame. It was utterly impossible to discriminate between Indians in the midst of the battle. In those days, Indians seldom permitted themselves to be taken prisoners in battle, and an attempt to do so, even if the Indian was badly wounded, was a dangerous undertaking. This was the reason that no prisoners were taken at Sand Creek. Major Anthony, who was not friendly to Colonel Chivington, says that while in some instances the Indians killed at Sand Creek were mutilated, he saw nothing to the extent since stated.
Colonel Chivington's statement concerning the matter is:
Officers who passed over the field by my orders after the battle, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of Indians killed, report that they saw but few women and children dead; no more than would certainly fall in an attack upon a camp in which they were. I myself passed over some portions of the field after the fight, and saw but one woman who had been killed and one who had hanged herself. I saw no dead children.
In this connection, I wish to refer back to my own statement concerning the matter, as Colonel Chivington's observations were identical with mine.
All this shows that the charge that the battle was merely a massacre is as untruthful as are most of the other statements made by the coterie of disgruntled army officers, Indian agents, traders, interpreters, and half-breeds. Much of the testimony given at the Congressional and military hearings was hearsay evidence of statements said to have been made by persons who claimed to have been in the battle. Possibly, some such statements may have been made by irresponsible braggarts belonging to the two regiments that formed the command, for in every regiment during the Rebellion, Eastern as well as Western, there were a few men who were no credit to their comrades, and who have since told of many fictitious happenings, or those having only the slightest basis of truth. Statements of this character may, perhaps, have been made by irresponsible members of the First and Third Colorado regiments.
It is inconceivable to any one who knew the members of the latter regiment that either its officers or enlisted men, with possibly a rare exception, would have approved of, and much less have participated in, the wanton acts of cruelty claimed to have been perpetrated. No unprejudiced person can believe a charge of such a character against Colonel Shoup, afterwards for many years an honored United States Senator from the State of Idaho; or of Major Hal Sayre, one of Colorado's most respected mining engineers; or of Captain Harper Orahood, who, later, was for many years a law partner of Senator H. M. Teller; or of Captain Baxter of Pueblo, or Captain Nichols of Boulder, both afterwards members of the Legislature of Colorado and honored citizens in the community in which they lived; or in fact against any of the officers of the Third Colorado, as practically all of them were men of high standing in their respective communities.