The resolution must be passed by a vote of two-thirds of the mir. Now, about one-fifth of the householders are absent from home, engaged in some wage-earning occupation, and there is also a certain percentage among the emigrants who have not yet severed their relations with the community. After subtraction of both these groups, which are counted in the vote, it becomes very easy for the stronger households to stand against the advocates of subdivision. Furthermore, those who are in the habit of leasing their plots would have no interest in the subdivision, even if present. The case of the adherents of the mir thus becomes a very precarious one. This is strikingly evidenced by the following figures:
| Ranenburg. Per cent. | Dankoff. Per cent. | |
|---|---|---|
| Total of the community | 100 | 100 |
| Lessors | 25 | 24 |
| Remainder | 75 | 76 |
| Vote required for subdivision | 66⅔ | 66⅔ |
| Opposition sufficient to stay the same.[148] | 9 | 10 |
We know that the lessor class is constantly growing with the increase of the population, and the spread of the movement from the village. Thus the young generation grows indifferent to the custom of the village community.
The old-fashioned households, on the other hand, are accumulating the plots of the declining farmers, and show a pronounced opposition to agrarian communism. There still remain the intermediate groups of the “weak” householders, who faithfully preserve their allegiance to the mir. The position of these groups is, however, very unstable.
It follows that the formation of classes within the mir tends to perpetuate the expropriation of the “weak” families, and the concentration of communal land, formerly held by them, in the hands of the “strong.”
It is true that it is only the right of possession which is conferred upon the lessee of communal land. But there are many facts that go to show the possible evolution of possession into property.
Attention has been called in Russian economic literature to the tendency toward private property developing among the former serfs out of the redemption of their plots. At the time of the Ryazañ census there were 364 communities concerned in the region under consideration, and it was in 100[149] out of this number that the opposition against the redivision of the communal land came to the front. Those who had been paying the redemption tax at the time when the taxes exceeded the net income of the lots, objected to the decrease of the latter after the land had acquired a certain value. The wealthier householders had threatened to pay at once the whole amortization debt that hung over their plots, so as to compel the community to deed them over to their owners at the time, according to law[150].
Whatever may have been the final outcome of the issue this time[151], “the ides of March are not gone.” The nearer we approach the end of the period of redemption, the greater becomes the material interest attaching the individual to his plot, and the greater, consequently, his opposition to the redivision of the land. At present, since the Statute of Redemption has been extended to all divisions of the peasantry, the conflict between agrarian communism and the interests of the individual has become universal. The old peasant common law, which developed naturally as the consequence of economic equality, now proves oppressive for the destitute, no less than for the wealthy. Given the existing class distinctions within the community, there is no good reason why the proletarian, on leaving his village, should sacrifice his right of property to the mir, instead of alienating it for his own benefit.
Thus the play of economic interests is dissolving the village community into, on the one hand, a landless rural proletariat, and, on the other hand, a peasant bourgeoisie, to whom the title to a large portion of communal land is destined to be transferred.