At the time when the decree on Socialist land management was made public, the fundamental elements of nationalization had hardly begun to take shape: the territory affected by nationalization was by no means defined; there was not the personnel necessary for the creation and enforcement of any plan concerning production; the large masses of laborers hardly understood the idea of nationalization and in some instances were hostile to the measures by means of which the Soviet power was carrying out the program of nationalization.
In order to summarize the results of the work, which began on a nation-wide scale in March, 1919, and to estimate these results, one must first realize the conditions which formed the starting-point for the work of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture at the time when it commenced to carry out the nationalization of agriculture.
The extent of the capitalist heritage, which our organized Soviet estates now have at their disposal, amounts to 615,503 dessiatins or areable land, situated in the Soviet provinces and formerly in the hands of private owners. Eighty-five per cent of the areable land, which formerly belonged to the landed aristocracy was taken over for the purpose of both organized and non-organized distribution—chiefly the latter.
The equipment of the various estates was diminished and destroyed to no lesser extent. Instead of the 386,672 privately owned horses, registered in the Soviet provinces, according to the census of 1916, the Soviet estates in the hands of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture received 23,149 horses—a number hardly sufficient for the cultivation of one-third of the area under cultivation now belonging to the Soviet estates. Of the 290,969 cows—only 43,361 came into the possession of the Soviet estates. The entire number of horses and cows will yield sufficient fertilizer for only 13,000 dessiatins of fallow land, i.e., about 10 per cent of the area intended to be converted into areable land.
The supply of agricultural machinery and implements was in the same condition.
The Soviet estates had almost no stocks of provisions. The workmen were compelled either to steal or to desert for places where bread was more abundant.
The winter corn was sowed in the fall of 1918 on very limited areas (not over 25 per cent of the fallow land), very often without fertilizer, with a very small quantity of seeds to each dessiatin. In 13 out of 36 Soviet provinces (governments) no winter corn has been sowed at all.
A considerable portion of the estates taken over by the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture could not be utilized due to the lack of various accessories, such as harness, horseshoes, rope, small instruments, etc.
The workers were fluctuating, entirely unorganized, politically inert—due to the shortage of provisioning and of organization. The technical forces could not get used to the village; besides, we did not have sufficient numbers of agricultural experts familiar with the practical organization of large estates. The regulations governing the social management of land charged the representatives of the industrial proletariat with a leading part in the work of the Soviet estates. But torn between meeting the various requirements of the Republic of prime importance, the proletariat could not with sufficient speed furnish the number of organizers necessary for agricultural management.
The idea of centralized management on the Soviet estates has not been properly understood by the local authorities, and the work of organization from the very beginning had to progress amidst bitter fighting between the provincial Soviet estates and the provincial offices of the Department of Agriculture. This struggle has not yet ceased.