The reason why, even after the complete monopoly had been attained, the price of oil was not put up again will be apparent when we come to examine the economic limits of the power of a Trust.
FLUCTUATIONS OF PRICES OF STANDARD OIL, 1870 TO 1890.
§ 10. A large number of these Trusts, similar in their constitution to the Standard Oil Trust, and with the same object of maintaining a scale of prices based upon monopoly, have been founded in the United States. Some have undoubtedly owed their establishment to the prevalence of low profits in a trade where close competition has led to a constant cutting of prices, and their foundation has been leniently regarded as an act of self-defence. To this order belong the Whisky Trust, the Cotton Oil Trust, the Cotton Bagging Trust, and others. Indeed, one well-informed writer upon the subject holds that this is the normal origin of the Trust. "With the exception of the Standard Oil Trust, and perhaps one or two others that rose somewhat earlier, it may be fairly said, I think, that not merely competition, but competition that was proving ruinous to many establishments, was the cause of the combinations."[133]
This condition of ruinous competition must be recognised as the normal condition of all highly-organised businesses where modern machinery is applied, and which are not sheltered by some private economy in the shape of special facilities in producing or in disposing of their goods. Even the Standard Oil Company, as we saw, claimed that a policy of consolidation was forced upon it by the conditions of the market. But this claim is not a refutation, but an admission of the statement that the object of a Trust is to obtain monopoly prices; for these ruinously low prices and profits are the result of free competition, and the only alternative to this free competition is monopoly. Hence it is a legitimate conclusion that the economic object of a Trust is to substitute monopoly for competitive prices, and to do this more effectively than can be done by the mere acceptance of a common price-list by the separate firms engaged in a branch of production. In order to attain this object it is not necessary that the Trust shall comprise all the capital engaged in an industry. Even when the Standard Oil Trust was firmly established, and was, according to its own admission, paying 12-1/2 or 13 per cent. on its highly-watered stock, there appears to have existed no fewer than 111 smaller independent companies competing with it directly or indirectly at some point within the area of its market.[134] But the Standard Oil Trust was able to control prices, as the producer of some 75 per cent. of the total product, and the practical monopolist over the main area of its market. Similarly the Sugar Refineries Trust in 1888 had a firm grip over prices by its possession of 80 per cent. of the sugar refining capacity of the Atlantic Coast, or 65 per cent. of the sugar consumed in the United States.[135] There are other cases where a formally constructed Trust is for a time engaged in close effective competition, either with another Trust, as was the position of the Standard Oil Trust over a portion of its markets in the period 1881 to 1884, or with powerful companies not organised as Trusts. This is what Mr. Gunton appears to consider the normal condition of a Trust, one in which competition takes place between a few large bodies of capital instead of between many smaller bodies.[136] Certain Trusts have certainly been compelled to struggle for the retention of their monopoly power over the market. A notorious example is that of the Sugar Trust, which, after a most successful start in 1888, found itself in 1890 face to face with a new and formidable competitor in the shape of the Claus Spreckles refineries of Philadelphia and San Francisco, and was compelled to forego the high profits it had been making and fight for its existence under terms of keenest competition.
But in so far as a Trust stands in this position it has failed to achieve its industrial end of checking "ruinous competition" and the "cutting of prices." It is not in the possession of the chief economies of a Trust so long as it remains at warfare, for it is compelled to expend all that it gains from the enlarged scale of business and from the cessation of competition among its constituent companies upon the strife with its single antagonist. A Trust in this inchoate condition has no special economic character distinguishing it from other large aggregates of competing capital. It is with fully-formed trusts which are able to control prices and regulate to some degree production and profits that we are concerned. An economic Trust has its raison d'être in monopoly. It may not have eliminated all actual competitors, and is generally limited in its power by the possibility of outside opposition, but so far as its power extends it must be able to regulate prices upon non-competitive lines.
§ 11. A large number of different articles have at some stage in their production fallen under the monopoly of a Trust.[137]
As is the case with "corners" and "rings" in the produce market, certain classes of commodities lend themselves more readily than others to the monopoly of Trusts.
There are three classes of industry which more easily than others permit the formation of effective trusts.